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In recent years, building Supply Chain Resilience (SCRES) has gained considerable interest 
as the best way firms can face up to disruptions and gain a competitive advantage. The need 
for more empirical work on SCRES is well expressed in the literature, but there are few prior 
empirical studies on SCRES to date; and their focus has been on the developed world, 
especially Western Europe and North America. Yet, developing countries constitute a 
significant part of the world population and global supply chains; and there is evidence to 
believe that developing countries have also faced disastrous effects of supply chain failures. 
And the current global interconnectedness suggests that such effects can propagate into the 
developed world. Further, while several potential strategies for improving SCRES have been 
proposed in the literature, the relationships between them remain ambiguous, with some 
researchers arguing they are independent and others considering them to be interrelated – 
meaning they could contradict or reinforce each other, potentially affecting SCRES.  
     This thesis presents findings from the case study of a supply network of 20 manufacturing 
firms in the developing country of Uganda, to answer the following related questions: what 
do manufacturing firms in Uganda perceive to be the threats to their supply chains? What 
strategies do they adopt to build resilience? What are the outcomes of implementing these 
strategies? The thesis also investigates how the threats and strategies are interrelated, and 
what it means for SCRES. The findings reveal that the context of a developing country 
characterised, for example, by weak legal controls and social acceptance of certain customs 
and practices can produce threats to SCRES like corruption and dishonest employees that are 
less pronounced in the developed world. It is also found that the threats to SCRES are mainly 
chronic and endogenous events rather than the exogenous discrete, large-scale catastrophic 
events typically emphasised in the literature.  
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     This study initially applies Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) theory to interpret the data, 
which shows how environmental conditions, supply chain threats, and resilience strategies 
are inherently inter-related. This proves to be a useful theory frame – it emerges that the 
systemic nature of the threats to SCRES and of the strategies for dealing with these threats 
clearly produces non-linear and non-stationary outcomes. But it was also found that these 
systemic relationships among threats, strategies and their outcomes are explained by the 
context in which the supply chain is situated. Hence an embeddedness perspective was 
adopted to show that the political, cultural and territorial embeddedness of supply networks in 
a developing country can produce threats or render resilience strategies either ineffective or 
even counterproductive. This study therefore finds that both CAS and embeddedness 
perspectives are needed jointly to explain SCRES – it is embeddedness in a developing 
country that contributes to the phenomenon of “supply chain risk migration”, whereby an 
attempt to mitigate one threat produces another threat and/or shifts the threat to another point 
in the supply network. This portrays resilience as a continual process of supply network 
members responding to chronic and catastrophic events that may be endogenous and/or 
exogenous, and to the outcomes of their own previous responses – not to a specific set of 
structures or practices.  
     These findings have implications for managers wishing to build SCRES. For example, 
managers are informed that supply chain events of continuous possibilities deserve attention. 
Managers are also reminded of the potential migration of threats – they should thus 
understand how threats, strategies and potential outcomes are interconnected. Further, 
managers should understand the contexts in which their supply chains are embedded. 
 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Declaration ................................................................................................................................. ii 
Dedication ................................................................................................................................ iii 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... iv 
Publications ................................................................................................................................ v 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................. xiv 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................ xvi 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  ............................................................................................. 1 
1.1. Research Background and Motivations .............................................................................. 1 
1.2. Objectives and Research Questions: ................................................................................... 4 
1.3. The Study Context – Uganda .............................................................................................. 6 
1.3.1. Brief Overview of Uganda ........................................................................................... 7 
1.3.2. Uganda’s Business Environment: Social, Political and Economic Situation .............. 9 
1.3.3. Uganda’s Export and Import Trade (Outbound and Inbound Supply Chain) ............ 10 
1.3.4. Uganda’s Manufacturing Sector................................................................................. 11 
1.4. Organisation of the Thesis ................................................................................................ 12 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................. 14 
2.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 14 
2.2. Concepts Related to Supply Chain Resilience (SCRES) .................................................. 14 
2.2.1. Supply Chain Risk Management ................................................................................ 20 
ix 
 
2.2.1.1. Categorisation of Supply Chain Risks ................................................................. 22 
2.2.1.2. The Relationship between Supply Chain Risk Management and SCRES .......... 24 
2.2.2. Supply Chain Robustness ........................................................................................... 27 
2.2.3. Supply Chain Vulnerability ........................................................................................ 30 
2.2.5. Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................. 34 
2.3. Defining Supply Chain Resilience (SCRES) .................................................................... 36 
2.4. Analysis of the SCRES literature ...................................................................................... 43 
2.4.1. Key Strategies for Building Supply Chain Resilience ............................................... 50 
2.4.1.1. Increasing Flexibility ........................................................................................... 51 
2.4.1.2. Creating Redundancy .......................................................................................... 52 
2.4.1.3. Supply Chain Collaboration ................................................................................ 53 
2.4.1.4. Supply Chain Agility ........................................................................................... 54 
2.4.1.5. An Assessment of Research on SCRES Strategies ............................................. 55 
2.4.2. Overview of the Empirical Research on SCRES ....................................................... 56 
2.4.3. Use of Theory in the SCRES Literature ..................................................................... 63 
2.4.3.1. An Assessment of the Use of Theory in the SCRES Literature .......................... 64 
2.5. Complex Adaptive Systems: A Proposed Theory Lens for SCRES Research ................. 66 
2.5.1. A CAS Theory Lens: Fit with Supply Chains and the Phenomenon of SCRES ........ 68 
2.6. Conclusion and Summary of the Research Gaps .............................................................. 74 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................... 76 
3.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 76 
x 
 
3.2. Research Methodological Design ..................................................................................... 77 
3.2.1. Research Philosophy: Pragmatism ............................................................................. 77 
3.2.2. Research Approach .................................................................................................... 81 
3.2.3. Research Strategy and Choice: Case Study................................................................ 83 
3.2.4. Techniques and Procedures ........................................................................................ 85 
3.2.4.1. Selection of the Cases .......................................................................................... 85 
3.2.4.2. The Case Study/Interview Protocol ..................................................................... 91 
3.2.4.3. Ethical Concerns .................................................................................................. 91 
3.2.4.4. The Pilot Study .................................................................................................... 92 
3.2.4.5. Data Collection .................................................................................................... 94 
3.2.4.6. The Unit of Analysis............................................................................................ 96 
3.2.4.7. Data Analysis ....................................................................................................... 97 
3.3. Quality of the research design ........................................................................................... 99 
CHAPTER 4: FIRST LEVEL ANALYSIS OF DATA ......................................................... 102 
4.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 102 
4.2. Supply Chain Threats ...................................................................................................... 102 
4.2.1. Exogenous Supply Chain Threats ............................................................................ 104 
4.2.1.1. Geopolitical Threats .......................................................................................... 104 
4.2.1.2 Economic Threats ............................................................................................... 117 
4.2.2. Endogenous Threats ................................................................................................. 123 
4.2.2.1. Supply-Side Threats .......................................................................................... 123 
xi 
 
4.2.2.2. Firm Level Threats ............................................................................................ 133 
4.2.2.3 Demand-Side Threats ......................................................................................... 149 
4.3. Supply Chain Resilience (SCRES) Strategies ................................................................ 157 
4.3.1. Relationship Management Strategies ....................................................................... 158 
4.3.2. Supply Management Strategies ................................................................................ 164 
4.3.3. Demand Management Strategies .............................................................................. 175 
4.3.4. Information Management Strategies ........................................................................ 179 
4.3.5. Product Management Strategies ............................................................................... 183 
4.3.6. Financial Management Strategies ............................................................................ 185 
4.3.7. Human Resource Management Strategies................................................................ 187 
4.4. Outcomes of Implementing SCRES Strategies............................................................... 187 
4.4.1. Outcomes of collaboration with suppliers ................................................................ 190 
4.4.2. Outcomes of Maintaining Strategic Stock ............................................................... 192 
4.4.3. Outcomes of Local Sourcing .................................................................................... 193 
4.4.4. Outcome of Outsourcing .......................................................................................... 194 
4.4.5. Outcome of Using Exclusive Sourcing .................................................................... 195 
4.4.6. Outcomes of Product Recalls ................................................................................... 195 
4.4.7. Outcomes of Effective Credit Management ............................................................. 196 
4.4.8. Outcome of Quality Management ............................................................................ 197 
4.4.9. Outcome of Employee Training ............................................................................... 197 
4.4.10. Outcome of Insurance ............................................................................................ 198 
xii 
 
4.4.11. Outcome of Co-opetition ........................................................................................ 198 
4.4.12. Outcome of Procurement Management.................................................................. 198 
4.5. Concluding Remarks ....................................................................................................... 199 
CHAPTER 5: SECOND LEVEL ANALYSIS: USING CAS AND EMBEDDEDNESS 
THEORY FRAMES .............................................................................................................. 207 
5.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 207 
5.2. The Complex Adaptive Systems Interpretation .............................................................. 207 
5.2.1. Example One –The Threat of Limited Local Supply Market and Successive 
Adaptations......................................................................................................................... 215 
5.2.2. Example Two – The Threat of Dishonest Employees and Successive Adaptations 218 
5.3. The Embeddedness Perspective ...................................................................................... 222 
5.3.1. Embeddedness as Both an Enabler and Inhibitor of SCRES ................................... 232 
5.3.2. Embeddedness Causing Unexpected Adverse Outcomes from SCRES Strategies . 233 
5.3.3. Different Categories of Embeddedness Combining to Produce Threats to SCRES 233 
5.4. Concluding remarks ........................................................................................................ 234 
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS .......................................................... 236 
6.1. Research Contributions ................................................................................................... 236 
6.2. Theoretical Implications ................................................................................................. 244 
6.3. Developing Propositions about Supply Chain Resilience .............................................. 245 
6.4. Implications for Practice ................................................................................................. 247 
6.5. Limitations and Future Research Implications ............................................................... 248 
References .............................................................................................................................. 251 
xiii 
 
APPENDIX 1: Interview Guide ............................................................................................. 282 
APPENDIX 2: Firms' Responses to Each Supply Chain Threat, SCRES Strategy and 
Outcome, Identified from the Data ........................................................................................ 284 
APPENDIX 3: Number of Firms Identifying the Threats, Strategies & Outcomes .............. 289 
APPENDIX 4: Table Showing Links Into And Out Of the Nodes Forming a Network of 
Conditions, Threats, Strategies & Outcomes with Corresponding Data Sources 





















LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1: Categories of Uganda's Manufacturing Firms ........................................................ 12 
Table 2.1: Decisions on the Concepts Related to SCRES ....................................................... 20 
Table 2.2: Examples of Definitions of Supply Chain Risk Manangement .............................. 21 
Table 2.3: Categories of Supply Chain Risks .......................................................................... 23 
Table 2.4:Summary Example of the Literature Indicating that Supply Chain Risk 
Management Enhances SCRES ............................................................................................... 25 
Table 2.5: Definitions of Supply Chain Robustness ................................................................ 27 
Table 2.6: Definitions of Supply Chain Vulnerability ............................................................. 30 
Table 2.7a: Existing Definitions of SCRES from the Literature ............................................. 37 
Table 2.7b: Key Characteristics of Existing SCRES Definitions ............................................ 39 
Table 2.8: Cost Effectiveness as Part of SCRES ..................................................................... 41 
Table 2.9: Summary of Proactive & Reactive SCRES Strategies & Respective Authors ....... 46 
Table 2.10: Overview of Empirical Research on SCRES (Cross-sectional & Longitudinal 
Case Studies & Cross-sectional Surveys ................................................................................. 58 
Table 2.11: Comparison Between the Features of a Complex Adaptive System (CAS), a 
Supply Chain & SCRES .......................................................................................................... 71 
Table 3.1: Profiles of Case Companies in the Network ........................................................... 89 
Table 4.1:Taxonomy of Exogenous & Endogenous Threats to the Supply Chain ................ 103 
Table 4.2: Taxonomy of SCRES Strategies (Higher & Lower Level Categories) ................ 158 
Table 4.3: Outcomes of Implementing SCRES Strategies .................................................... 189 
Table 4.4a: Summary  Count of Endogenous and Exogenous Threats; and Respective 
Number of Respondent Firms from the Data ......................................................................... 201 
Table 4.4b: Number of Threats, Strategies & Outcomes Cited by Each Firm ...................... 202 
xv 
 
Table 4.5: Threats Caused or Compounded by the Ugandan Political, Cultural and 
Geographical Environment .................................................................................................... 204 
Table 5.1: Nodes in the Network of Conditions, Threats, Strategies and Outcomes Ranked 
According to Total number of Links (Sum of Links into & out of the Node) ....................... 208 
Table 5.2: Aspects of Embeddedness Revealed in the Data: Political, Cultural & Territorial 
Embeddedness........................................................................................................................ 227 


















LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1: Map of Africa Showing the Location of Uganda .................................................... 8 
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Model of the Relationship among the Broad Concepts Related to 
SCRES ..................................................................................................................................... 35 
Figure 3.1: Aspects of the Research Design ............................................................................ 77 
Figure 3.2: Formal and Informal Networks of the Firms Studied ........................................... 90 
Figure 4.1: Kinds of Political Instabilities Revealed in the Data ........................................... 105 
Figure 4.2: Combined Factors Form Threat to SCRES ......................................................... 106 
Figure 4.3: Government Policy and its Consequences .......................................................... 109 
Figure 4.4: Corruption and its Effects.................................................................................... 112 
Figure 4.5: Antecedents and Consequences of Product Counterfeiting ................................ 114 
Figure 4.6: The Threat of Communication Barriers and its Consequences ........................... 115 
Figure 4.7: Natural Disasters and their Consequences .......................................................... 116 
Figure 4.8: Antecedents and Consequences of Informal Sector ............................................ 118 
Figure 4.9: Antecedents and Consequences of Unfair Competition ...................................... 119 
Figure 4.10: Antecedents and Consequences of Poor Transport Infrastructure .................... 120 
Figure 4.11: Power Shortages and Associated Threats .......................................................... 122 
Figure 4.12: Consequences of Power Asymmetries (Stronger Suppliers) ............................. 124 
Figure 4.13: Antecedents and Consequences of Poor Quality Raw Materials ...................... 127 
Figure 4.14: Consequences of Dishonest Suppliers ............................................................... 129 
Figure 4.15: Antecedents and Consequences of Raw Material Delays and Shortages .......... 130 
Figure 4.16: Antecedents and Consequences of Machine Breakdowns ................................ 134 
Figure 4.17: Consequences of Product Characteristics.......................................................... 135 
Figure 4.18: Consequences of Owner Management Behaviour ............................................ 137 
xvii 
 
Figure 4.19: Antecedents and Consequences of Dishonest Employees ................................ 138 
Figure 4.20: Consequences of Insufficient Skilled Manpower .............................................. 139 
Figure 4.21: Antecedents and Consequences of Poor Internal Coordination ........................ 141 
Figure 4.22: Antecedents and Consequences of Poor Quality Products ................................ 142 
Figure 4.23: Antecedents and Consequences of Payment Threat (to Suppliers/Labour) ...... 143 
Figure 4.24: Antecedents and Consequences of Financial Difficulties (Focal Firm) ............ 145 
Figure 4.25: Antecedents and Consequences of Procurement Risk ...................................... 146 
Figure 4.26: Antecedents and Consequences of Industrial Disputes ..................................... 147 
Figure 4.27: Antecedents and Consequences of Poor Customer Delivery Performance ....... 148 
Figure 4.28: Antecedents and Consequences of Dishonest Customers/Distributors ............. 151 
Figure 4.29: Antecedents and Consequences of Payment Threat (From Customers) ........... 152 
Figure 4.30: Antecedents and Consequences of Order Cancellations ................................... 154 
Figure 4.31: Antecedents and Consequences of Demand Variations .................................... 155 
Figure 4.32: Antecedents and Consequences of Customer Characteristics ........................... 156 
Figure5.1: Degree Distribution of Links between Nodes ...................................................... 212 
Figure 5.2: A Gephi Software Generated Network of Threats (and Conditions), Strategies and 
Outcomes ............................................................................................................................... 213 
Figure 5.3: Typical Perspective in the Prior Literature on the Relationships between Threats 
and SCRES Strategies, Compared with the Findings of this Study ....................................... 214 
Figure 5.4: Effects of Limited Supply Market on SCRES..................................................... 216 
Figure 5.5: The Threat and Consequences of Dishonest Employees ..................................... 220 
Figure 5.6: A Vicious Cycle - Dishonest Employee Behaviour Constraining other SCRES 
Strategies ................................................................................................................................ 221 




Figure 6.1: Supply Chain Threat Migration Matrix in the Continual Process of Creating 









1.1. Research Background and Motivations 
The contemporary wave of globalisation and increased interdependence of firms have shown 
that companies can no longer compete in isolation of other entities in their supply chains – 
competition is no longer between companies but supply chains (Cabral et al., 2012). This 
interconnectedness has increased the vulnerability of firms to disruptive events at any point in 
their supply chains (Pereira et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2015a; Levalle & Nof, 2015).  
     Managing disruptions from supply chain threats has therefore gained a considerable 
interest in the field of supply chain management (Hohenstein et al., 2015; Das & Lashkari, 
2015; Kim et al., 2015a); and recent research has emphasised the importance of Supply Chain 
Resilience (SCRES) for effectively surviving the adverse effects of disruptive events (e.g. 
Carvalho et al., 2012; Xiao et al., 2012; Brandon-Jones et al., 2014; Das & Lashkari, 2015). It 
has been recently reported, for example, that more than 80% of companies are concerned 
about the resilience of their supply chains (World Economic Forum, 2013). SCRES is based 
on the premise that not all risks are avoidable (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; Hohenstein et al., 
2015), and by building resilience, firms can manage disruptions to their supply chains and 
continue delivering goods and services to customers (Ambulkar et al., 2015; Scholten & 
Schilder, 2015). A full consensus on a definition of SCRES is not yet reached (Scholten et al., 
2014; Kim et al., 2015a), but most researchers agree that it is concerned with a supply chain’s 
readiness, effective response to, and recovery from a disruption – recovering to the previous 
level or, preferably, a better level of operational performance (Carvalho et al., 2014; 
Hohenstein et al., 2015).  
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The need for more research on the phenomenon of SCRES has been recently emphasised 
in the operations and supply chain management literature (Pereira et al., 2014; Ambulkar et 
al., 2015; Hohenstein et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2015a; Scholten & Schilder, 2015). But to date, 
few empirical studies on SCRES have been reported in the literature (Scholten & Schilder, 
2015); and there is a noticeable limited use of theory frames to improve our understanding of 
SCRES. Further, the available empirical studies on SCRES were mainly conducted in 
Western Europe and North America (e.g. Zsidisin & Wagner, 2010; Gölgeci & Ponomarov, 
2014; Scholten & Schilder, 2015), leaving developing countries severely underrepresented. 
Yet developing countries, which constitute a significant part of global supply chains and the 
world’s population, have similarly experienced the devastating effects of supply chain 
failures (Chika et al., 2011). For example, it was reported that the infiltration of counterfeits 
to pharmaceutical supply chains led to the death of 2,500 people in 1995 and 192,000 people 
in 2001 in Nigeria and China, respectively (Chan et al., 2010).  Similarly, in 2011, during the 
Arab Spring, Uganda suffered a severe fuel crisis and raw material shortage that disrupted the 
production and delivery of many goods and services. This sparked massive country-wide 
protests, and was followed by a violent police crackdown that led to many injuries and 
fatalities (The Independent, 2011). Such events illustrate the vulnerability of supply networks 
in developing countries and the severity of the outcomes when they fail.  
We should therefore be concerned with the resilience of developing world supply chains 
because, in a globally-connected world, their failure has repercussions elsewhere (Diabat et 
al., 2012; Pereira et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2015a; Levalle & Nof, 2015), as developing 
countries are often either the sources of basic manufactured goods and raw materials for the 
developed world, or destination markets for products from the developed world. Moreover, 




     Further, the literature has presented many possible strategies for improving the resilience 
of supply chains, such as increasing flexibility and creating redundancy. But there is a 
noticeable lack of research on the relationships between the various strategies. Some scholars 
consider these strategies to be independent (Sheffi & Rice, 2005; Zsidisin & Wagner, 2010); 
but others argue that they are interrelated (e.g. Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; Ponis & Koronis, 
2012; Johnson et al., 2013), with their outcomes either complementing or contradicting each 
other. An example is where it is argued that supply chain collaboration and redundant 
resources/spare capacity facilitate flexibility (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; Scholten & Schilder, 
2015), while it is also argued that close collaborative relationships can either conflict with 
some aspects of flexibility (Stevenson & Spring, 2007; Scholten & Schilder, 2015), or lead to 
confidentiality threats emanating from sharing sensitive information (Jüttner & Maklan, 
2011). This suggests that the relationships between SCRES strategies and their 
implementation outcomes should be investigated. And given that supply chains have been 
described as “complex adaptive systems”, exhibiting features such as non-linearity, 
coevolution, self-organisation and emergence (Choi et al., 2001; Surana et al., 2005; Day, 
2014), it logically becomes important to study resilience systemically – investigating the 
inter-relationships between supply chain threats, resilience strategies, and outcomes – rather 
than analysing them individually and separately. This systemic analysis has not been done in 
prior empirical work on SCRES and although complex adaptive systems theory has been 
proposed in the literature as an appropriate lens for understanding SCRES (e.g. Day, 2014), it 
has not been applied in empirical studies before to ascertain how it could actually help to 






1.2. Objectives and Research Questions: 
The above background shows there is clear motivation to conduct more empirical research on 
SCRES in a developing country context – it has been shown that developing countries which 
have been largely neglected, also suffer severe effects of disrupted supply chains. Moreover, 
the cultural, economic and other differences that exist between developed and developing 
countries suggest that perceptions and responses to threats may differ between the two 
contexts. Meanwhile, differences in levels of economic and political maturity and the quality 
of infrastructure may suggest certain developing countries are more vulnerable to certain 
disruptions than more mature, developed countries. Thus, it is important to understand what it 
means to be resilient for supply chains in these developing countries. Considering the 
argument that the inter-relationships between threats, strategies and outcomes should be 
analysed systemically rather than individually and separately to reflect the current framing of 
a supply chain as a Complex Adaptive System (CAS), this study aims to address two related 
research questions outlined below.  
Research questions 
RQ1: What are the elements of supply chain resilience in a developing country? 
a) What do manufacturing firms in Uganda perceive to be the threats to their 
supply chains? 
b) What strategies do they adopt to build resilience to these threats? 
c) What are the outcomes of implementing these strategies? 
RQ2:  How are threats and strategies interconnected with the outcomes? 
     a)   What does this interconnectedness mean for supply chain resilience? 
 
 
From the literature in Chapter 2, it will be shown that SCRES is a complex adaptive 
system phenomenon (e.g. Hearnshaw & Wilson, 2013; Day, 2014). Further, it will be 
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established that SCRES research is still in its infancy with limited focus on the context of 
developing countries, which differs from that of developed countries as already mentioned 
above, with potential implications for SCRES. Against this backdrop, this thesis adopts a case 
study approach, conducting interviews across a supply network of 20 manufacturing firms in 
the developing country of Uganda, to address the above research questions. The case study 
approach has been found suited to conducting research on such an emerging complex 
phenomenon and in such a unique context as suggested by Stuart et al. (2002). By studying a 
network of firms, this thesis concurs with the notion that SCRES is a network level 
phenomenon, whose appropriate unit of analysis should be a network rather than individual 
firms, as recently advocated by Kim et al. (2015a).  
Uganda was deemed suitable for this study because evidence shows that like other 
developing countries, it has experienced disastrous effects of supply chain disruptions. As 
will be shown in section 1.3, the Ugandan environment could be a suspect in contributing to 
threats to the resilience of supply networks located there. It has been acknowledged, for 
example, that Uganda’s business environment is constrained by a poor work ethic, 
institutional weaknesses, infrastructural bottlenecks, policy changes, crime, theft and 
disorder, power outages, limited access to finance, weak legal system, political instabilities,  
inadequacy of technology readiness  and corruption (Mawejje, 2013). There are also reported 
socially accepted practices that facilitate dishonest behaviour between buyers and suppliers 
like product adulteration and counterfeiting, deliberate delivery failures and deliberate supply 
of poor quality products (Ntayi et al., 2012) – these are suspected to cause disruptions to the 
functioning of supply chains. 
This thesis answers the first research question by developing taxonomies of threats, 
strategies and outcomes (in Chapter 4). This chapter finds that there are threats and 
conditions unique to a developing country context, which affects resilience. To address the 
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second question (in Chapter 5),  Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) theory is applied 
qualitatively to account for how an intervention in the process of building resilience produces 
unexpected, successive adaptations within the supply chain that require further intervention. 
This produces non-linear inter-relationships between threats, strategies and outcomes. 
However, it also emerges that it is important to understand the role of the political, 
geographical and cultural context in which the supply chain is located, if we are to explain 
why and how such inter-relationships occur. Thus, an embeddedness framework is also 
adopted to supplement CAS.  
The concept of embeddedness was founded by Polanyi (1944) and later re-visited by 
Granovetter (1985). The basic idea behind embeddedness is that economic actions and 
behaviour are constrained or facilitated by their relationships with other economic and non-
economic actors whether voluntarily or involuntarily (e.g. Granovetter, 1985). Various 
categories of embeddedness have been suggested including cultural, political and territorial 
embeddedness (e.g. Hess, 2004) – these three have been found especially relevant for this 
study. Many of the inter-relationships between threats, strategies and outcomes identified 
from the data were caused by Uganda’s distinct political, geographical and cultural 
environment in which the supply networks were situated. A more detailed discussion on 
embeddedness will be provided in Chapter 5, since it was not the original guiding theoretical 
framework, but only emerged from the data to supplement CAS theory – it later emerged that 
the CAS perspective could not, on its own, help to interpret the data appropriately.   
1.3. The Study Context – Uganda  
The section describes the study context i.e. the developing country of Uganda. It is suspected 
that the context of a developing country might have an important influence on SCRES. 
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Understanding this context is therefore expected to improve analysis of data and 
interpretation of the case study findings in the later Chapters 4 and 5, for example, in terms of 
identifying which points can be considered important. The need to describe the context within 
this case study research arises from the fact that although it is acknowleged that case studies 
are beneficial for allowing examination of the context and its relevance, the context is 
different from case study data in a sense that data is collected from part of the wider context 
and it is important to understand whether it is representative of that context. The case study 
data collected is more in-depth and specific but this section provides a more general view and 
can, for example, guide on which findings should be given emphasis during data analysis and 
interpretation of the findings. 
1.3.1. Brief Overview of Uganda 
Uganda is a developing, landlocked country located in Eastern Africa – bordered to the north 
by South Sudan, to the west by the Democratic Republic of Congo, to the southwest by 
Rwanda, to the south by Tanzania and to the east by Kenya. Most of these neigbouring 
countries have recently encountered or are still encountering significant political instabilities. 
In the past two decades, Uganda has achieved sustained economic growth, with GDP 
growing at an average annual rate of 7.1% from 1992 to 2011, making it the third highest 
growth rate recorded in Sub-Saharan Africa during this period (UNDP, 2013). In the financial 
year 2013/14, Uganda’s GDP stood at $ 26,505 million. However, this is just about 1% and 
0.2% of the GDPs of the UK and USA respectively (World Bank, 2015).  It also reported that 
the country experienced a decline in growth in the financial year 2013/14, with its growth rate 
only standing at 4.5% of GDP, which is below the average annual growth rate of 7.1% of 
GDP – a decline of 2.6%. This decline, especially in the manufacturing sector, was attributed 
to demand and supply factors, including high interest rates and market disruptions caused by 
uncertainty resulting from political instability in South Sudan (World Bank Report, 2015). 
8 
 
     Uganda lies astride the Equator between longitudes 29 ½° East and 35° East and between 
latitudes 4 ½° North and ½° South, at an average altitude of 1,100 meters above sea- level, 
occupying a total area of  about 241,550.7 square kilometres – about 18% of which is open 
inland waters and wetlands (UNDP, 2013). The rest of the land cover is estimated at about 
38% agricultural land, followed by grassland (22 %), forests 11%, bush land 10% and built-
up areas 2% (Uganda Bureau of Statistics  Report, 2014). Uganda has a total population of 
about 34.9 million people, a population density of about 174 persons per square kilometre 
(Uganda Bureau Of Statistics  Report, 2014), a  GDP per capita of  $759, and about 19.7% of 
the population is below the poverty line (World Bank report, 2015). The map of Africa below 
illustrates the location of Uganda.  
 
 





1.3.2. Uganda’s Business Environment: Social, Political and Economic Situation 
The services sector is the major contributor to Uganda’s GDP (i.e. 48%), followed by 
agriculture (26.2%), with the manufacturing sector contributing only 18.4% to the GDP 
(World Bank Report, 2015). In the developed countries such as the UK and USA, the services 
sector contributes about 80% and 78% of GDP respectively, followed by the manufacturing 
sector contributing 20% and 21% of GDP respectively, while agriculture contributes only 
about 1% of GDP in both economies (World Bank, 2015). Recent studies have shown that 
Uganda’s business environment has been deteriorating over time, especially in terms of 
infrastructure, institutions, and the general macroeconomic environment (Mawejje, 2013). 
This is further revealed in Uganda’s competitiveness ranking which shows that the Ugandan 
business environment deteriorated to 123 in 2013 from 108 in 2009 – a decline that is largely 
attributed to factors such as insufficient education and skills (UNDP, 2013). Uganda’s 
business environment is further constrained by a poor work ethic, institutional weaknesses, 
infrastructural bottlenecks e.g. transport and telecommunication, a lack of innovation, policy 
changes, crime, theft and disorder, power outages, customs and trade regulations, unstable 
taxation system, limited access to finance, unfair competitive practices by the informal sector, 
weak legal system, macro-economic instabilities, political instabilities,  inadequacy of 
technology readiness  and corruption (Mawejje, 2013). A weak legal system for example is 
reportedly caused by a lack of political will where the government is not willing to fight 
vague legal definitions and where legal institutions have been undermined through political 
interference, bribery, underfunding, harassment and, and threats to prosecutors and witnesses 
(Human Right Watch Report, 2013). 
     Uganda has consistently been ranked as one of the more corrupt countries in the world, 
and this has been mainly attributed to politics of patronage and interference with the rule of 
law (Mbabazi &Yu, 2015). Transparency International ranks countries according to their 
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relative perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 
(very clean), also known as the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The 2014 CPI which 
included 175 countries rated Uganda at 29 out of 100, ranking it 142
nd
 out of 175 countries 
(Transparency International Report, 2014). Further, dishonest behaviours such as connivance 
and deliberate failure to fulfil promises are common in Uganda’s commercial transactions, 
which adversely affect buyer-supplier transactions, e.g. by influencing contract enforcement 
behaviour (Ntayi et al., 2011). For example, it is reported that employees in Uganda value 
their social identity more than professional standards; and consequently, it is such social 
relations and cohesion that facilitate dishonest behaviour between buyers and suppliers (Ntayi 
et al., 2012). This may include adulterating products by adding sand and stones to increase 
the weight, mixing good quality with poor quality products, refusing to pay post-delivery, 
accepting advance payment from one buyer before selling the product to another, suppliers’ 
colluding to supply sub-standard and fake items, and failing to adhere to delivery schedules 
intentionally (Ntayi et al., 2012). The dishonest behaviour of suppliers, customers and 
employees and the effect of social cohesions together with some of the contextual factors 
highlighted above will later emerge as important aspects of the case study findings. 
 
 1.3.3. Uganda’s Export and Import Trade (Outbound and Inbound Supply Chain) 
Uganda’s exports are significantly increasing but the imports bill significantly exceeds export 
receipts, leading to persistent trade deficits – a scenario that is compounded by the fact that 
Uganda mainly exports low value unprocessed agricultural products compared to imports of 
high value manufactured products (Uganda Bureau Of Statistics Report, 2014). Agricultural 
products constitute the largest proportion of Uganda’s exports (i.e. 37.61%), followed by 
manufactured products (i.e. 26.73%), marine products (i.e. 7.4%) and minerals (i.e. 2.82%). 
Manufactured/processed exports include fish and fish products, petroleum products, cement, 
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sugar & sugar confectionary, iron and steel, hides and skins, soap, beer and mineral water 
(Uganda Bureau of Statistics Report, 2014).  
     The main destination for Uganda’s exports is the Common Market of Eastern and 
Southern African states (COMESA) which accounts for close to 50% of the total export 
value. This is followed by European Union, accounting for over 23% and the Middle East 
accounting for over 8% of total export value (Uganda Export Promotions Board, 2010). The 
highest value imports include petroleum and petroleum products followed by road vehicles, 
medical and pharmaceutical products, iron and steel, and cereals. The main source of 
Uganda’s imports is Asia especially India and China (55.3%). This is followed by Africa 
(17.3%), the EU (11.7%), the Middle East (10.2%), North America (2.5%) and other 
European countries (1.5%) (Uganda Bureau of Statistics Report, 2014). The above discussion 
shows that supply chains in Uganda extend globally. This suggests the consequences of 
supply chain disruptions in Uganda can be felt elsewhere, including in the developed world – 
reinforcing the need to investigate the resilience of supply chains in this developing country 
context.  
 
1.3.4. Uganda’s Manufacturing Sector  
Uganda’s manufacturing sector is steadily growing and highly promoted by the government – 
its contribution to the economy increased by 2.8%, contributing 18.4% to the GDP in the 
financial year 2013/14 (World Bank report, 2015). Manufacturing in Uganda is heavily 
reliant on imported materials and is faced with challenges like the dominance of the informal 
sector, financial constraints and high interest rates, inadequate transportation and logistics 
infrastructure, poor telecommunication, corruption, weak institutions, inadequate skills, 
power shortages and reliance on imports of petroleum products (Obwona et al., 2014). The 




Table 1.1: Categories of Uganda's Manufacturing Firms 
 
Major category Sub-categories 
Food Products  
 
Manufacture of meat and meat products, processing & preserving of fish & 
fish products, manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats, manufacture 
of dairy products, coffee processing,  manufacture of grain milling products,  
manufacture of prepared animal feeds, tea processing,  manufacture of bakery 
products and manufacture of Sugar.  
Drinks and Tobacco  Manufacture of malt liquors and malt, manufacture of soft drinks  and 
manufacture of Tobacco Products 
Textiles, Clothing and 
Footwear 
Cotton ginning, manufacture of made-up textiles & wearing apparel, 
manufacture of leather & foot wear  
Paper Products  Sawmilling, paper & paper products, printing & publishing  
Chemicals, Paint, Soap 
& Foam Products 
Manufacture of paint and varnishes, manufacture of pharmaceuticals, 
manufacture of soap & chemical products and manufacture of 
mattresses  
Bricks & Cement  Manufacture of bricks and ceramic products,  manufacture of cement, lime 
and other articles of cement  
Metal & Related 
Products 
Manufacture of basic iron and steel, manufacture of structural metal products, 
other metal products  
Miscellaneous Products Manufacture of plastic products, manufacture of furniture 
Source: Adapted from UBOS report (2014). 
1.4. Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of six chapters as outlined below: 
     Chapter 1 has presented a brief background and motivation for the study. This includes 
highlighting the gaps in the literature that need to be addressed through answering two related 
research questions, which are also outlined. This chapter has also briefly highlighted how the 
stated research questions will be addressed, including the choice of the study context and the 
theoretical frameworks that are used in interpreting the findings. Finally, a brief description 
of the study context of Uganda is provided, in order to gain understanding of the broader 
study environment and enhance the interpretation of findings. Uganda’s political 
environment, economic environment, socio-cultural environment, outbound and inbound 
supply chains as well as the manufacturing sector are briefly described.  
     Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive review of the SCRES literature to date, including the 
broad related concepts like supply chain risk management, supply chain robustness, supply 
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chain security and supply chain vulnerability. This positions the thesis in the context of 
previous research. This chapter further analyses the available different definitions of SCRES 
and develops a more comprehensive working definition. SCRES strategies are discussed and 
prior empirical work is analysed in terms of the research focus, method, theory used and the 
country/context. The research gaps to be addressed are identified and CAS theory is 
presented and justified as an appropriate lens for the study of SCRES.  
     Chapter 3 follows to describe the research methodological design applied in this thesis. 
This chapter includes discussion and justification of the methodological choices made in this 
study.  
     Chapter 4 then presents the first level analysis of case study data. This level of analysis is 
more detailed and aims to develop a category structure from the data, where taxonomies of 
supply chain threats, resilience strategies and outcomes that emerge from the data are 
discussed. This chapter addresses the first research question and also makes some conclusive 
remarks that provide a springboard for Chapter 5. 
     Chapter 5 follows with the second more integrative level of analysis using CAS and 
embeddedness theory frames to explain the relationships between supply chain threats, 
resilience strategies and outcomes; and in the process interprets what such interrelationships 
mean for SCRES. This chapter constitutes the study’s main attempt at theory building. 
     Finally, Chapter 6 provides conclusions and discussion, which include the contributions of 











This chapter presents a critical review of the relevant literature and identifies the existing 
research gaps that need to be addressed. Note: Part of this chapter – a systematic literature 
review paper was published in the International Journal of Production Research. This chapter 
will try to show how limited the current understanding of SCRES is, conceptually and 
empirically. Perhaps most obviously, it is focussed almost entirely on developed economies – 
while the worst experiences of disrupted and corrupted supply chains exist in the developing 
world. Further, the contradictions regarding the relationships among the suggested SCRES 
strategies and the limited use of theory frames that would help to improve understanding in 
empirical work will be revealed. The chapter begins with the main concepts related to SCRES 
in order to contextualise the study in the wider related literature – concepts such as supply 
chain risk management (in 2.2.1), supply chain robustness (in 2.2.2), supply chain 
vulnerability (in 2.2.3) and supply chain security (in 2.2.4)  will also be discussed. 
      The rest of the chapter proceeds with defining SCRES (2.3), analysing SCRES literature 
(2.4), key Strategies for building SCRES (2.4.1), an overview of empirical work on SCRES 
(2.4.2), use of theory (2.4.3), Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) theory (2.5); and finally, 
conclusion and summary of the research gaps (2.6). 
2.2. Concepts Related to Supply Chain Resilience (SCRES) 
The concept of SCRES is closely related to other broad concepts which are often highlighted 
and /or discussed in the SCRES literature. While some of these concepts encapsulate threats 
of supply chain disruption e.g. supply chain uncertainty and supply chain vulnerability, others 
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encapsulate responses to such threats e.g. supply chain risk management, supply chain 
security and supply chain robustness. The term supply chain robustness, for example, is at 
times either used interchangeably with SCRES (e.g. Christopher & Rutherford 2004; Zhang 
et al., 2011; Spiegler, et al., 2012), or considered a component of SCRES (Christopher & 
Rutherford, 2004;Wieland & Wallenburg, 2013; Yang & Xu, 2015). Other scholars have 
argued that creating supply chain robustness is one of the strategies for enhancing SCRES 
(e.g. Tang, 2006b; Vlajic et al., 2012); while others suggest robust supply chains can be 
achieved by reducing vulnerability and improving resilience (Vlachos et al., 2012). Also, 
ensuring supply chain security has been identified as a way of managing security-related 
supply chain risk (Marucheck et al., 2011; Yang &Wei, 2013). Some of the concepts related 
to SCRES are relatively well established research fields in their own rights and are 
consequently more mature than SCRES. It is argued for example that SCRES emerged from 
supply chain risk management (Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009). Further, some of these 
concepts can appear confusing – they can sometimes be used interchangeably e.g. supply 
chain uncertainty and supply chain risk (Ekwall, 2010; Sodhi et al., 2012). Hence, it is logical 
that a more profound understanding of SCRES can be gained from a clear understanding of 
these closely related areas.  
     SCRES related concepts that encapsulate threat can, for example, help us to answer the 
fundamental question of “Supply chain resilience against what”? This is important because 
the existing SCRES research has focused on high-profile catastrophic, discrete events (Jüttner 
& Maklan, 2011; Johnson et al., 2013; Urciuoli et al., 2014; Scholten et al., 2014; Saenz & 
Revilla, 2014;Yang & Xu, 2015). This is perhaps because the idea of SCRES emerged 
following such large scale exogenous events (Spiegler, 2013) – it is observed from the 
literature that research specifically on the concept of SCRES can be traced back to the early 
2000s when the earliest definitions were coined. This was triggered by large scale discrete 
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catastrophic events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks (e.g. Rice & Caniato, 2003; Christopher 
& Peck, 2004). Nevertheless, recent research has acknowledged that SCRES can also be 
relevant to smaller but much more frequent chronic disruptions (e.g. Carvalho et al., 2014; 
Ambulkar et al., 2015). Thus, the more general answer could, for example, be that supply 
chains should be resilient against disruptions (e.g. Brandon-Jones et al., 2014; Ambulkar et 
al., 2015). But SCRES literature considers supply chain disruption to be interwoven with 
other concepts such as supply chain risk and supply chain vulnerability (Jüttner & Maklan, 
2011). For example, some scholars have defined supply chain risks as anything that may 
disrupt the flows of information, materials or products along the supply chain (Peck, 2006). 
Moreover, supply chain disruption has been portrayed as a form of supply chain risk (Tang, 
2006a; Manuj & Mentzer, 2008; Deane et al., 2009; Zsidisin & Wagner, 2010; Singhal et al., 
2011; Chen et al., 2013; Wakolbinger & Cruz, 2011). And supply chain vulnerability is also 
at times regarded as a risk factor (Lavastre et al., 2012). Further, Peck (2006) claimed that 
when something is at risk, it means it is vulnerable. Jüttner & Maklan (2011) added that when 
the vulnerability of a certain supply chain is addressed, its risks are also addressed.  Likewise, 
constructs such as risk, uncertainty, disruption and disaster in supply chains have often been 
used interchangeably (Singhal et al., 2011).  
     The other two concepts that have been linked to SCRES are: Business Continuity Planning 
and Crisis management (Macdonald, 2008). These concepts are also relatively more 
established research fields than SCRES. The following sub-sections present a more detailed 
discussion of the SCRES related concepts introduced above. We first begin with brief 
overviews of Business Continuity Planning, crisis management and supply chain uncertainty 
– concepts which will not receive any further detailed consideration throughout the thesis.  
Later, Table 2.1 provides reasons why some of the above concepts will or will not be 
discussed further. This will be followed by a more detailed discussion of four related 
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concepts i.e. supply chain vulnerability, supply chain risk management, supply chain 
robustness and supply chain security. 
 
 Business Continuity Planning and Crisis Management  
The Business Continuity Institute (2011) defines business continuity management as “a 
holistic management process that identifies potential threats to an organization and the 
impacts to business operations those threats, if realized, might cause, and which provides a 
framework for building organizational resilience with the capability of an effective response 
that safeguards the interests of its key stakeholders, reputation, brand and value‐creating 
activities”. Blos et al. (2009) argued that business continuity management training (which is 
part of business continuity planning) is important in supply chain risk management and 
reduction of supply chain disruptions. Similarly, Rice and Caniato (2003) argued that 
business continuity planning means developing plans to prepare for, respond to and restore 
operations following the occurrence of unexpected disruptive phenomena. More specifically, 
Macdonald (2008) observed that both business continuity planning and crisis management 
are related to SCRES.  Coombs (2007) defined a crisis as a potential threat to the organisation 
and crisis management as a process designed to prevent or lessen the damage a crisis can 
inflict on an organisation and its stake holders. Crisis management is meant to facilitate 
organizations in overcoming the outbreak of threats in order to be able to survive in the 
market (Leung & Lam, 2004). From the foregoing explanations and in accordance with the 
observation by previous scholars (e.g. Macdonald, 2008), it is clear that business continuity 
planning and crisis management apply more specifically to organisations or events in general 
than they do to supply chains. This thesis focusses on analysing the resilience of a network of 
firms and not of individual firms in isolation – the phenomena to be studied such as threats to 
resilience involve connections between firms as either suppliers or customers. Hence, 
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business continuity planning and crisis management as organisational rather than supply 
chain level constructs are not within the scope of this study.  
 
 Supply Chain Uncertainty 
Some previous researchers have attempted to distinguish between risk and uncertainty (e.g. 
Spekman & Davis, 2004; Simangunsong et al., 2012). However, others have maintained that 
the distinction is unclear and unnecessary (Jüttner et al., 2003; Tang & Musa, 2011). For 
example, Tang & Musa (2011) argued that risk and uncertainty in supply chains are hard to 
distinguish and their definitions remain vague. The multidisciplinary nature of the concept of 
uncertainty and the difficulty of clearly defining it was also acknowledged by Carey & 
Lawson (2011). Ritchie and Brindley (2007) asserted that the concepts of risk and uncertainty 
are quite often interchangeably used.  Moreover, scholars who believe that the two concepts 
differ also appear to be inconsistent. For instance, Simangunsong et al. (2012) considered 
supply chain uncertainty as a broader term that incorporates risk and claimed that unlike risk 
which has only negative consequences, uncertainty may either have negative or positive 
consequences. This position seems to contradict previous scholars such as Tummala and 
Schoenherr (2011) who argued that risk is associated with an undesirable loss – arguing that 
such a loss is in the form of unwanted negative consequences and uncertainty. Blome and 
Schoenherr (2011) added that environmental uncertainty can be mitigated through risk 
management. It is further argued that decision making under conditions of uncertainty may be 
perceived as high risk (Ritchie and Brindley, 2007) which further demonstrates the closeness 
of these concepts – meaning uncertainty is an ingredient of risk.  
     Ritchie & Brindley (2007) explained that risk consequences are not only negative but can 
as well be positive to justify the existence of risk taking for potential gain. Similarly, Rao & 
Goldsby (2009) argued that risk entails not only the down side possible consequences but 
also upside possibilities in terms of higher performance expectations – emphasising that risk 
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must fulfil two concurrent conditions of both exposure and uncertainty. Ritchie and Brindley 
(2007) also added that variations from the expected level or target level whether positive or 
negative have an influence on the measurement of risk. Likewise, Cagliano et al. (2012) 
borrowed from the previous literature to state that both undesirable and desirable unexpected 
outcomes are incorporated in defining risk.  Drawing from the existing literature, 
Simangunsong et al. (2012) further realised that, both risk mitigation and coping with 
uncertainty, share the same viewpoint. It is also believed that the sources of risk are the same 
sources of uncertainty (Lavastre et al., 2012; Simangunsong et al., 2012). Waters (2007) 
differentiates between risk and uncertainty only on the basis of probability of their occurrence 
by claiming that unlike uncertainty, the likelihood of risk can be estimated. 
     The above brief overview demonstrates that the distinction between risk and uncertainty is 
not only insignificant but also still elusive. Therefore, for the purposes of this study and 
consistent with other scholars (e.g. Jüttner, 2005; Spekman & Davis, 2004; Waters, 2007; 
Cagliano et al., 2012; Ekwall, 2010; Rao & Goldsby, 2009; Christopher et al., 2011; 
Tummala & Schoenherr, 2011; Pfohl et al., 2010), supply chain risk is addressed as having a 
negative connotation in the first place, thereby justifying the reason as to why supply chains 
should be resilient against it.  Both supply chain risk and supply chain uncertainty arguably 
lead to or compound supply chain vulnerability and disruption that require constructing 
resilient supply chains (e.g. Cardoso et al., 2015). A summary of the SCRES related concepts 
and the reasons for or against addressing them in further details in this study is shown in 











Reason Example references 
Business continuity 
planning 
Not addressed Applies more at an 
organisational level 
Macdonald ( 2008 ) 
Crisis management Not addressed Applies more at an 
organisational level 




with supply chain risk 
Synonymous with 
supply chain risk 
Tang (2006a); Manuj & 
Mentzer (2008); 
Wakolbinger & Cruz 
(2011); Zsidisin & 
Wagner (2010); Singhal 
et al. (2011) 
Supply chain risk 
management 




Addressed Related Christopher & Peck 
(2004); Tang (2006b) 
Supply chain security Addressed Related  Barksh & Kleindorfer 
(2009); Zhang et al. 





with supply chain risk  
Trivially  different  
from supply chain 
risk in the context 
of this study 
Jüttner et al. (2003);  
Singhal et al. (2011), 
Simangunsong et al. 




Addressed Related Closs & McGarrell 
(2004); Speier et al. 
(2011) 
 
Table 2.1 above shows four concepts are to be discussed further in the sub-sections that 
follow – to explore their relationships with SCRES. The concepts are: supply chain risk 
management, supply chain vulnerability, supply chain robustness and supply chain security. 
Further, in order to maintain the discussion within the scope of the study – as these are 
distinct broad research areas in their own right – we shall focus only on the aspects that relate 
them to SCRES.   
 
2.2.1. Supply Chain Risk Management 
There is not yet any consensus on the definition of supply chain risk (e.g. Peck, 2006; Ho et 
al., 2015). For example, Ho et al. (2015) defined supply chain risk as ‘the likelihood and 
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impact of unexpected macro and/or micro level events or conditions that adversely influence 
any part of a supply chain leading to operational, tactical, or strategic level failures or 
irregularities’. Like SCRES, supply chain risk management is considered a relatively new 
discipline (Juttner et al., 2003; Ritchie & Brindley, 2007; Trkman & McCormack, 2009; 
Tummala & Schoenherr, 2011; Sodhi, et al., 2012; Ghadge et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2013). 
Supply chain risk management has emerged at the confluence of two relatively well 
established concepts i.e. supply chain management and risk management (Christopher & Lee, 
2004). Christopher et al. (2011) established that the majority of companies do not have 
structured supply chain risk management systems. Other researchers have commented on the 
lack of empirical studies on supply chain risk management (e.g. Tang & Musa, 2011; Sodhi 
et al., 2012), and on the lack of general consensus on how to define supply chain risk 
management (e.g. Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009; Sodhi, et al., 2012). Some of the different 
definitions suggested are outlined in Table 2.2.  
 




Carter & Rogers 
(2008) 
Supply chain risk management is “the ability of a firm to understand and manage 
its economic, environmental, and social risks in the supply chain” which is 
possible through adoption of contingency planning and creating  resilient and 
agile supply chains 
Ho et al. (2015) Supply chain risk management is ‘an inter-organisational collaborative endeavour 
utilising quantitative and qualitative risk management methodologies to identify, 
evaluate, mitigate and monitor unexpected macro and micro level events or 
conditions, which might adversely impact any part of a supply chain 
Juttner  (2005), 
Juttner et al. 
(2003) 
 Supply chain risk management  is the identification and management of risk for 
the supply chain through a coordinated approach among supply chain members to 
reduce supply chain vulnerability as a whole 
Manuj & Mentzer 
(2008) 
Global supply chain risk management is the identification and evaluation of risks 
and consequent losses in the global supply chain, and implementation of 
appropriate strategies through a coordinated approach among supply chain 
members with the objective of reducing one or more of the following – losses, 
probability, speed of event, speed of losses, the time for detection of the events, 
frequency, or exposure – for supply chain outcomes that in turn lead to close 
matching of actual cost savings and profitability with those desired 
Tang (2006a) Supply chain risk management is the management of supply chain risks through 
coordination or collaboration among the supply chain partners so as to ensure 




Most of the above definitions in table 2.2 have included important aspects necessary for 
building SCRES like identification, evaluation, mitigation and monitoring of supply chain 
risk events or conditions (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008; Ho et al., 2015). These aspects can, for 
example, be important in the preparation phase of SCRES. Other relevant variables identified 
in the above definitions include collaboration and coordination (Jüttner et al., 2003; Jüttner, 
2005; Tang 2006a; Manuj & Mentzer, 2008; Ho et al., 2015), ensuring continuity (Tang, 
2006a), reducing vulnerability (Jüttner et al., 2003; Jüttner, 2005), contingency planning and 
supply chain agility (Carter & Rogers, 2008). All the above have been acknowledged as 
critical antecedents of SCRES (e.g. Christopher & Peck, 2004; Pettit et al., 2010; Jüttner & 
Maklan, 2011). 
2.2.1.1. Categorisation of Supply Chain Risks  
Some researchers have argued that in order to develop appropriate supply chain risk 
management approaches, risks should be identified and categorised in some way (e.g. 
Habermann, 2009; Schlegel & Trent, 2012). Similarly, SCRES researchers have 
acknowledged that categorising supply chain risks is important because there may be suitable 
resilience strategies for specific categories (Spiegler, 2013). Indeed, Pettit et al. (2010) 
contended that the desired level of resilience is achieved when there is a match between 
vulnerabilities and corresponding capabilities. However, it is not well known how broadly 
applicable some SCRES strategies are, i.e. whether they are suitable for dealing with a wide 
range of threats. If so, it may be these that are favoured by managers in practice. But it may 
be, for example, that some strategies increase resilience to one threat but increase 
susceptibility or vulnerability to another (Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015).  For example, it is 
argued that maintaining redundant resources to increase flexibility in mitigating disruptions 
may produce a liquidity risk (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011).  
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     To date, there is no consensus on the most appropriate way of categorising supply chain 
risks. For example, some have grouped risks in relation to the supply chain in question e.g. 
according to whether they are external to the supply chain, internal to the supply chain but 
external to the focal firm and whether they are internal to the focal firm (e.g. Jüttner et al., 
2003; Christopher & Peck, 2004; Spiegler, et al., 2012).  Most recently, Ho et al. (2015) 
observed that some other researchers have simply identified risk types without any clear basis 
of categorisation (e.g. Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Blackhurst et al., 2008; Manuj & Mentzer, 
2008; Tang & Tomlin, 2008; Wagner & Bode, 2008; Tummala & Schoenherr, 2011). Others 
have included disruption as a type of supply chain risk (e.g. Chopra & Sodhi 2004; Tang, 
2006a; Blackhurst et al., 2008; Tummala & Schoenherr, 2011). Finally, others have classified 
supply chain risks according to the magnitude of the potential adverse effect of risk events 
(Tang, 2006a; Kumar et al., 2010; Ho et al., 2015). The different categories of supply chain 
risks identified from the literature are summarised in Table 2.3.  
 
Table 2.3: Categories of Supply Chain Risks 
 
Authors Categories of supply chain risks 
Blackhurst et al. 
(2008) 
1) Disruptions/disasters, 2) Logistics, 3) Supplier dependence, 4) 
Quality, 5) Information systems, 6) Forecast, 7) Legal, 8) Intellectual 
property, 9) Procurement, 10) Receivables, 11) Inventory, 12) Capacity, 
management, 13) Security risks 
Chopra & Sodhi (2004) 1)Disruptions, 2) Delays, 3) Systems, 4) Forecast, 5) Intellectual 
property, 6) Procurement, 7) Receivables, 8) Inventory, 9) Capacity 
risks 
Christopher & Peck (2004) 1) External to the network: environmental risk 2) External to the firm 
but internal to the supply chain network: demand and supply risks, 3) 
Internal to the firm: process and control risks 
Ho et al. (2015) 1) Macro-risks e.g. earthquakes and weather-related disasters, war and 
terrorism and political instability), 2) Micro-risks i.e. demand risk, 
manufacturing risk, supply risk and infrastructural risk. 
Jüttner et al. (2003) 1) Network-related risk, 2) Organisational risk, 3) Environmental risk.   
Kumar et al. (2010) 1)Internal operational risks e.g. demand, production and distribution, 
supply risks, 2) External operational risks e.g. terrorist attacks, natural 
disasters, exchange rate fluctuations 
Manuj & Mentzer (2008)  1) Supply, 2) Demand, 3) Operational, 4) Other risks 
Peck (2005) 1)Value stream/product or processes risks, 2)Assets and infrastructure, 
3)Dependences, 4) Organizational and inter-organizational network, 5) 
Environment 
Rao & Goldsby (2009) 1) Environmental factors, 2) Industry factors, 3) Organizational factors, 
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4) Problem specific factors, 5) Decision maker factors 
Samvedi et al.  (2013)   1) Supply risk, 2) Demand risk, 3) Process risks, 4)  Environmental 
risks 
Spekman & Davis (2014) 1) Risks associated with goods flows, information flows and cash 
flows, 2) Security risks, 3) Relationship risks, 4) Risks associated with 
Corporate social responsibility 
Spiegler et al. ( 2012) 1) Internal to the firm, 2) Risks which are external to the firm but 
internal to the supply chain, 3) Risks which are external to the supply 
chain.  
Tang & Musa (2011) 1) Material flow risks, 2) Financial flow risks, 3) Information flow 
risks. 
Tang & Tomlin (2008) 1) Supply, 2) Process, 3) Demand, 4) intellectual property, 5) 
Behavioural, 6) Political/Social risks.  
Tang (2006a) 1) Operational risks: uncertain customer demand, uncertain supply and 
uncertain cost, 2) Disruption risks: earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, 
terrorist attacks, economics crises 
Trkman & McCormack 
(2009) 
1) Endogenous risks e.g.  market and technology turbulence, 2) 
Exogenous risks e.g. discrete events (such as terrorist attacks, 
contagious diseases) and continuous risks (e.g. inflation rate, consumer 
price index changes) 
Tummala & Schoenherr 
(2011) 
1) Demand risks, 2) Delays, 3) Disruptions, 4) Inventory, 5) 
Manufacturing (process) breakdown, 5) physical plant (capacity), 
5)Supply (procurement), 6) System, 7) Sovereign, 8) Transportation 
risks. 
Wagner & Bode (2008) 1) Demand side risks, 2) Supply side risks, 3) Regulatory and legal 
risks, 4) Infrastructure risk, 5) Catastrophic risks 
 
2.2.1.2. The Relationship between Supply Chain Risk Management and SCRES 
Supply chain resilience is said to have emerged from supply chain risk management 
(Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009; Petit et al., 2010). Although some scholars have argued that 
the relationship between supply chain risk management and SCRES depends on the target 
objective of the supply chain risk management strategy (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011), others 
emphasise that supply chain risk management should aim at enhancing SCRES (e.g. Thun et 
al., 2011; Thun & Hoenig, 2011). It has also been argued that ensuring SCRES is the best 
way of managing the risk of supply chain disruptions (e.g. Xiao et al., 2012; Ambulkar et al., 
2015). The table below provides a summary of the literature which emphasises that supply 





Table 2.4: Summary Example of the Literature Indicating that Supply Chain Risk 






Risk management strategies should aim at building both robust and 
resilient supply chains 
Jüttner & Maklan 
(2011) 
An approach to risk through increasing knowledge about supply chain risk 
is expected to result in increased SCRES. Further, risk sharing as a 
component of supply chain risk management positively influences SCRES 
in terms of enhancing visibility, collaboration and flexibility. Also, 
knowledge creating risk management helps in building SCRES through 
facilitating supply chain visibility. 
Kong & Li (2008) Efficient supply chain risk management reduces uncertainty and makes 
supply chains resilient – supply chain risk management should not end at 
visibility and planning, but should proceed to facilitate a response 
management capability. Supply chain risk planning during supply chain 
risk management facilitates SCRES. 
Levesque (2012) Resilient supply chains require among others, honest risk assessment of the 
likelihood and potential downside impact of a major disruption, building 
flexible contingency plans as well as conducting other activities that can 
facilitate supply chain risk mitigation 
Lin & Zhou (2011) Managing supply chain risks enables smooth operation of the whole supply 
chain as well as the building of a resilient global supply chain. Further, the  
requirements of product design change significantly impacts on the supply 
chain risks thereby directly affecting supply chain vulnerability and 
resilience 
Schlegel & Trent (2012) Supply chain risk management is an important enabler in building SCRES  
Soni et al. (2014) Resilience in the supply chain will be enhanced, and indeed made possible 
by the creation of a risk management culture in the organization 
Tang & Musa (2011); 
Tang (2006a) 
Some of the supply chain risks e.g. single sourcing risk and sourcing 
flexibility risks can be managed  through creating resilient supply chains  
Tang (2006a, 2006) Firms prefer implementing robust supply chain risk management strategies 
that provide both efficiency and resilience. Such strategies include 
selecting and maintaining additional suppliers, crafting appropriate supply 
contracts, responsive pricing, demand postponement, product 
postponement, information sharing, collaborative forecasting, 
replenishment planning and  increasing supply chain visibility 
Thun & Hoenig (2011) Supply chain risk identification, analysis and control help to establish 
effective supply chain risk management, which in turn facilitate the 
creation of secure and resilient supply chains 
Thun et al. (2011) Supply chain risk management instruments should be suitable for creating 
resilient supply chains 
Tummala & Schoenherr 
(2011) 
Supply chain risk management action plans should preferably aim to avoid 
risks and if this cannot be possible, they should focus on at least 
mitigating, containing and controlling them. In essence, supply chain risk 
management action plans should not only target risk avoidance but also 





From table 2.4 above, it can be observed that most scholars believe that implementing supply 
chain risk management strategies can increase SCRES (Colicchia et al., 2010). For example, 
supply chain risk mitigation strategies which were highlighted by Tang & Musa (2011) and 
Tang (2006a) including multiple sourcing, flexibility, early warning systems, supply chain 
design, operational hedging, postponement, contract and incentive alignment, investing in 
environmental protection, contingency planning, improving visibility and collaboration were 
also suggested by others as appropriate for creating SCRES (e.g. Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; 
Sheffi & Rice, 2005; Xu, 2008; Zsidisin & Wagner, 2010). Moreover, Tang (2006a, 2006) 
indicated that robust supply chain risk management strategies provide both efficiency and 
SCRES. It therefore follows that creating SCRES involves managing risks which in turn 
could mean that a resilient supply chain facilitates supply chain risk management. For 
example, the strategies suggested by Christopher et al., (2011) for mitigating global sourcing 
risks i.e. network re-engineering, collaboration, creating a global sourcing risk management 
culture and agility were adopted from the model for resilient supply chains earlier developed  
by Christopher & Peck (2004). This is also in line with Waters’ (2007) suggestion that the 
design of a resilient supply chain is one of the cores of supply chain risk management. 
Further, Tang et al. (2012) argued that in order to cope with supply chain risk management 
difficulties, there is a need in part, to design resilience plans before risk occurrence as well as 
resource mobilisation to mitigate risk after occurrence.  
     From the foregoing discussion, it can be observed that several authors have linked the 
general concept of supply chain risk management to SCRES. But Jüttner & Maklan (2011) 
established a difference between the two concepts using empirical data – arguing that some 
components of supply chain risk management such as supply chain risk measures do not 
necessarily mitigate supply chain vulnerability or enhance resilience. 
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      Finally, supply chain risk management is also related to supply chain robustness – a 
concept that is also arguably related to SCRES (Spiegler et al., 2012). It is argued that the 
most appropriate supply chain risk management strategies are those that create both robust 
and resilient supply chains (Christopher & Rutherford, 2004; Tang, 2006a). The concept of 
supply chain robustness is explored further in the next subsection.  
2.2.2. Supply Chain Robustness  
Supply chain robustness is another broad concept which is closely related to SCRES – with 
some researchers claiming there is completely no difference between the two concepts 
(Christopher & Rutherford, 2004; Zhang et al., 2011; Spiegler et al., 2012; Spiegler, 2013). 
For example, Asbjørnslett (2009) stated, “a supply chain is robust, or resilient, with respect to 
a threat, if the threat is not able to produce any `lethal' effects on the system.” But the author 
further argued that what differentiates a robust system from a resilient one is that the latter 
has the ability to adapt to the threat. Supply chain robustness enables smooth operation under 
varying situations as well as minimisation of undesirable risk consequences thereby 
providing a competitive advantage (Vieira & Lemos, 2009). Similar to SCRES, supply chain 
robustness is an emerging concept that still lacks a generally agreed definition (Vieira & 
Lemos, 2009). Thus it is important to understand the different ways supply chain robustness 
has been defined in order to improve understanding of the concept and its relationship with 
SCRES.  
 
Table 2.5: Definitions of Supply Chain Robustness 
 
Authors Definitions 
Durach et al. (2015) Supply chain robustness is the ability of a supply chain to resist or 
avoid change. 
Han & Shin (2015) Robustness is the ability of a supply network to resist the risks and 
recover from the disruption. 
Klibi et al. (2010) Supply chain network design is robust, for the planning horizon 
considered, if it is capable of providing sustainable value creation 
under all plausible future scenarios (normal business conditions as 
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well as major disruptions  
Kouvelis et al. (2006) The supply chain is robust if it hedges the firm’s performance against 
the worst contingencies in terms of uncertain factors over a planning 
horizon 
Meepetchdee & Shah 
(2007) 
Supply chain robustness is the extent to which the supply chain is 
able to carry out its functions despite some damage done to it, such as 
the removal of some of the components in the logistical network 
Sawik (2014) Robustness refers to an equitably efficient performance of a supply 
chain in average-case as well as in the worst-case, which reflects the 
decision-makers common requirement to maintain an equally good 
performance of a supply chain under different conditions 
Spiegler et al. (2012) Supply chain robustness implies that the system has acceptable 
changes in performances due to changes in uncertain parameters 
Vieira & Lemos (2009) A supply chain is considered robust when it is insensitive to 
variations or noises in not so regular operating conditions. 
Vlajic et al. (2012) Supply chain robustness is the degree to which a supply chain shows 
an acceptable performance during and after an unexpected event that 
caused disturbances in one or more logistics processes 
Wieland & Wallenburg 
(2013) 
Supply chain robustness refers to the ability of a supply chain to 
withstand disruption and continue operating. Whether normal 
operations would continue, the firm would be able to meet consumer 
demand, performance would not deviate from targets, and the supply 
chain could carry out regular functions 
Wieland (2013) A supply chain is robust if it uses resources that enable it to resist 
change without adapting its initial situation  
Xiao et al. (2012) Robustness of a supply chain system shows the ability to resist 
external disturbances 
Zhang & Wang (2011) Supply chain robustness is the ability of a supply chain to resist 
supply chain risks and disruptions and maintain normal operations 
 
From Table 2.5 above, most of the authors seem to agree that supply chain robustness 
involves resistance or avoidance of supply chain disruptions and maintaining normal 
operations during and post supply chain disruption. This general view was also upheld by 
Vlajic et al., (2012) who, after analysing different definitions from several articles, concluded 
that supply chains are robust if their structures are not altered as a result of supply chain 
disruptions. Meepetchdee and Shah (2007) also contended that supply chain robustness is 
required to guard against undesirable disruption and to ensure long term survival. Thus, a 
robust supply chain has the ability to continue functioning normally amidst the occurrence of 
a risk event (Tang, 2006a; Waters, 2007; Meepetchdee & Shah, 2007; Zhang & Wang, 2011).  
From the above definitions, it seems clear that unlike SCRES whose major defining feature is 
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adaptation (e.g. Christopher & Rutherford 2004), supply chain robustness involves  deploying 
proactive measures to cope with turbulence, with no adaptation needed during times of 
change ( Durach et al., 2015).  
     While some authors have associated robustness with resistance (e.g. Zhang & Wang 2011; 
Xiao et al., 2012; Wieland, 2013), others have argued to the contrary. Fiksel (2003), for 
example, claimed that a system’s robustness can be achieved through resilience and not 
resistance – a view that is re-echoed by Vlachos et al. (2012) who contended that supply 
chain robustness can be created by reducing vulnerability and improving resilience. Brandon-
Jones et al. (2014) added that in creating robustness, components of the system can adapt in 
response to specific perturbations while maintaining overall operating performance. But 
Wieland (2013) insisted that a robust supply chain resists rather than responds to changes – 
suggesting that robust supply chains must be strong, but not necessarily adaptable (e.g. 
Christopher & Rutherford 2004; Wieland, 2013). Indeed Brandon-Jones et al. (2014) 
conceptualised robustness and resilience as two different supply chain performance 
outcomes.  
     The above discussion shows there are still some contradictions in the literature regarding 
the relationship between robustness and resilience of supply chains. Some scholars consider 
supply chain robustness as one of the components of SCRES (Christopher & Rutherford 
2004; Vlajic et al; 2012; Wieland & Wallenburg, 2013; Yang & Xu, 2015; Han & Shin, 
2015). Others argue that both SCRES and supply chain robustness can be achieved using the 
same strategies such as additional suppliers, supply contracts, responsive pricing, demand 
postponement, product postponement, information sharing, collaborative forecasting, 
replenishment planning and increasing supply chain visibility, flexible sourcing, visibility, 
creating a risk management culture (Christopher & Rutherford, 2004; Tang, 2006a, 2006b; 
Spiegler et al., 2012; Xiao et al., 2012; Azevedo et al., 2013; Brandon-Jones et al., 2014). 
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However, others have maintained that supply chains that are robust are not necessarily 
resilient (e.g. Ekwall, 2009; Christopher & Rutherford, 2004; Spiegler et al., 2012). This 
means they may lack adaptive capability, which is implied for SCRES (Christopher & 
Rutherford 2004; Wieland, 2013). 
     In conclusion, although some authors have claimed that supply chain robustness is a 
component of resilience (e.g. Christopher & Rutherford 2004; Vlajic et al; 2012; Wieland & 
Wallenburg, 2013; Yang & Xu, 2015; Han & Shin, 2015), the above discussion seems to 
suggest that ‘robustness’ means there is no discernible change in the supply chain system 
under threat, whereas ‘resilience’ means there is discernible change but no loss in function 
(e.g. Tang, 2006a; Waters, 2007; Meepetchdee & Shah, 2007; Zhang & Wang, 2011; 
Wieland, 2013).  
2.2.3. Supply Chain Vulnerability 
The concept of supply chain vulnerability gained attention due to increased interest in supply 
chain risk management and resilience (Schlegel &Trent, 2012). And like SCRES, research on 
supply chain vulnerability is still limited (Svensson, 2000; Christopher & Peck, 2004). 
Further, the concepts of supply chain vulnerability and supply chain risk are at times used 
interchangeably (Peck, 2006; Lavastre et al., 2012). Hence, it is also important to look at how 
different scholars have defined supply chain vulnerability in order to clearly understand what 
the concept means. 
 
Table 2.6: Definitions of Supply Chain Vulnerability 
 
Authors Definitions 
Barnes and Oloruntoba 
(2005) 
Vulnerability is defined as a susceptibility or predisposition to change 
or loss because of existing organizational or functional practices or 
conditions  
Christopher and Peck, 
(2004)  
Supply chain vulnerability  is an exposure to serious disturbance, 
arising from risks within the supply chain as well as risks external to the 
supply chain 
Jüttner et al. (2003) Supply chain vulnerability is the propensity of risk sources and risk 
drivers to outweigh risk mitigating strategies, thus causing adverse 
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supply chain consequences 
Jüttner (2005) Supply chain vulnerability is the exposure to serious disturbance arising 
from supply chain risks and affecting the supply chain’s ability to 
effectively serve the end customer market 
Pettit et al. (2010) Supply chain vulnerabilities  refer to the fundamental factors that make 
an enterprise susceptible to disruptions 
Svensson ( 2002) Vulnerability is the condition that is caused by time and relationship 
dependences in a company’s business activities in supply chains.  The 
degree of vulnerability may be interpreted as proportional to the degree 
of time and relationship dependencies and the negative consequence of 
these dependencies in a company’s business activities towards suppliers 
and customers.  
Svensson ( 2000) Vulnerability refers to the existence of random disturbances that lead to 
deviations in the supply chain of components and materials from 
normal, expected or planned schedules or activities, all of which cause 
negative effects or consequences for the involved manufacturer and its 
sub‐contractors. 
  
From the above definitions, it can be concluded that supply chain vulnerability is the supply 
chain’s condition of exposure to a threat/ risk. The fact that not all supply chain risks can be 
controlled means that every supply chain has some degree of vulnerability – and this is the 
premise on which SCRES is built (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; Christopher & Holweg, 2011; 
Tummala & Schoenherr, 2011; Cox et al., 2011; Ivanov & Sokolov, 2013; Hohenstein et al., 
2015).  
     Supply chain vulnerability can signify a supply chain’s lack of resilience to both internal 
and external threats (Asbjørnslett, 2009). Hence, building SCRES is important for reducing 
supply chain vulnerability (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; Xiao et al., 2012). Likewise, Sheffi & 
Rice (2005) argued that reducing vulnerability implies reducing the likelihood of a disruption 
and thereby enhancing resilience. Although these scholars have generally argued that 
minimising supply chain vulnerability enhances SCRES, others have argued to the contrary. 
For instance, Jüttner & Maklan (2011) claim that a highly vulnerable supply chain may either 
have a high or low resilience. The authors contend that some strategies may reduce supply 
chain vulnerability without necessarily causing any effect on SCRES. For example, a supply 
chain risk strategy which avoids certain geographical risk areas can reduce vulnerability e.g. 
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to political instability in the avoided region without necessarily increasing the response to and 
recovery from a disruption if it still took place. Indeed Petit et al. (2010; 2013) contended that 
SCRES is about appropriately balancing vulnerabilities and corresponding capabilities.  
 
 2.2.4. Supply Chain Security 
Supply chain security has been linked to supply chain risk management, supply chain 
robustness and SCRES (Barksh & Kleindorfer 2009; Zhang et al., 2011; Yang &Wei, 2013). 
Supply chain security is considered important for reducing vulnerability – especially arising 
from threats of intentional acts e.g. terrorism, theft and food contamination (Zhang et al., 
2011; Speier et al., 2011). Like other SCRES related concepts already discussed above, 
supply chain security is relatively new (Williams et al., 2008; Speier et al., 2011). And 
despite its growing importance due to potential security related supply chain disruptions, 
research about supply chain security is still scarce (Williams et al., 2008).  
     Scholars have proposed different definitions of supply chain security. For example, Closs 
& McGarrell (2004) stated that supply chain security management is the application of 
policies, procedures, and technology to protect supply chain assets (product, facilities, 
equipment, information, and personnel) from theft, damage, or terrorism, and to prevent the 
introduction of unauthorised contraband, people, or weapons of mass destruction into the 
supply chain.  Pfohl et al. (2010) also defined supply chain security as the protection of the 
supply chain against attacks and disturbance with a criminal intent, or as an aftermath of 
juridical consequences in the case of liability and perpetuation of the companies under those 
kinds of circumstances.  
     The definition by Closs and McGarrell (2004) appears to be the most comprehensive – 
and it has been adopted by subsequent authors (e.g. Williams et al., 2008; Pfohl et al., 2010; 
Speier et al., 2011). But, supply chain security is not only about intentional threats as 
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emphasised by this definition but also unintentional threats. For example, Speier et al. (2011) 
stated that supply chain security measures are aimed to prevent or minimise the negative 
impact of both intentional and unintentional supply chain risk events, so as to enhance supply 
chain’s continual operations without interruption arising from constraints in facilities, 
resources and capacity. Supply chain security is needed to mitigate disruptions from 
intentional threats like theft, contamination/sabotage, or a terrorist attack; as well as 
unintentional supply chain disruptions e.g. hurricanes, tornados and floods that may for 
example disrupt transportation infrastructure and/or manufacturing; accidents and 
unintentional food contamination (Speier et al., 2011).  Similarly, Rice and Spayd (2005) 
noted that  today’s globalised supply chains have become increasingly vulnerable to several 
security threats including terrorism, product adulteration, infrastructural failure and 
brand/franchise destruction, which require supply chain members to commit some level of 
investment in supply chains’ security  so as to enhance SCRES.  Such investments include 
collaboration among supply chain members, enhancing visibility and tracking, standards 
development, appropriate supplier selection, quality management initiatives; and 
transportation and conveyance security (Rice & Spayd, 2005). 
      Likewise, Pettit et al. (2010) also argue that improving security is crucial for addressing 
increased vulnerability of the global supply chain in order to ensure SCRES through for 
example providing protection against disruptions from cyber-security threats as well as 
threats to employees’ safety. Further, the study by Park (2011) identified security compliance 
as a flexible supply chain practice that enhances SCRES capabilities in terms of readiness and 
response to, as well as recovery from disruptions. This can be achieved through supply chain 
partners’ prioritising security, conducting regular security audits to ensure adherence to 
security standards like packaging procedures, prescribing penalties for non-compliance and 
offering specific security education programs to supply chain partners (Park, 2011). 
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     Some scholars have however, argued that supply chain security may not guarantee SCRES 
(Rice & Caniato, 2003). In order to enhance SCRES, it is argued that supply chain security 
should be supplemented with other initiatives e.g. contingency planning (Ekwall, 2010) and 
collaboration between public and private actors (Rice &Spayd, 2005; Barksh & Kleindorfer, 
2009; Pettit et al., 2010). Zhang et al. (2011) claimed that both supply chain robustness and 
SCRES can help to enhance supply chain security – presenting supply chain security as 
broader than supply chain robustness and SCRES. But from the above argument, it seems 
clear that most researchers recognise creating supply chain security as one of the strategies 
for enhancing SCRES.   
2.2.5. Concluding Remarks 
The extant literature supports the existence of relationships between the four broad concepts 
discussed above i.e. supply chain risk management, supply chain vulnerability, supply chain 
robustness and supply chain security – these concepts are also related to SCRES in different 
ways as discussed. Three of these concepts encapsulate the response to threat i.e. supply 
chain risk management, supply chain robustness and supply chain security. And these have a 
positive relationship with SCRES – we find that some strategies that enhance these concepts 
could also enhance SCRES. We also find these concepts differ from SCRES in certain ways. 
For example, supply chain risk management is understood to be relatively broader than 
SCRES – with the latter being the preferred sub-set of the former. It was also found that 
adaptation is implied by SCRES, as is resistance by supply chain robustness – it was found 
that resilience suggests there is a discernible change in the supply chain system under threat 
of disruption but without loss in function while robustness suggests there is no such a 
discernible change.  Further, supply chain security was seen as a strategy of supply chain risk 
management or creating SCRES against especially threats from malign actors. Finally, the 
concept of supply chain vulnerability encapsulates the supply chain condition of 
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susceptibility to disruption by a potential threat – and most scholars acknowledge the 
existence of an inverse relationship between supply chain vulnerability and SCRES. The 












The arrors in Figure 2.1 show that the SCRES related concepts that encapsulate response to 
threat are mutually re-inforcing and they all facilitate SCRES. However, together with 
SCRES, they all have an inverse relationship with supply chain vulnerability. Although 
relationships between these concepts and SCRES have been acknowleged in the literature, it 
has been clearly indicated that some scholars still do not agree with some of the relationships. 
Moreover, it was found that there is not yet a general concensus on the definition of each of 
the concepts. Likewise, SCRES – which  the four concepts are arguably related to – has  not 
yet achieved a generally accepted definition (Kim et al., 2015a; Hohenstein et al., 2015). The 
lack of unified definitions suggests these related concepts are likely to be understood and 
interpreted differently thereby confusing the relationships between them. Hence, like for the 
related concepts discussed above, the next section provides an account of  how SCRES has 
been defined in the literature so as to enhance understanding of the concept and develop a 
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual Model of the Relationship among the 
Broad Concepts Related to SCRES 
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2.3. Defining Supply Chain Resilience (SCRES) 
Supply Chain Resilience (SCRES) is a relatively new concept that has emerged from the 
broader concept of “resilience” that has been explored in a number of disciplines to  which 
the broad notion of resilience is relevant. These  descilplines include ecology, sociology, 
psychology, economics, organisational studies, and sustainable development (Ponomarov & 
Holcomb, 2009). Indeed, several authors have acknowleged that resilience is a 
multidisciplinary phenomenon (e.g. Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009; Bhamra et al., 2011; 
Ponis & Koronis, 2012; Spiegler et al., 2012). The disparate nature of the resilience literature 
– spread across many fields – and the broad notion of what the concept means has led to 
authors developing and using differing perspectives to describe the nature of SCRES. For 
example, resilience has been considered a property of supply chains (Day, 2014; Kim et al., 
2015a); or an ability or capability (e.g. Pettit et al., 2013; Brandon-Jones et al., 2014; Pereira 
et al., 2014; Scholten et al., 2014; Ambulkar et al., 2015; Hohenstein et al., 2015; Levalle & 
Nof, 2015); or a dynamic and adaptive capability (Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009; Golgeci & 
Ponomarov, 2013; Rajesh & Ravi, 2015). This understanding of SCRES from differing 
perspectives has led to authors acknowledging the problem of a lack of consensus on the 
definition of SCRES in the extant literature (e.g.Spiegler et al., 2012; Mensah & Merkuryev, 
2014; Kim et al., 2015a; Hohenstein et al., 2015). The various definitions that can be 
identified from the SCRES literature are summarised in Table 2.7a, while the main elements 









Table 2.7a: Existing Definitions of SCRES from the Literature 
 
Authors Definitions 
Barroso et al. (2010) 
SCRES is the supply chain’s ability to react to the negative effects caused by disturbances that occur at a given moment in 
order to maintain the supply chain’s objectives. 
Brandon-Jones et al. (2014)   
SCRES is defined as the ability of a system to return to its original state, within an acceptable period of time, after being 
disturbed 
Carvalho et al. (2011) 
SCRES is concerned with the system’s ability to return to its original state or to a new more desirable one after experiencing a 
disturbance and avoiding occurrence of failure modes.  
Carvalho et al. (2012b) SCRES is the ability of the supply chain to cope with unexpected disturbances. 
Christopher & Peck (2004) 
SCRES is the ability of the supply chain to return to its original state or move to a new, more desirable state after being 
disturbed. 
Christopher & Rutherford 
(2004) 
Resilience is the ability of a system to return to its original (or desired) state after being disturbed. 
Closs & McGarrell (2004) 
SCRES is the supply chain’s ability to withstand and recover from an incident. A resilient supply chain is proactive - 
anticipating and establishing planned steps to prevent and respond to incidents. Such supply chains quickly rebuild or re-
establish alternative means of operations when the subject of an incident. 
Datta (2007) 
SCRES is not only the ability to maintain control over performance variability in the face of disturbance but also a property of 
being adaptive and capable of sustained response to sudden and significant shifts in the environment in the form of uncertain 
demands. 
Datta et al. (2007) 
Resilience of the supply network is the ability of the production–distribution system to meet each customer demand for each 
product on time and to quantity. 
Erol et al. (2010) 
Resilience is a response to unexpected or unforeseen changes and disturbances, and an ability to adapt and respond to such 
changes. 
Farasca et al. (2008) 
SCRES is the ability of a supply chain to reduce the probabilities of a disruption, to reduce the consequences of those 
disruptions when they occur and to reduce the time to recover normal performance. 
Gaonkar & Viswanadham 
(2007) 
SCRES is the ability of a supply chain to maintain, resume and restore operations after a disruption. 
Guoping & Xinqiu (2010) SCRES is the ability of the supply chain to return to its original or ideal status under emergency risk environment. 
Hohenstein et al. (2015) 
SCRES is the supply chain’s ability to be prepared for unexpected risk events, responding and recovering quickly to potential 
disruptions to return to its original situation or grow by moving to a new, more desirable state in order to increase customer 
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service, market share and financial performance. 
Longo & Oren (2008) 
Resilience is a critical property that, in a context of supply chain change management, allows the supply chain to react to 
internal/external risks and vulnerabilities, quickly recovering an equilibrium state capable of guaranteeing high performance 
and efficiency levels. 
Munoz & Dunbar (2015) 
Operational SCRES can be thought of as the existing capability to recover from disruptions by restoring and maintaining the 
continuity of operations across the multiple supply chain echelons that match supply and demand. 
Pettit et al. (2010) Supply chain resilience is the ability to survive, adapt and grow in the face of turbulent change.  
Ponis & Koronis (2012) 
SCRES is the ability to proactively plan and design the supply chain network for anticipating unexpected disruptive (negative 
events), respond adaptively to disruptions while maintaining control over structure and function and transcending to a post 
robust state of operations, if possible a more favourable one than that prior to the event, thus gaining a competitive advantage. 
Ponomarov & Holcomb 
(2009) 
SCRES is the adaptive capability of the supply chain to prepare for unexpected events, respond to disruptions, and recover 
from them by maintaining continuity of operations at the desired level of connectedness and control over structure and 
function. 
Ponomarov (2012) 
SCRES is the adaptive capability of a firm’s supply chain to prepare for unexpected events, respond to disruptions, and recover 
from them in a timely manner by maintaining continuity of operations at the desired level of connectedness and control over 
structure and function. 
Rice & Caniato (2003) 
Resilience in the supply network environment is the ability to react to unexpected disruption and restore normal supply network 
operations. 
Sheffi (2005) 
Resilience in terms of the corporate world is the ability of the company to bounce back from a large disruption including the 
speed with which it returns to a normal level of performance. 
Shuai et al. (2011) 
Resilience is defined as the rapid recovery ability to equilibrium after the supply chain is attacked by a disturbance and we use 
the recovery time to measure the ability. 
Xiao et al. (2012) 
SCRES is the supply chain’s ability to return to the original or ideal status after external disruption and includes both the 
abilities of adaptability to the environment and recovery from the disruption. 
Yang & Xu (2015) 
SCRES refers to the ability to respond to supply chain disruption caused by natural disasters, and this can be analysed by 
considering robustness of the supply chain and rapidity of recovery. 
Yao & Meurier (2012) 







Table 2.7b: Key Characteristics of Existing SCRES Definitions 
 
 







































































































































Barroso et al. (2010)  X   X   X      
Brandon-Jones et al. (2014)    X     X X      
Carvalho et al. (2011)  X X    X  X X     
Carvalho et al. (2012b)  X X  X         
Christopher & Peck (2004)  X   X X  X X     
Christopher & Rutherford (2004)  X   X X  X X     
Closs & McGarrell (2004)  X  X X X X       
Datta (2007)  X X  X   X X     
Datta et al. (2007)  X   X  X       
Erol et al. (2010)  X X  X         
Farasca et al. (2008)  X  X X X X X      
Gaonkar & Viswanadham (2007)  X   X X  X      
Guoping & Xinqiu (2010)  X    X  X X     
Hohenstein et al. (2015)  X  X X X X X X     
Longo & Oren (2008)     X X  X X     
Munoz & Dunbar (2015)  X    X  X      
Pettit et al. (2010)  X X  X    X     
Ponis & Koronis (2012)  X X X X X  X X X X X  
Ponomarov & Holcomb (2009)  X X X X X  X X X    
Ponomarov (2012)  X X X X X X X X X    
Rice & Caniato (2003)  X   X X        
Sheffi (2005)  X    X X X      
Shuai et al. (2011)  X    X X X X     
Xiao et al. (2012)  X X   X  X X     
Yang & Xu (2015)  X   X X X    X   
Yao & Meurier (2012)  X   X X  X      
 
From tables 2.7a and 2.7b above, it can be argued that the two most comprehensive 
definitions of SCRES are those provided by Ponis & Koronis (2012) and Ponomarov (2012). 
For example, these two definitions incorporate the most characteristics in Table 2.7b, 
including adaptive capability and capacity, preparation, response and timely recovery to the 
original or, preferably, an improved level of operational performance. However, like the rest 
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of the definitions, these two have equally ignored the important aspect of cost effectiveness 
(see final column of Table 2.7b). Yet the World Economic Forum (2013) indicated that cost 
efficiency and resilience can coexist without a major negative impact and should ideally be 
complementary. Similarly, Ishfaq (2012) recently argued that SCRES can be achieved 
without prohibitively high operational costs. Table 2.8 indicates literature supporting the need 
to consider cost effectiveness in SCRES. Although formal definitions of SCRES do not 
appear to incorporate cost effectiveness, this table shows that cost effectiveness has been 






Table 2.8: Cost Effectiveness as Part of SCRES 
 
Argument for Inclusion Authors 
Resilient capabilities in the aspect of logistics and supply chain management should enable cost effective minimisation of 
vulnerabilities. 
Asbjørnslett (2009) 
There is a need to minimize the expected cost of mitigation when building SCRES. Bakshi & Kleindorfer (2009) 
The attributes which are capable of enhancing the firm’s supply resilience are those that increase its ability to quickly and 
efficiently recover from disruptive phenomena. 
Blackhurst et al. (2011) 
Too high investments in creating SCRES may overshadow its marginal benefits. Brandon-Jones et al. (2014)   
Lean (cost minimisation and waste elimination) and resilience can co-exist in supply chain management. Cabral et al. (2012) 
Time and cost are key performance indicators of resilient supply chains. Carvalho et al. (2011) 
Supply chain resilience strategies should provide efficient and effective response. 
Carvalho et al.( 2012d); 
Carvalho et al.( 2012c)  
Network resilience should be measured considering the cost, time and resources incurred in the recovery process. Chen & Miller-Hooks (2012) 
SCRES can be created efficiently and cost effectively through the agile six sigma approach. 
Christopher & Rutherford 
(2004) 
Investment in SCRES-building measures should be balanced against the need to maintain a cost-efficient supply chain. Dahlman (2008) 
SCRES strategies, such as maintaining enough slack, should not adversely affect the normal operational efficiency. Datta (2007) 
Through flexible system optimization, a resilient supply network can be realised both effectively and efficiently. Fang et al. (2012) 
Resilience aims to recover the desired values of the states of a system not only within an acceptable time but also at an 
acceptable cost. 
Haimes (2006); Haimes et al. 
(2008) 
Disruptions should be mitigated at minimum cost in order to achieve an optimum state of SCRES. Ivanov et al. (2014) 
A supply chain should be designed in such a way that it is resilient as well as optimal in its operations. Mandal (2012) 
Optimisation models aim to allocate limited resources among mitigation strategies in order to achieve SCRES cost 
effectively. 
Ratick et al. (2008); Sawik 
(2013) 
Strategies for enhancing SCRES, such as increasing safety inventory and improving the efficiency of reserve capacity 
should be within the cost margins. 
Shuai et al. (2011) 
An increase in relationship resources results in increased network resilience, but such resources should not be increased 
beyond a certain limit, where it is not cost effective. 
Smith & Vidal (2010) 
The resilience of a system involves its ability to use the lowest possible amount of resources during recovery processes. The 
system that incurs the lower resilience costs will be considered the more resilient one. 
Vugrin et al. (2011) 
The recovery time and recovery cost are important considerations in selecting  appropriate strategies to  build grain SCRES 
against disasters 




Resilient supply chains may not necessarily be those with the lowest costs (Carvalho et al., 
2012b; Carvalho et al., 2012c), but it is argued here that any definition of the resilience of an 
economic system without regard for cost is incomplete. Supply chain disruptions should be 
minimised cost effectively (e.g. Lee, 2004; Wagner & Neshat, 2012). Cost efficiency has 
been identified as a feature of resilient systems (e.g. Fiksel 2003) and the reduction of costs 
through rapid and effective coordination is a necessary focus of resilient supply chains (Xiao 
et al., 2012). Moreover, SCRES should not be taken as merely the ability to manage risk, but 
also the ability to respond to risk in a better and more cost effective way than competitors; 
and, in the process, gain a competitive advantage (e.g. Hamel & Valikangas 2003; Yao & 
Meurier 2012).  
In order to take into account all of the above, we define SCRES as:  
 
The adaptive capability of a supply chain to prepare for and/or respond to disruptions, to 
make a timely and cost effective recovery, and therefore progress to a post-disruption state of 
operations – ideally, a better state than prior to the disruption. 
     The above definition implies that a supply chain’s resilience  can be assessed on four 
aspects – preparation for a disruptive event; response to an event; recovery from the event; 
and, growth/competitive advantage after the event (e.g. Hohenstein et al., 2015) – while 
SCRES strategies or capabilities should aim to ensure these aspects are maximised in a timely 
way and at minimum cost. In addition, the capability to adapt underpins these four aspects. 
Adaptation means a supply chain has the ability to develop different responses to match the 
nature of the threats it faces (Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015). This implies that the supply chain’s 
elements may change to provide an appropriate response to a disruptive event rather than 
selecting from a pre-existing set of responses. As an example, the 1997 fire that destroyed 
Aisin Seiki’s Kariya plant – Toyota’s key supplier of P-valves, a critical component to 
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vehicle manufacture – was not anticipated and the responses had not been predetermined. But 
a quick recovery was enabled by the adaptive capability of the supply network that had been 
built into strong relationships between the company and its suppliers. This facilitated 
coordinated and self-organised responses that included setting up alternative p-valve 
production sites at suppliers used to providing other components (Nishiguchi and Beaudet 
1998). This adaptive capability reflects the nature of disruptive events, which may be 
unforeseeable, inherent to the supply chain, co-evolving with the supply chain’s responses, 
and so on. Over time, the supply chain may learn from disruptive events and corresponding 
responses; and it may develop new capabilities that make it more resilient to similar threats in 
the future (Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015). 
    The foregoing section has helped in consolidating the different definitions of SCRES and 
redefining the concept in order to gain a deeper understanding of the concept for purposes of 
the study. The next section analyses and categorises the literature on SCRES so as to 
highlight the research gaps that form the basis of the research questions addressed in this 
thesis.   
2.4. Analysis of the SCRES literature  
To date, much of the available SCRES literature focuses on outlining strategies for enhancing 
SCRES. For example, recent modelling work includes that of Kristianto et al. (2014), which 
focused on supply chain design and redundancy; Levalle & Nof (2015) on network formation 
and configuration; Rajesh & Ravi (2015) on appropriate supplier selection for enhancing 
SCRES, Wang et al. (2015) on contingent re-routing to enhance resilience, Gong et al. 
(2014), on supply chain redesign and cooperation between supply chain managers and 
managers of infrastructure, Yang & Xu (2015) on collaboration with the government in order 
to acquire government facilitation during disasters, Cardoso et al. (2015) on supply chain 
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design and planning; and Das & Lashkari (2015) on risk readiness and planning. Recent 
theoretical contributions include Day (2014), on a CAS framework that links SCRES to 
disaster relief; and Pereira et al. (2014), on the link between procurement and SCRES. In 
addition, Stevenson & Busby (2015) analysed the counterfeiting threat to supply chains and 
how supply chains can build resilience against product counterfeiting. Meanwhile, Kim et al. 
(2015a) indicated how different types of structural relationships affect SCRES, arguing that 
SCRES should be analysed from a network perspective. Most of these studies highlighted the 
need for more empirical work on SCRES.       
      A similar focus on SCRES strategies can also be observed in the current empirical work 
on SCRES. Although empirical researchers have used various terms such as antecedents 
(Mandal, 2012; Brandon-Jones et al., 2014; Scholten et al., 2014; Gölgeci & Ponomarov, 
2014; Scholten & Schilder, 2015), enablers (Blackhurst et al., 2011), practices (Zsidisin & 
Wagner, 2010; Azevedo et al., 2013), capabilities (Pettit et al., 2010; Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; 
Fakoor et al., 2013), competencies (Wieland & Wallenburg, 2013) and strategies (Urciuoli et 
al., 2014), they all refer to what can help in building SCRES. Indeed, Hohenstein et al. (2015) 
recently argued that all the above terms can in some way be rephrased as SCRES strategies 
and include, for example, improving flexibility, creating redundancy, building collaborative 
supply chain relationships, improving supply chain agility, and enhancing visibility. Specific 
practices like information sharing (Brandon-Jones et al., 2014) and resource reconfiguration 
(Ambulkar et al., 2015), which were treated as antecedents of SCRES, can be considered as 
components of collaboration and flexibility, respectively. Therefore, in this section, the 
SCRES literature is first discussed in terms of the SCRES strategies proposed (Section 2.4.1). 
This is followed by an overview of the available empirical research on SCRES in terms of 
e.g. the research areas/topics, methods, geographical contexts (2.4.2) and the use of theory in 
SCRES empirical work (2.4.3). 
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In the following table (Table 2.9), the various SCRES strategies that have so far been 
proposed in the literature will be identified together with corresponding authors. And after the 




Table 2.9: Summary of Proactive & Reactive SCRES Strategies & Respective Authors 
 














Appropriate supplier selection/Procurement – Using selection criteria that can help 
to minimise disruptions and their impact, such as political stability in suppliers’ 
territories, quality, capabilities (e.g. technological), financial stability, business 
continuity, reliability, etc. 
Mascaritolo & Holcomb (2008); Pereira et al. (2014); Rajesh & Ravi 
(2015) 
Building logistics capabilities – Capabilities for managing supply and information 
flows necessary for minimising vulnerabilities, e.g. risk hedging capabilities, 
information technology upgrades, and information sharing.  
Ponomarov & Holcomb (2009); Ponomarov (2012) 
Building security – Measures to protect the supply chain against deliberate 
disruptions, e.g. theft, terrorism & the infiltration of counterfeits 
Rice & Caniato (2003); Pettit (2008); Barksh & Kleindorfer (2009); 
Pettit et al. (2010); Park (2011); Fakoor et al. (2013) 
Building social capital and relational competences – Effective communication and 
information sharing before the risk event increases risk awareness and  limits 
vulnerability, e.g. communication, cooperation, trust, reciprocity, etc.  
Johnson et al. (2013); Wieland & Wallenburg (2013) 
Coopetition – Creating and maintaining collaboration between competitors so as to 
gain from synergies, e.g. sharing resources for building security & resilience. 
Barksh & Kleindorfer (2009); Borekci et al. (2014) 
Creating appropriate contractual agreements – Long term and short term contracts 
that can enable flexibility in supply to minimise shortages. 
Tang (2006a, 2006b); Urciuoli et al. (2014) 
Collaboration with the government/ Creating public-private partnerships /  – 
Contractual agreement between a public agency and a private sector entity to share 
skills & assets, risks and rewards in order to deliver services or facilities to the 
general public. It increases government interest in private entities’ supply chains. 
Stewart et al. (2009); Gong et al. (2014); Urciuoli et al. (2014); Yang 
& Xu (2015) 
Creating risk management culture – Ensuring that all organisational members 
embrace supply chain risk management, and this involves, e.g. top management 
support and firm integration/team work. 
Christopher & Peck (2004); Sheffi & Rice (2005); Sheffi (2005); Xu 
(2008); Zhang et al. (2011); Mandal (2012); Leat & Revoredo (2013) 
Increasing innovativeness – The motivation and capability to seek and invent new 
business ideas, e.g. new products, technologies, processes and strategies that can 
reduce vulnerability. 
Golgeci & Ponomarov (2013) 
Increasing visibility – The ability to see through the entire supply chain (all nodes 
and links), which helps to identify potential threats. 
Glickman & White (2006); Datta et al. (2007); Lakovou et al. (2007); 
Longo & Oren (2008); Pettit (2008); Pettit et al. (2010); Zhang et al. 
(2011); Carvalho et al. (2012b); Saenz & Revilla (2014) 
Inventory management – The strategic alignment of inventory management using a Boone et al. (2013) 
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system-wide approach to minimise inventory risks 
Knowledge management – Developing knowledge and understanding of supply 
chain structures (i.e. physical and informational), and the ability to learn from 
changes as well as educate other entities. 
Rice & Caniato (2003); Christopher & Peck (2004); Xu (2008); Kong 
& Li (2008); Ponis & Koronis (2012); Ponomarov & Holcomb 
(2009); Lakovou et al. (2007); Jüttner & Maklan (2011); Scholten et 
al. (2014) 
Portfolio diversification– Indulging in different products to reduce dependence on 
particular products and suppliers.  
Urciuoli et al. (2014) 
Supplier development – Facilitating suppliers with incentives, e.g. financial, training 
and technical knowledge to improve efficiency, commitment and reliability. 
Tang (2006b); Leat & Revoredo (2013) 
Supply chain collaboration – The ability to work effectively with other supply chain 
entities for mutual benefit, e.g. sharing information and other resources to reduce 
vulnerability. 
Rice & Caniato (2003); Christopher & Peck (2004); Datta et al. 
(2007); Mascaritolo & Holcomb (2008); Pettit (2008); Ji & Zhu 
(2008); Bakshi & Kleindorfer (2009); Ponomarov & Holcomb 
(2009); Pettit et al. (2010); Pettit et al. (2013);  Barroso et al. (2010); 
Erol et al. (2010); Peters (2010); Jüttner & Maklan (2011); Zhang et 
al. (2011); Park (2011); Soni & Jain (2011); Mandal (2012); Ponis & 
Koronis (2012); Carvalho et al. (2012b); Leat & Revoredo (2013); 
Fakoor et al. (2013); Scholten et al. (2014); Brandon-Jones et al. 
(2014); Scholten &Schilder  (2015) 
Supply chain network structure/ design – Constructing the supply chain network for 
resilience, e.g. balancing redundancy, efficiency, vulnerabilities, etc. 
Datta et al. (2007); Diabat et al. (2012); Carvalho et al. (2012a); 
Mandal (2012); Leat & Revoredo (2013); Scholten et al. (2014); 
Kristianto et al. (2014) ; Levalle & Nof  (2015); Gong et al. (2015) 
Cardoso et al. (2015) 
Sustainability compliance – Compliance to economic, social and environmental 
requirements to mitigate associated supply chain risks, e.g. reputational risks. 
Soni & Jain (2011) 
Use of information technology – Information technology enhances connectivity and 
supports other resilience strategies, e.g. visibility and collaboration, which can help 
in signalling potential disruptions. 












s Building logistics capabilities – Capabilities for supply and information flows, e.g. 
to reduce cycle times, increase delivery competence, knowledge management and 
customer service to quickly recover from a disruption. 
Ponomarov & Holcomb (2009); Ponomarov (2012) 
Building social capital and relational competences – Effective communication, 
trust and information sharing can enable rapid access to resources necessary for 
recovery, e.g. communication, cooperation, trust, reciprocity, etc.   
Johnson et al. (2013); Wieland & Wallenburg (2013) 
Contingency planning – Anticipating potential events and specifying the measures 
to deal with supply chain risks and disruptions before they actually occur, e.g. by 
Glickman & White (2006); Tang (2006b); Pettit (2008); Mascaritolo 
& Holcomb (2008) Pettit et al. (2010); Park (2011); Vlachos et al. 
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forecasting and monitoring early warning signals. (2012); Urciuoli et al. (2014); Cardoso et al. (2015); Das & Lashkari 
(2015) 
Contingency re-routing – Using alternative routes (transportation) as contingency 
measure in case of threat of disruption to the current route e.g. turbulence and bad 
weather at sea 
Wang et al. (2015) 
Creating redundancy – The strategic and selective use of spare capacity and 
inventory that can be used to cope with disruptions, e.g. spare stocks, multiple 
suppliers and extra facilities. 
Rice & Caniato (2003); Christopher & Rutherford (2004); Sheffi 
(2005); Sheffi & Rice (2005); Peck (2005); Tang (2006b); Lakovou 
et al. (2007); Xu (2008); Ratick et al. (2008); Longo & Oren (2008); 
Ji & Zhu (2008); Zsidisin & Wagner (2010); Carvalho et al. (2011); 
Park (2011); Azevedo et al. (2011); Diabat et al. (2012); Carvalho et 
al. (2012d); Ponis & Koronis (2012); Vlachos et al. (2012); Xu et al. 
(2014); Urciuoli et al. (2014); Saenz & Revilla (2014); Kristianto et 
al.( 2014); Wang et al. (2015) 
Demand management – Mitigating the impact of disruptions by influencing 
customer choices through, e.g. dynamic pricing, assortment planning and silent 
product rollovers. 
(Tang 2006b); Urciuoli et al. (2014) 
Ensuring supply chain agility – The ability to respond quickly to unpredictable 
changes in demand and/or supply. 
Christopher & Rutherford (2004); Christopher & Peck (2004); Kong 
& Li (2008); Tang & Tomlin (2008); Longo & Oren (2008); Ji & Zhu 
(2008); Erol et al. (2010); Peters (2010); Carvalho et al. (2011b); 
Ponis & Koronis (2012); Carvalho et al. (2012b); Mandal (2012); 
Scholten et al. (2014) 
Increasing flexibility – The ability of a firm and supply chain to adapt to changing 
requirements with minimum time and effort. 
Rice & Caniato (2003); Sheffi, (2005); Sheffi & Rice (2005); Tang 
(2006b); Glickman & White (2006); Lakovou et al. (2007); Datta et 
al. (2007); Xu (2008); Pettit(2008); Ratick et al. (2008); Tang & 
Tomlin (2008); Mascaritolo & Holcomb (2008); Longo & Oren 
(2008); Ji & Zhu (2008); Zsidisin & Wagner (2010); Pettit et al. 
(2010); Erol et al. (2010); Zhang et al. (2011); Azevedo et al. (2011); 
Soni & Jain (2011); Carvalho et al. (2011b); Park (2011); Xiao et al. 
(2012); Ishfaq (2012); Diabat et al.(2012); Carvalho et al. (2012a); 
Ponis & Koronis (2012); Vlachos et al. (2012); Carvalho et al. 
(2012b); Fakoor et al. (2013); Azevedo et al. (2013); Mensah & 
Merkuryev (2014); Geng et al. (2014); Ambulkar et al., 2015). 
Increasing velocity – The pace of flexible adaptations that can determine the 
recovery speed of the supply chain from a disruption. 
Longo & Oren (2008); Carvalho et al. (2012b) 
Increasing visibility – The ability to see through the entire supply chain (all nodes Longo & Oren (2008); Pettit (2008); Pettit et al. (2010); Soni & Jain 
49 
 
and links) so as to effectively respond to a disruption. (2011); Carvalho et al. (2011); Zhang et al. (2011); Azevedo et al. 
(2011); Azevedo et al. (2013); Brandon-Jones et al. (2014); Saenz & 
Revilla (2014)  
Supply chain collaboration – The ability to work effectively with other supply chain 
entities for mutual benefit, e.g. sharing information and other resources necessary 
for response and recovery. 
Rice & Caniato (2003); Sheffi (2005); Datta et al. (2007); 
Mascaritolo & Holcomb (2008); Pettit (2008); Ji & Zhu (2008); 
Ponomarov & Holcomb (2009); Pettit et al. (2010); Pettit et al. 
(2013);  Erol et al. (2010); Peters (2010); Jüttner & Maklan (2011); 
Zhang et al. (2011); Park (2011); Soni & Jain (2011); Carvalho et al. 
(2011); Ponis & Koronis (2012); Leat & Revoredo (2013); Brandon-
Jones et al., 2014; Scholten et al. (2014); Gong et al.( 2015) ;Scholten 
&Schilder  (2015) 
Use of information technology – Information technology enhances connectivity and 
supports other resilience strategies, e.g. visibility and collaboration, which can help 
in coordinating responses to disruptions.  





2.4.1. Key Strategies for Building Supply Chain Resilience 
In Table 2.9, the different strategies for achieving SCRES are summarised together with 
relevant authors, e.g. who have identified, referred to, or investigated the particular strategy. 
The strategies have been broadly organised into two categories – proactive and reactive 
strategies – although some particular strategies can be either proactive or reactive depending 
on when and why they are applied. For example, collaboration can help to mitigate 
disruptions before they occur, e.g. by facilitating information sharing and the use of other 
strategies, like building security and supplier development. But it can also be used to aid 
recovery after a disruption by enabling supply chain actors to share resources and provide a 
coordinated response (Nishiguchi & Beaudet 1998; Scholten et al., 2014). Also, some of the 
strategies in the table are interrelated while others reinforce each other. For example, building 
social capital and relational competences can be regarded as facilitators of collaboration. 
Visibility and velocity can support agility (Christopher & Peck, 2004) while the use of 
information technology seems indispensable for most of the strategies. It is also noticeable 
from the table that more proactive than reactive strategies are highlighted in the literature. On 
the one hand, these strategies may be preferred in practice as they can be applied to prepare 
for a disruption rather than to respond. Thus, they are likely to support the continuation of 
‘operations as normal’ and minimise vulnerability. On the other hand, managers may be 
reluctant to implement proactive strategies since it becomes difficult to justify investments 
that mitigate potential disruptive events which may not ultimately occur.  
     Finally, although these strategies have been categorised according to when they are 
applied – in accordance with other scholars (e.g. Ghadge et al., 2012; Wieland & Wallenburg, 
2013; Saenz & Revilla, 2014; Hohenstein et al., 2015) – some strategies may be planned and 
crafted before a disruption but only applied after the disruption. For example, redundant 
suppliers may be selected before the risk event but only contracted afterwards. Related to this 
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observation, Tang (2006b) attempted to categorise SCRES strategies through theoretical 
work. The author categorised the strategies broadly as supply and demand management, and 
argued that SCRES strategies fall into nine sub-categories i.e. postponement to create product 
flexibility, strategic stock, flexible supply base, make and buy, economic incentives, flexible 
transportation, revenue management, dynamic assortment planning and silent product 
rollover.   
Table 2.9 reveals that the most commonly cited SCRES strategies involve increasing 
flexibility, creating redundancy, forming collaborative supply chain relationships and 
improving supply chain agility. This is consistent with previous researchers who have 
considered these strategies as the most critical for SCRES (e.g. Longo & Oren, 2008; Jüttner 
& Maklan, 2011; Ponis & Koronis, 2012). These four key strategies – some of which are 
inter-related – are briefly discussed below before a broader discussion and assessment of 
resilience strategies follows.  
2.4.1.1. Increasing Flexibility 
Erol et al. (2010) defined flexibility as the ability of an enterprise to adapt to the changing 
requirements of its environment and stakeholders with minimum time and effort. Literature 
reveals various flexibility practices that can enhance SCRES such as postponement, a flexible 
supply base, flexible transportation, flexible labour arrangements, and order fulfilment 
flexibility (e.g. Tang, 2006b; Christopher & Holweg, 2011; Pettit et al., 2013). For example, 
it is argued that flexibility through postponement enhances resilience during a crisis by 
deferring demand to a future period (Tang, 2006b). Thus, flexibility creates SCRES by 
enhancing prompt adaptability during turbulence (e.g. Christopher & Holweg, 2011). It also 
aids a supply chain’s rapid response and recovery, and this can be facilitated by the 
availability of alternative choices (redundancy), including alternative suppliers (e.g. Sheffi & 
Rice, 2005). Flexibility also enables resources to be more easily redeployed, including 
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transportation and labour resources (Pettit et al., 2013). More generally, flexibility is 
necessary given that threats to resilience are non-stationary, requiring responses that are 
similarly adaptive.   
2.4.1.2. Creating Redundancy  
Redundancy involves the strategic and selective use of spare capacity and inventory that can 
be invoked during a crisis to cope, e.g. with supply shortages or demand surges (Christopher 
& Peck, 2004). Creating redundancy can be an expensive means of building resilience. For 
example, spare capacity is needed along the critical path to reduce potential vulnerability and 
build resilience (Christopher & Rutherford, 2004). It is however important to note that certain 
factors like geographical location and the total (global) demand should be considered when 
relying on redundancy to build SCRES. For example, if redundant suppliers are in close 
proximity to the disrupted supply network, they may also be affected by the event (such as in 
the case of an earthquake or flood).  
Further, it is also asserted that redundancy involves the duplication of capacity in order to 
continue operations during a failure (Rice & Caniato, 2003), and that it can therefore also be 
considered a route to flexibility (e.g. Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; Kristianto et al. 2014). Indeed, 
Johnson et al. (2013) found that redundancy increases flexibility, which facilitates response 
through the adaptable deployment of resources. This helps to avoid delay, thereby increasing 
SCRES. Although building flexibility is closely linked to redundancy, flexibility can also be 
achieved in other ways, e.g. by employing a multi-skilled labour force, installing multi-
purpose machines, and creating flexible contractual arrangements. Such flexibilities that do 
not necessarily rely on redundancy have been preferred by various scholars because they save 




2.4.1.3. Supply Chain Collaboration  
According to Pettit et al. (2013), supply chain collaboration refers to the ability to work 
effectively with other entities for mutual benefit in areas such as forecasting, postponement 
and risk sharing. Collaboration could also involve information exchange, which can reduce 
uncertainty, increase transparency and facilitate the creation and sharing of knowledge, such 
as about supply chain risks and uncertainties (Christopher & Peck, 2004). Collaboration can 
also enable supply chain partners to share the costs of building security and resilience (Bakshi 
& Kleindorfer, 2009). Moreover, it influences the processes adopted by supply chain partners 
to ensure supply chain recovery (Ghadge et al., 2012). For example, collaboration can 
facilitate the sharing of resources and other complementary skills necessary for recovery from 
a disruption (Scholten et al., 2014; Scholten &Schilder, 2015).  
     Collaboration also enhances SCRES by enabling supply chain partners to support each 
other during a disruptive event (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011) and to provide a flexible and 
coordinated response. For example, Toyota’s collaboration with suppliers following the 1997 
Aisin Seiki Kariya plant fire referred to earlier in Section 2.3 (Nishiguchi & Beaudet, 1998). 
This example is also useful in reminding us how certain practices in supply chain 
relationships, like just-in-time supply and single-sourcing supply partnerships create 
vulnerabilities that must be traded off against the benefits of these practices, like strong 
networks that could potentially facilitate a rapid response to a crisis. But such collaboration 
can also produce fragility, for example, in making social commitments that have to be 
honoured even when counter-productive. This was evident in the findings of this study where 
firms could be requested to wait patiently in case of supplier delivery delays and failures – 
limiting flexibility to switch suppliers and affecting the downstream by similarly delaying 




2.4.1.4. Supply Chain Agility 
Christopher & Peck (2004) defined supply chain agility as the ability to respond quickly to 
unpredictable changes in demand or supply; this could perhaps be achieved through a rapid 
change to business processes and systems (Erol et al., 2010). Christopher & Peck (2004) 
suggested that supply chain agility is mainly composed of visibility and velocity. Supply 
chain visibility refers to the ability to see through the entire supply chain (Christopher & 
Peck, 2004). It enables a clear view of the whole chain, which may help in detecting signals 
of impending disruptions. Visibility implies having knowledge of the status of a supply 
chain’s assets and environment (Pettit et al., 2013), thereby also helping to avoid 
overreactions, unnecessary interventions and ineffective decisions in circumstances of risk 
(Christopher & Lee, 2004). Furthermore, it helps the supply chain to effectively respond to 
and recover from disruptions through, for example, identifying vulnerable suppliers, thereby 
allowing enough time to develop countermeasures against potential failures (Jüttner & 
Maklan, 2011). For example, Procter & Gamble planners have tried to strengthen their supply 
chain visibility by installing monitoring tools to map the supply chain so as to improve threat 
awareness and receive timely warnings of potential disruptions (Saenz & Revilla, 2014). 
     Saenz & Revilla (2014) further describe how supply chain visibility helped Cisco to 
improve its agility and resilience to the Japanese earthquake and tsunami of 2011. Within 
twelve hours of the disaster, Cisco was able to map out its supply base beyond tier one 
suppliers (more than 300 suppliers) and within twenty-four hours, it was able to trace its 
customers and field 118 customer enquiries. This helped it to build a firm SCRES agenda and 
survive the effects of the disaster (Saenz & Revilla, 2014). The second element of agility 
referred to by Christopher & Peck (2004) – supply chain velocity – focuses on the pace of 
flexible adaptations (Stevenson & Spring, 2007), and thus determines the recovery speed of 
the supply chain from a risk event (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011). 
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2.4.1.5. An Assessment of Research on SCRES Strategies  
The four core strategies discussed above have received the majority of the attention in the 
SCRES literature. Beyond these four strategies, the literature on means of developing 
resilience to supply chain threats or disruptions is broad but limited in depth (see Table 2.9). 
Moreover, although the SCRES literature has identified many strategies for creating SCRES, 
few studies have gone beyond this to focus on how firms can actually develop or implement 
these strategies (Blackhurst et al., 2011). Yet, SCRES research should not only be about 
identifying strategies, but also about understanding how they can be successfully 
implemented. For example, it is abundantly clear that SCRES strategies have financial 
implications that may limit their implementation. Other issues, such as corruption, socio-
political instability, and unethical competitive practices, which are common sources of 
business risks (Lakovou et al., 2007), may also pose a threat to a SCRES strategy 
implementation. Similarly, how firms can choose between different SCRES strategies is 
under-researched. Given that a firm has limited resources to deploy, what factors should a 
manager take into consideration when deciding how to improve SCRES? One of the factors 
influencing the choice of strategy to adopt is likely to be a firm’s or individual’s perceptions 
of risk (Martin et al., 2009; Park, 2011). Cox et al. (2011) argued that the perception of a 
threat plays a fundamental role in building SCRES.  Thus, perceptions of supply chain threats 
and how such perceptions shape decisions concerning the choice of certain SCRES strategies 
over others could be an important consideration for future research. 
Although, clearly, several SCRES strategies have been proposed, the relationships 
between them remain ambiguous (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; Ponis & Koronis, 2012; Johnson 
et al., 2013; Hohenstein et al., 2015). There are varying views on the exact relationship 
between constructs such as flexibility, redundancy, collaboration and agility (e.g. Tang 
&Tomlin 2008; Zsidisin & Wagner, 2010; Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; Ponis & Koronis, 2012; 
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Johnson et al. 2013). All can be considered as antecedents of SCRES (e.g. Zsidisin & Wagner 
2010; Carvalho et al. 2012b; Ponis & Koronis 2012). But, for example, while some SCRES 
scholars consider constructs like flexibility and redundancy to be independent (Sheffi & Rice, 
2005; Zsidisin &Wagner, 2010), others argue they are interrelated (e.g. Jüttner & Maklan, 
2011; Ponis & Koronis, 2012; Johnson et al., 2013).  Further, it is argued that supply chain 
collaboration and redundant resources facilitate flexibility (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; Scholten 
& Schilder, 2015; Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015); and that both flexibility and collaboration can 
improve agility (Carvalho et al., 2012b) – suggesting these strategies can complement each 
other. Nevertheless, it seems equally possible that different strategies for building SCRES can 
conflict with one another. For example, it has been argued that building close collaborative 
relationships can conflict with some aspects of flexibility (Stevenson & Spring, 2007; 
Scholten & Schilder, 2015). Collaboration through information sharing may facilitate the 
disclosure of sensitive information leading to loss of confidentiality (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011) 
and enhancing redundancy to facilitate flexibility may result in a liquidity risk (Jüttner & 
Maklan, 2011). 
Based on the above discussion, it can be argued that enhancing each SCRES strategy in 
isolation may be counterproductive, raising the possibility of a moving problem known as 
risk migration (e.g. Grabowski & Roberts, 1997; Alcock & Busby, 2006). In other words, in a 
bid to achieve one facet of resilience – by enhancing one of its antecedents – other facets are 
likely to be degraded through the effects on other antecedents. This – which is likely to 
reduce the effectiveness of SCRES strategies – requires a more holistic approach and should 
be investigated further.  
2.4.2. Overview of the Empirical Research on SCRES 
The current SCRES research is dominated by conceptual, theoretical and modelling work 
mainly focussing on the straegies for building resilience (Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015). The 
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focus of a sample of the current papers in these categories has been outlined in section 2.4.  
Recently, out of the 91 papers reviewed through a comprehensive systematic search by 
Tukamuhabwa et al. (2015), 39 belonged to the conceptual and theoretical  category while 33 
were modelling work. The empirical research in the form of case studies and surveys were 
limited to just 19 papers (Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015). The table below provides an updated 






Table 2.10: Overview of Empirical Research on SCRES (Cross-sectional & Longitudinal Case Studies & Cross-sectional Surveys 
 







Secure and resilient supply 
chains to terrorist attacks 
Case Study 
Case study of 20 medium and large scale 
companies ranging from high-tech and 





Pettit et al. 
(2010) 




Case study/ focus group of an apparel and 
beauty care products retailer. 8 separate focus 







Enablers and inhibitors of 
supply resilience 
Case Study 
Case study of an automobile manufacturer, two 
suppliers and a distributor; and a 
pharmaceuticals manufacturer, three retailers 















Social capital and SCRES: 
UK rail crash 
Case Study 
Case study of The Lambrigg, UK rail crash. 











Case study of the ASDA Pork-Link supply 






An assessment model based 
on green and resilient 
practices. 
Case Study 







Pettit et al. 
(2013) 
An assessment tool for 
supply chain resilience 
Case Study 
Case study of 7 global manufacturing and 
service firms and focus groups (global retailer 
of personal care, beauty, and apparel products, 
electronics, medical transportation firm 
operating as a non-profit firm, personal care 




Borekci et al. 
(2014) 
Relational dynamics and 
resilience in buyer-supplier 
triads 
Case Study 
Case study of eight buyers and their suppliers 







Collaboration and SCRES Case Study 
Case study of 2 food processing companies  












Case study of the Voluntary Organisations 
Active in Disaster (VOAD); nine interviews in 







Strategies for building the 
resilience of energy supply 
chains 
Case Study 
Case study of five companies operating in the 










SCRES capabilities in a 
global financial crisis 
Case Study 
Case study of 3 large firms: a chemical 







Boone et al. 
(2013) 
Strategic alignment of 
inventory and SCRES 
Case Study 
Field study involving 10 United States Air 








SCRES practices, supply risk 
sources and disruption 
occurrences 
Survey 
Survey conducted within 5 large companies in 
construction, paper and other capital 
equipment, aircraft manufacture, and material 
handling equipment industries – sample size of 








Antecedents of SCRES Survey 
Survey of 141 IT executives with a response 






Fakoor et al. 
(2013) 




Survey of 126 managers and experts in the 







Firm innovativeness and 
SCRES 
Survey 
Survey of 121 participants from the USA & 












Relational competences and 
SCRES 
Survey 
Survey of manufacturing firms with a response 











Jones et al. 
(2014)   
Antecedents of SCRES and 
robustness 
Survey 
Survey of 264 UK manufacturing plants, with 










Gölgeci &  
Ponomarov 
(2014) 




Survey of 121 participants from the USA & 








Antecedents of SCRES Survey 










The number of empirical papers – case studies or surveys – is limited to just twenty articles, 
as summarised in Table 2.10 above. These articles have predominantly focussed on the 
strategies a supply chain may use or has previously used to build SCRES. All the different 
terms used such as antecedents, enablers and practices refer to what can help in building 
SCRES and can be rephrased to mean strategies (Hohenstein et al., 2015). The lack of 
empirical work on SCRES presents a distinct knowledge gap. It means that we cannot clearly 
understand how SCRES can be either achieved or, indeed, lost in practice. What is proposed 
in theory may not apply in practice. For example, it is now generally theorised that a supply 
chain is a CAS (e.g. Wycisk et al., 2008; Hearnshaw & Wilson, 2013; Day, 2014), which 
suggests empirically adopting an intergrated view of threats, strategies and outcomes if we 
are to understand SCRES. Also, the few available empirical papers constitute a sizable 
number of cross-sectional surveys typically being based on a single respondent from each 
firm. Previous scholars have acknowledged that resilience is interpreted differently by 
particular groups of people, based on how their interpretation fits their understanding and 
purpose (Walker et al., 2004). Moreover, McCarthy et al. (2006) recommended  the use of a 
multiple case study approach when researching CAS phenomena such as SCRES. This 
approach is important in understanding how and why firms construct particular influences on 
SCRES as either effective or ineffective, and therefore, how they deal with them as a result.  
     Further, it is observed that SCRES researchers have predominantly used a firm as the unit 
of analysis. But the processes involved in SCRES, such as adaptation and co-evolution  are 
arguably difficult to understand by studying a single entity in the supply chain – they need to 
be examined across multiple related firms in a network. SCRES is a network phenomenon 
arising from connectivity and interdependence between firms. This suggests that we should 
consider supply chains, rather than individual firms, as the unit of analysis as recommended 
by Kim et al. (2015a) . Busby & Alcock (2008) observed that most contemporary risk events 
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have emerged at the level of networks rather than individual firms. It is further claimed that  
the resilience of a firm is determined by the resilience of its supply chain (Sheffi & Rice, 
2005; Wedawatta et al., 2010). 
     The final column in Table 2.10 shows that SCRES research has mainly been conducted in 
developed countries, particularly in Western Europe and North America. SCRES research to 
date has concentrated almost exclusively on the developed world context. Yet, there are 
grounds for believing that the most catastrophic effects of supply chain failures (particularly 
on human life) have occurred in developing countries. For instance, the infiltration of 
counterfeit drugs into the pharmaceutical supply chain has been more prevalent and caused 
more severe effects in the developing world than in developed countries (Chika et al., 2011). 
For example, it was reported that counterfeit pharmaceuticals led to the death of 2,500 people 
in 1995 and 192,000 people in 2001 in Nigeria and China, respectively (Chan et al., 2010).  
Furthermore, the cultural and economic differences that exist between developed and 
developing economies suggest that perceptions and responses to threats may differ between 
these contexts. Meanwhile, differences in economic development and the relatively poor 
quality of infrastructure, like road and rail networks, may mean certain developing countries 
are more susceptible to certain disruptions than more mature, developed countries. Thus, 
investigating how SCRES issues are handled in developing countries is an important future 
research direction. 
     It is also observed that much prior work has focused on high-profile catastrophic, discrete 
events, e.g. SARS, terrorist attacks and the foot-and-mouth disease (Rice & Caniato, 2003; 
Christopher & Peck, 2004; Sheffi, 2005), the global financial crisis (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011), 
rail crashes (Johnson et al., 2013), war (Urciuoli et al., 2014), and Hurricane Katrina 
(Scholten et al., 2014). A similar focus on large-scale disasters can also be found in 
conceptual papers on SCRES (e.g. Boin et al., 2010; Abe & Ye, 2013; Day, 2014; Saenz & 
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Revilla, 2014). But supply chains also suffer from smaller, yet much more frequent, chronic 
problems that affect their resilience (e.g. Carvalho et al., 2014; Ambulkar et al., 2015; Das & 
Lashkari, 2015) – an example being the threat of product counterfeiting. And once we view a 
supply chain as a CAS, that can exhibit inherent non-linearities, it becomes apparent that 
even relatively small external and internal events can cause a considerable impact. This will 
be developed later in section 2.5. 
2.4.3. Use of Theory in the SCRES Literature 
This subsection briefly reviews the theories that have been used thus far in SCRES empirical 
research. Established theoretical lenses help in understanding a phenomenon, in identifying 
the relationships among variables and in enhancing the generalisability of findings across 
different contexts (Foy et al., 2011). The notable theories that have been used so far in 
SCRES empirical research and indicated in Table 2.10 are: Resource Based View (RBV), 
Dynamic Capabilities, Systems theory, Rational choice theory, Social capital, Relational view 
and contingency theory. From Table 2.10, it is evident that the most commonly used theories 
are the Resource Based View (RBV) and the related dynamic capabilities model. The RBV 
postulates that internal organisational resources that are valuable, inimitable, rare and non-
substitutable are a source of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). It suggests that a firm is 
comprised of both the tangible and intangible resources, which, for example, may combine to 
create capabilities that determine its reaction to several internal and external threats as well as 
to opportunities (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). In SCRES research, the RBV has been 
used to explain the resources and capabilities that are considered antecedents of resilience, 
such as logistics capabilities (Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009), human, organisational and 
inter-organisational capital resources (Blackhurst et al., 2011), redundant resources and 
flexible capabilities (e.g. Park, 2011). Other studies (e.g. Ponomarov, 2012) have 
incorporated the related dynamic capabilities perspective, arguing that capabilities for 
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enhancing SCRES should be dynamic to match changes in the environment (e.g. Teece, 
2007).  
Beyond the RBV and the related dynamic capabilities model, Blackhurst et al. (2011) used 
systems theory to explain resilience as an inherent feature of a system composed of e.g. 
flexibility, agility and adaptive capacity. A supply chain has been seen as an open system that 
is vulnerable to disruption from environmental events, with the impact of disruption on such 
a system depending on its level of resilience (Blackhurst et al., 2011). Through the systems 
theory lens, Blackhurst et al. (2011) proposed that disruptions to a supply chain due, for 
example, to stringent security, customs regulations, product complexity or inadequate 
supplier capacity can reduce SCRES. 
Few other theories beyond the above have been used in the SCRES literature, but most of 
these have been used by a single paper only (see Table 2.10, 6
th
 column). For example, 
Brandon-Jones et al. (2014) used contingency theory, which stipulates that optimal decisions 
and actions depend on both internal and external factors. This theory considers strategies as 
necessary responses to the environment (Wagner & Bode, 2008). Applying this theory, 
Brandon-Jones et al. (2014) contended the relationship between supply chain visibility and 
SCRES is moderated by supply base complexity e.g. the geographical dispersion of the 
supply base.  
2.4.3.1. An Assessment of the Use of Theory in the SCRES Literature 
Table 2.10 shows that only six of the twenty one empirical papers explicitly used or referred 
to a theoretical lens. This limited application of theory in SCRES research was also 
acknowledged by Fang et al. (2012). The lack of theory application may have limited our 
ability to understand resilience and its related variables as well as the relationships between 
them. It also makes the generalisation of research findings from one context to another 
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difficult. It is therefore important that the SCRES research literature makes greater use of 
theory to improve our understanding of the phenomenon. 
It is argued here that the main theories used so far are not sufficient for explaining SCRES. 
RBV, for example, which is the most often used theory in the SCRES literature, is premised 
on a firm’s internal resources (Barney, 1991). Yet, SCRES is a system level phenomenon that 
occurs at the level of a supply chain rather than an individual firm, and it involves 
connections between firms. Thus, RBV does not particularly help us to understand SCRES as 
a network level phenomenon. Kim et al. (2015a) recently argued against the current firm 
level analysis of SCRES phenomena, suggesting that a more appropriate level of analysis 
would indeed be a supply network. Further, RBV assumes reasonably predictable 
environments where the future value of resources is determinable (Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010). 
But SCRES has emergent characteristics due to the non-linear, dynamic and unpredictable 
nature of the environment to which it is a response. RBV also focuses on the component level 
– on the value of individual and separable resources; and it ignores their synergies, making it 
reductionist (e.g. Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010). In contrast, SCRES is a system level pattern 
emerging from the collective, dynamic and non-linear interactions between firms along the 
supply chain. As such, it could be argued that it can neither be objectively measured nor 
appropriately described using reductionist approaches (e.g. Brownlee, 2007). 
As with the RBV, both the dynamic capabilities model and contingency theory have a firm 
level focus and may not adequately explain the systemic nature of SCRES. For example, 
dynamic capability models consider market dynamism and firm evolution over time (e.g. 
Wang & Ahmed, 2007). Meanwhile, contingency theory focuses on the fit between an 
organisational structure and its contingencies. Most of the other theories used thus far have 
similar shortcomings for studying SCRES. Systems theory is more promising for it 
recognises resilience as a systemic phenomenon. However, today’s supply chains go beyond 
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traditional systems – they are complex systems with elements that continuously interact with 
each other and with their environment in an adaptive way. This means supply chains are 
complex adaptive systems (Day, 2014; Carter et al., 2015) and their resilience is achieved 
through adaptive and co-evolving processes.  Therefore, an alternative theoretical lens that 
takes these features into account is required to make further progress in understanding and 
building SCRES. This study suggests that Complex Adaptive System (CAS) theory provides 
such a lens. Recently, Day (2014) used CAS theory, to conceptually explain the resilience of 
disaster relief supply networks and acknowledged that disaster relief supply networks differ 
from commercial supply chains. These supply networks may, for example, be constructed to 
respond to high profile events for a discrete period of time. There are many other types of 
supply chains – including long-term supply chains that face continuous threats – that also 
need to be resilient, and to which features like adaptation and co-evolution may be even more 
relevant. Thus, CAS can offer more help in understanding and interpreting empirical work on 
SCRES in commercial supply networks such as that of manufacturing firms in Uganda.  In 
the next section, the CAS framework is outlined as a candidate theoretical lens – justifying its 
choice as an appropriate theory for studying SCRES.  
2.5. Complex Adaptive Systems: A Proposed Theory Lens for SCRES 
Research 
The term Complex Adaptive System (CAS) emerged from complexity theory (Nilsson, 2003; 
Burnes, 2004; Schneider & Somers, 2006; Brownlee, 2007) and was initially applied to living 
systems (Surana et al., 2005; Wycisk et al., 2008). Complexity theory focuses on the 
emergence of order in dynamic and non-linear systems that operate at the edge of chaos 
(Fuller & Moran 2001; Burnes, 2004; Urry, 2005). Since physical and social phenomena 
contain both chaos and order, complex nonlinear systems tend to be neither overly stable nor 
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unstable. This is achieved through their order-generating rules, which facilitate 
transformation and self-organisation in order to remain at the edge of chaos amidst 
environmental changes (Burnes, 2004). A CAS is regarded as a special kind of complex 
system due to the property of adaptation (Nilsson, 2003; Surana et al., 2005) and can exist in 
unstable, but not completely chaotic environments (Innes & Booher, 1999).  
Holland (1995) defined a CAS as a kind of system that, over time, emerges into a coherent 
form through the aforementioned properties of adaptation and self-organisation. It consists of 
an interconnected network of multiple entities (or agents) that respond adaptively to changes 
in both the environment and the system of entities within it (Choi et al., 2001). In a CAS, 
adaptation implies that the system’s agents or elements are responsive, flexible, reactive and 
often proactive in dealing with the inputs of other agents or elements that affect it (Nilsson, 
2003). This means the CAS agents have the ability to develop or modify different responses 
to match the nature of the requirements of other agents or the environment. The agents that 
constitute a CAS are guided by order-generating rules, also known as schemas (e.g. 
McCarthy, 2003; Pathak et al., 2007; Hasgall, 2013), which determine how the CAS responds 
during the adaptation process. The CAS environment is rugged and dynamic; and CAS agents 
must adapt to maintain fit with the environment in a timely manner (Wycisk et al., 2008; Day, 
2014). During the adaptation process, new changes in the CAS and its environment may arise 
through a process of co-evolution (Choi et al., 2001), which makes it necessary to learn, 
thereby making appropriate modifications to schemas to increase fitness (Wycisk et al., 2008; 
Day, 2014). But, equally, a CAS acts on and modifies its environment, and entities within the 
environment learn from the system’s responses.  
The process of co-evolution in a CAS is also influenced by its non-linearity (Choi et al., 
2001), which together with self-organisation and emergence has been considered a core 
feature of a CAS (McCarthy, 2003, 2004; McCarthy et al., 2006). Non-linearity implies that 
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extreme events may yield disproportionately negative or positive effects (Wycisk et al., 
2008). Non-linearity may be influenced by the number and type of connections and 
interactions between the CAS agents (McCarthy et al., 2006). The degree of connectivity may 
also influence the extent to which the CAS agents act autonomously such that the higher the 
connectivity, the lower the agents’ autonomy, and vice versa (Pathak et al., 2007).  
Non-linearity in a CAS also produces self-organisation and emergence (McCarthy et al., 
2006). Self-organisation and emergence refer to the synergistic effect of the decisions and 
actions of individual agents in a CAS that can cause changes, including the development of 
new structures, patterns and properties (Pathak et al., 2007). These changes may also be 
facilitated by the feature of scalability, which implies that different entities at different levels 
of a CAS have the same concerns; for example, reducing costs, increasing delivery speed and 
adaptation (Surana et al., 2005; Wycisk et al., 2008). As such, individual agents strive to 
achieve their goals by addressing their concerns, but end up causing the emergence of similar 
collective patterns at the wider system level. 
2.5.1. A CAS Theory Lens: Fit with Supply Chains and the Phenomenon of SCRES  
From the above, it follows that non-linearity, self-organization and emergence are core 
features of a CAS (McCarthy et al., 2006); and it is these features  and  a few others (outlined 
in Table 2.11)  that explain why a supply chain has been considered a CAS (Pathak et al., 
2007; Wycisk et al., 2008; Hearnshaw & Wilson, 2013; Day, 2014). Since resilience is 
inherent to a CAS (Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015), there is a logical fit between CAS theory and 
the study of SCRES. A supply chain as a CAS can be considered resilient if it is able to 
effectively adapt to threats in its environment without violating its integrity as a system – 
returning to its original (or attain a better) performance level. Such adaptation often involves 
modifying the environment meaning it inherently involves co-evolution.  SCRES involves 
adapting to non-linear processes such as where minor changes in supply chain controls allow 
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for catastrophic events to potentially occur. The most obvious example of this is the bullwhip 
effect, where a small distortion in the flow of orders downstream may result in a 
disproportionately large distortion upstream – disrupting the entire supply chain 
(Mackelprang & Malhotra, 2015).  The non-linearity of SCRES can also be demonstrated by 
the fire in 2000 that gutted Philips’ semiconductor plant – a key supplier of a critical cell 
phone component to both Nokia and Ericsson. This which was initially considered a small 
incident resulted in an unanticipated massive disruption to Nokia’s entire supply chain, and it 
emerged that Ericsson was less resilient to this than Nokia. As a result, Nokia prospered 
while Ericsson registered a $1.7 billion loss for the year and eventually went out of business 
(Hopkins, 2005). 
SCRES is manifested through the process of self-organisation – another property of a CAS 
– rather than as a result of being deliberately managed or controlled by a single firm. No 
single firm, however large it may be, can claim to manage and control the resilience of the 
entire supply chain. This is partly because a supply chain is complex to the extent that most 
of what happens therein is beyond the visibility and reach of a focal firm (Choi & Krause, 
2006; Carter et al., 2015). Moreover, Carter et al. (2015) argued that what is perceived as a 
supply chain is relative and people can refer to different fragments of the supply chain  as 
their supply chains depending, for example, on each individual firm’s level of visibility and 
knowledge – meaning different firms can have differing visibility and knowledge of the same 
supply chain. These differences in visibility are similarly confirmed by the survey by the 
Business Continuity Institute (2013), which found that 75% of respondents lacked visibility 
of their supply chains.  
 A structured comparison between the features of a CAS, a supply chain and SCRES is 
provided in Table 2.11.  From  this table, the features of a CAS – such as adaptation and co-
evolution, nonlinearity, network connectivity/interaction, dimensionality, self-organisation 
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and emergence, and scalability – can be seen to be applicable to the notion of supply chains 






Table 2.11: Comparison between the Features of a Complex Adaptive System (CAS), a Supply Chain & SCRES 
 
CAS Features Description Relevance to Supply Chains 




(Choi et al. 2001; 
Schneider & 
Somers, 2006; 
Pathak et al., 
2007; Wycisk et 
al., 2008; Day, 
2014). 
The CAS agents change so as to cope with 
changes in other agents and its environment 
through self-organisation. The CAS can also 
influence changes in other agents as well as its 
environment. 
Due to environmental dynamism, the 
supply chain changes in order to adapt. The 
activities of individual firms may also 
influence the supply chain environment. 
SCRES is an adaptive phenomenon 
(Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009; 
Hearnshaw & Wilson, 2013; Adtiya et 
al., 2014). Firms adapt to supply chain 
threats, but this may cause more 
changes in the environment. 
Multi scale/ 
heterogeneous 
agents (e.g. Choi 
et al., 2001; 
Surana et al., 
2005; Wycisk et 
al., 2008) 
Agents refer to entities that form a CAS. They 
operate at different levels in the system. Agents 
may be individuals, teams, divisions or the entire 
organization. They are heterogeneous for they 
follow different schemas but aim to enhance 
their fitness within the entire system. 
Agents in a supply chain may be the 
individual firms. These operate at different 
levels with different rules, functions and 
objectives, e.g. supplier, manufacturer, 
distributor, retailer and customer. 
The resilience of a supply chain is a 
collective outcome from the 
interactions of different firms along the 
supply chain as they apply schema 
(strategies and rules) to increase 
fitness/survival (e.g. Day, 2014). 
Schema (Choi et 
al., 2001; 
McCarthy, 2003; 
Surana et al., 
2005; Pathak et 
al., 2007; Hasgall, 
2013)  
Schema refers to the norms, values, beliefs and 
assumptions that are shared by a group of 
individuals. It is a set of goal led rules that guide 
the decisions and operations of individual CAS 
agents. For example, schemas may include 
strategies or plans in an organisation. 
Organisations within the supply chain have 
rules, visions, objectives, goals and 
strategies that guide their decisions and 
operations.  
Schemas include strategies and plans 
(McCarthy, 2003) such as firms’ 
supply chain resilience strategies, 
which enable firms to modify their 
operations and adapt to their supply 





et al., 2001; 
The environment in which the CAS operates 
consists of other CASs and is more complex 
than the CAS itself. The environment is rugged 
and dynamic causing changes that the CAS 
agents must adapt to in order to achieve fitness. 
In a supply chain environment, changes 
exist, e.g. in the supply base, statutory 
regulations, etc. 
Environmental dynamism creates 
threats. SCRES involves adaptation to 
both internal and external threats.  
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Pathak et al., 
2007) 
This adaptation may also cause changes in the 
whole system as well as the environment. 
Ability to learn 
(Wycisk et al., 
2008; Day, 2014) 
Agents in a CAS learn by obtaining information 
from their relationships within the system and 
the surrounding environment. It is through their 
dynamic learning that they are able to make 
decisions on modifying their capabilities and 
changing their schema in order to improve their 
fitness and performance. 
Organizational learning exists among 
firms/agents in the supply chain.   
Organisational learning enhances 
SCRES (Ponomarov & Holcomb, 
2009; Pettit, 2010; Ponis & Koronis, 
2012). Learning helps in adaptation by 
facilitating the modification of 
resilience strategies. 
Nonlinearity 
(Choi et al., 2001; 
Urry, 2005; 
Surana et al., 
2005; Brownlee, 
2007; Pathak et 
al., 2007;Wycisk 
et al., 2008; Day, 
2014). 
There is a non-linear relationship between the 
cause and effect of CAS events. For example, a 
seemingly small event may cause extremely 
large effects in the system (either positive or 
negative). Similarly, severe events may yield 
very trivial effects and at times no effect at all. 
A small change in the downstream part of 
the supply chain can cause amplified and 
oscillating changes in the supply chain 
upstream, e .g. the bullwhip effect. 
Due to non-linearity coupled with 
interdependence, seemingly small 
disturbances can result in massive 
supply chain threats. Survival depends 
on embracing SCRES strategies, such 
as increasing visibility and flexibility 





et al., 2001; 
Pathak et al., 
2007; Wycisk et 
al., 2008) 
A CAS is composed of agents and their 
connections. The connectivity of these agents 
determines the complexity and the 
dimensionality of the CAS. 
Agents in a supply network have physical 
connection that facilitates the flow of 
information, resources and materials. Such 
connections include telephone lines and the 
internet. 
Supply network connectivity and 
clustering facilitated by information 
flows facilitate collaboration, reduce 
opportunistic behaviour and enhance 
resilience (Hearnshaw & Wilson, 
2013).  
Dimensionality 
(Choi et al., 2001; 
Surana et al., 
2005) 
Dimensionality refers to the degree of freedom 
an individual agent possesses in order to act 
somehow autonomously. 
Supply chain entities have different 
objectives and constraints. They operate 
autonomously although their connectivity 
with other supply chain members causes 
some interdependence. 
Individual firms have partial freedom 
to make decisions. This contributes to 
self- organisation, emergence and 
adaptation (e.g. McCarthy et al., 




(Choi et al., 2001; 
Surana et al., 
Decisions made by individual agents cause new 
structures, patterns and properties to emerge at 
the system level without being externally 
controlled or imposed by any single agent. Some 
agents may have greater influence on the system 
There is no single firm that deliberately 
controls or organises the entire supply 
chain. It simply emerges in part because a 
firm cannot manage the entire extended 
supply chain. Each firm tries to achieve its 
Resilience is an emergent feature of a 
supply chain (Day, 2014; Golgeci & 
Ponomarov, 2013). It is a result of self- 
organised processes that enhance 




& Somers, 2006; 
Brownlee, 2007; 
Pathak et al., 
2007; Wycisk et 
al,. 2008; Nilsson 
& Gammelgaard, 
2012) 
than others, but they cannot control it entirely. goals but this in turn contributes to the 
collective behaviour of the entire network.  
firm controls the resilience of the 
entire supply chain (Geng et al., 2014). 
Scalability (e.g. 
Surana et al., 
2005; Wycisk et 
al., 2008)  
The same causal dynamics in a CAS may apply 
across all of its levels. 
Agents/ firms at different tiers in the supply 
chain may have similar concerns, e.g. 
improving quality, delivery speed and 
reducing cost. 
Inter-relatedness within a supply chain 
and the presence of common schema 
shared by firms are vital for the 
adaptation and survival (resilience) of 
the entire supply chain (e.g. Schneider 
& Somers, 2006). 
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2.6. Conclusion and Summary of the Research Gaps 
To conclude, all the above observations in the SCRES literature remain very general and 
have not been substantiated to any great degree in the literature. There is still a need to 
understand how, for example, the strategies that firms use to try to attain supply chain 
resilience play out within the supply system. Based on the literature, it has been suggested 
that SCRES strategies interact with each other – an interaction that seems inevitable once we 
take a CAS perspective. However, there is still a lack of understanding of how they interact, 
with what consequences, and how resilience emerges (or fails to emerge) as a result. As 
indicated earlier in Chapter 1, it is also suspected that the context of the supply chain – 
particularly how it is situated in a more or less developed economy – will have an important 
influence on this process. Overall, therefore, three important gaps can be identified in the 
literature: 
 First, there is a need for further empirical work on SCRES, particularly across a 
network of firms and in a developing country context. Developing countries are 
important players in global supply chains and also face supply chain disruptions that 
can become catastrophic – yet from the available literature analysed above, 
developing countries have been evidently ignored. 
 Second, there is a need to understand the relationships between the various strategies 
proposed for building resilience. Strategies may reinforce or contradict each other, 
potentially affecting their implementation outcomes. 
 Third, further research is needed in which appropriate theory frames are used to 
interpret and enhance understanding of empirical findings as it was found that there is 
limited use of theoretical frames in the current SCRES empirical work. This thesis 
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supports the suggestion that CAS is a potentially important theory frame for the study 
of SCRES as a systemic phenomenon. 
Since CAS has been chosen as a guiding theoretical lens for this research, it becomes 
important to study resilience systemically, investigating the inter-relationships between 
threats, strategies and outcomes, rather than analysing them individually and separately as has 
been observed in the current SCRES literature. Building on the above gaps, this thesis seeks 
to firstly investigate the elements of SCRES in a developing country context by investigating 
what manufacturing firms in Uganda perceive to be the threats to their supply chains, what 
strategies they adopt to build resilience, and what the outcomes are of implementing these 
strategies. Secondly, there is need to investigate how threats and strategies are interrelated, 
and what such interrelatedness means for SCRES. These questions are already outlined in 
Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
 
The next chapter (Chapter 3) seeks to make progress in addressing the above research 
questions by describing the methodological design adopted to answer the research questions, 
mainly elaborating how the case study data was collected and analysed, including the 














This chapter presents the research methodology used in the study. The following sub-section 
(3.2) discusses the research design organised based on Saunders et al. (2009)’s research 
design framework. This entails: the research philosophy (3.2.1), research approach (3.2.2), 
research strategy and choice (3.2.3) and research techniques (3.2.4) which includes the 
selection of cases, case study protocol, ethical concerns, pilot study, data collection, the unit 
of analysis and data analysis. Finally the chapter concludes in (3.3) with the quality of the 
research design.  A recap of the research questions earlier introduced in chapter 1 is provided 
here below – research questions are important in research design for they inform the choices 
of the research strategy, data collection techniques and analysis (Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
Research questions 
RQ1: What are the elements of supply chain resilience in a developing country? 
a) What do manufacturing firms in Uganda perceive to be the threats to their 
supply chains? 
b) What strategies do they adopt to build resilience to these threats? 
c) What are the outcomes of implementing these strategies? 
RQ2:  How are threats and strategies interconnected with the outcomes? 





3.2. Research Methodological Design 
The research design is important to explain and justify the type of data to be collected, how 
and where it is to be collected, as well as how it is to be analysed, interpreted and presented 
(Yin, 2003). It links the data to be collected and the conclusions drawn to the research 
questions (Yin, 2009). There are several frameworks developed to guide research design. For 
example, Creswell (2009) highlights three broad components of the research design i.e. the 
philosophical positioning of the research (world view), the strategy of inquiry and the specific 
methods and procedures to be used. Similarly, Saunders et al. (2009) developed a research 
design framework which they labelled ‘research onion’ with the following layers: 
philosophies, research approaches, research strategies, research choice, techniques and 
procedures. This framework which arguably provides clarity and comprehensiveness of the 
different issues involved in research methodology and has been adopted by previous doctoral 
researchers (e.g. Wedawatta, 2013) will be adapted for this research.  
 
Figure 3.1: Aspects of the Research Design 
 
 
Source: Saunders et al. (2009). 
3.2.1. Research Philosophy: Pragmatism 
Amaratunga & Baldry (2001) contended that research, as a human action, is grounded on 
philosophical stances. Saunders et al. (2009) defines research philosophy as a comprehensive 
term related to the nature and development of knowledge. Research philosophy can be 
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classified into different research paradigms depending on the researchers’ beliefs about the 
creation of knowledge (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). The research paradigm refers to the 
shared belief systems that influence the kinds of knowledge researchers seek and how they 
interpret the evidence they collect (Morgan, 2007). According to the metaphysical paradigm, 
there is a linkage between ontology, epistemology, and methodology (Morgan, 2007). 
Likewise, Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) argued that both ontological and epistemological 
assumptions are crucial in guiding both scientist and social scientist research. Whereas 
ontology is a branch of philosophy that deals with the nature of the world and its existence, 
epistemology refers to how best the nature of the world can be investigated (Easterby-Smith 
et al., 2012). In other words, epistemology is about the best way of obtaining knowledge 
about the nature of reality – it is essentially about “how we know what we know” (Crotty, 
2003). The link between researchers’ ontological and epistemological assumptions suggests 
that the former takes precedence over the latter (Danermark et al., 2002).  
     There is an on-going debate regarding the most appropriate philosophical paradigm for 
social science and management research. The extreme contrast however, falls between 
positivism and social constructivism. Positivism generally assumes the existence of the social 
world, whose properties can be measured using objective methods rather than being 
subjectively inferred through sensation, intuition or reflection (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). 
Its variant is post-positivism which represents the thinking after positivism – emphasising 
that researchers cannot be “positive” about knowledge claims when investigating the 
behaviour as well as actions of humans (Creswell, 2009). Social constructionism on the other 
hand builds on the assumption that reality is subjective, socially constructed and given 
meaning by people (e.g. Creswell, 2009). According to scholars (e.g. Burrell & Morgan, 
1979), research may build on both positivism and anti-positivism. Such research should 
occupy a certain position along the continuum between the two approaches. Thus, borrowing 
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from this, and considering the nature of the research phenomenon at hand (i.e. SCRES), this 
research can be positioned between post-positivism and constructivism.  
     In terms of ontology for example, most supply chain research assumes that there are things 
we call ‘supply chains’ which exist irrespective of whether we happen to be analysing them 
at the time. They are supply chains not just because we call them that, but also because they 
behave in particular ways. Furthermore, it is argued here that we can measure objectively 
how well a supply chain performs in response to threats which we can also measure. 
However, this is always relative in the sense that what is a relevant measurement always 
depends on whose interests are at stake.  
     Moreover, some recent scholars have argued that a supply chain is a relative concept 
depending, for example, on what the focal firm perceives it to be (Carter et al., 2015).  Also, 
while risk perception can be measured objectively, risk remains an interactive and culturally 
determined phenomenon (Dake, 1992). Thus, this study maintains that the interpretation and 
meanings attached to supply chain risk related issues such as threats and resilience may differ 
among different socio-cultural settings – depending on various interpretations and meanings 
people attach to them. Related to this, some scholars (e.g. Walker et al., 2004) have 
recognised that different groups of people interpret resilience according to how their 
interpretation fits their understanding and purpose. For example, whereas consumers in the 
developed world may interpret product counterfeiting as a risk, it may not be viewed as such 
in a developing country where customers look at it as an appropriate way of getting cheap 
products, which they could not otherwise afford. This is further supported by the findings 
from this study which revealed that customers in Uganda prefer buying counterfeits because 
they are mostly cheaper than genuine products. Some interviewees further revealed that the 
government can deliberately recommend the use of substandard products. Such findings 
indicate that there is no objective boundary between SCRES phenomena and the context – 
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and this is why it was necessary to adopt an embeddedness framework in this research to 
explain the interrelationships among threats, SCRES strategies and outcomes (see chapter 6). 
Therefore, given the nature of the research phenomenon at hand as explained above (i.e. 
occupying a position along the positivism-constructivism continuum), one of the alternative 
ontological assumptions that create a middle ground between these two philosophical 
positions can be “critical realism”. Critical realism suggests existence of a real world both 
separately to our knowledge of it and concurrently with our socially constructed knowledge 
about reality (Danermark et al., 2002). However, a related philosophical position but one that 
goes beyond “paradigm wars” is pragmatism – and it is the position adopted in this study.  
     Pragmatism recognises the existence of objective reality as well as that lodged in mind, 
and appreciates the importance of using multiple methods, different world views, 
assumptions, forms of data collection and analysis (Creswell 2009). Proponents of 
pragmatism reject the traditional dualisms such as objectivism and subjectivism – they 
recognise the existence and importance of both the natural or physical world and the 
emergent social and psychological world that entails language, culture, human institutions 
and subjective thoughts. Pragmatists believe that research is influenced by the social, 
historical, political as well as other contexts (Creswell, 2009). This is particularly relevant to 
this study that seeks to understand SCRES from a different context (i.e. from a developing 
country context) which is expected to influence the findings. Initially, pragmatism was 
consistently omitted from the list of other philosophical approaches due to its sharp contrast 
with the metaphysical paradigm’s foundational assumptions on the nature of reality and 
possibility of objective truth – pragmatism challenged why we have to believe in one versus 
the other or to act one way rather than another (Morgan, 2007). Pragmatism distorts the 
original top-down approach to the philosophy of knowledge i.e. ontology, epistemology, and 
methodology (Guba & Lincoln, 1994) but does not discount the relevance of such an 
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approach (Morgan, 2007). Proponents of pragmatism argue that paradigms as epistemological 
positions draw attention to the deeper assumptions that researchers make, but they convey 
limited information about more substantive decisions e.g. what to study – they also arguably 
pay limited attention to how the choice of certain paradigms influence the practical decisions 
researchers make (Morgan, 2007).  
     The Pragmatist core argument is that the research questions are the most important 
determinant of the philosophical stance the researcher adopts: different epistemology or 
ontology may be appropriate for answering particular questions in the same study (Saunders 
et al., 2009). Hence, pragmatists are free to study that which interests them in the way they 
deem fit (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). Pragmatism therefore offers a middle position both 
philosophically and methodologically and facilitates the selection of methodological mixes 
that are appropriate in answering different research questions (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 
2004). This has been particularly relevant for this study because it involved different methods 
of data collection e.g. interviews, personal observation of company documents and factory 
tours.  It is through the pragmatist philosophical position that this research takes advantage of 
such flexibilities during the research process as it does not require researchers to be 
committed to any of the traditional dualisms (e.g. Creswell, 2009).  
3.2.2. Research Approach 
According to Saunders et al. (2009), research approach refers to whether the research is 
inductive or deductive. Combining both approaches in a single study is also possible and 
productive (Saunders et al. 2009). Whereas deductive research begins with the theoretical 
framework developed from the prior literature and formulates the hypotheses or propositions 
that should be tested empirically, a purely inductive research process begins with empirical 
observations prior to any theoretical framework and aims at theory building (Kovács & 
Spens, 2005). Whether there is a need to develop theory prior to empirical data collection is 
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still debatable. For example, scholars (e.g. Koulikoff-Souviron & Harrison, 2005) argue that 
prior theory limits flexibility in data collection because it leads to a predetermined mind-set, 
but others (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003; Yin, 2009) encourage researchers to develop 
prior constructs in order to have a clear focus during data collection and avoid being 
overwhelmed by voluminous data.  Moreover, Eisenhardt (1989) argues that the requirement 
for theory-building research to begin as close as possible to the idea of no theory under 
consideration is impossible to achieve. Nevertheless, to gain more valuable results, it is 
advised that researchers should allow room for flexibility in order to change positions 
between a strong theoretical background and a loose inductive design (Koulikoff-Souviron & 
Harrison, 2005).  
    In line with the above argument, this research began with a deductive approach by 
reviewing the literature in order to identify the knowledge gaps and develop research 
questions to guide the data collection.  Thereafter, an inductive approach was used during the 
interview data collection and analysis via in-depth examination of issues relating to the 
research questions in order to understand how people interpret their social world (i.e. without 
being restricted by prior theory). To some authors, this approach of combining both deductive 
and inductive approaches in one study is also referred to as an abductive approach (e.g. 
Dubois & Gadde, 2002). This research did not only aim to describe what is happening, but 
also why and how it is happening (e.g. Saunders et al., 2009). More generally, this study 
adopted a largely inductive approach where the aim was to generate explanation from 
analysis as there was no commitment to a preconceived general theory. Rather, CAS theory 
lens was used as a guiding framework that was expected to contribute to interpretation and 
understanding of the empirical data, but one that would also allow the development of a 
particular line of theorising about SCRES that was not confined to the ideas contained in 
CAS (e.g. Ketokivi & Choi, 2014). 
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3.2.3. Research Strategy and Choice: Case Study 
Following Saunders et al. (2009)’s research design framework,  research strategy can be in 
the form of survey, case study, grounded theory, ethnography, action research, experiment or 
archival research. Research choice on the other hand can be mono-methods, multiple methods 
or mixed methods (Saunders et al., 2009). The choice of a research strategy can be 
determined by the research question(s), the extent of existing knowledge, the available time 
and other resources as well as the researcher’s philosophical underpinnings (Saunders et al., 
2009). The literature review in Chapter 2 shows that SCRES researchers have made limited 
use of empirical approaches e.g. case studies. This makes it difficult to understand how and 
why SCRES is gained or lost in practice. More generally, empirical work has recently been 
encouraged in purchasing and supply chain management to enhance theory development and 
to provide strong and grounded examples (Dubois & Araujo, 2007). Certain research 
strategies may not fully explain the nature of supply chain phenomena such as resilience. For 
example, research based on modelling and simulation, which forms a significant part of the 
current SCRES literature, is usually prescriptive and aims to provide solutions to well-
structured problems with the assumption of well-defined conditions.  On the contrary, supply 
chains are viewed as partly social systems involving complex interrelated behavioural 
phenomena: implying that human behavioural factors influence supply chain decisions and 
behaviours and these can be best understood by strategies that embrace holistic and inductive 
approaches (Stuart et al., 2002; Randal & Mello, 2012). Prior researchers have called for 
increased use of qualitative case studies in supply chain management research (e.g. Seuring, 
2008; Kähkönen, 2011). Thus, a case study approach is adopted in this study on the premise 
that there is no distinct boundary between the phenomenon and the context (Yin, 2009). This 
became especially clear when after using CAS to interpret the data in Chapter 5, it was 
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evidently important to adopt an embeddedness perspective to enhance understanding and 
derive more insights about SCRES. 
     The case study approach has been acknowledged as effective for building theory 
especially when the study phenomenon is still at its infancy (Voss et al., 2002; Voss, 2009; 
Yin, 2009) thereby needing to appropriately answer  the how and why questions (Yin, 2009). 
From the literature review (in Chapter 2), it was evident that SCRES is a contemporary 
phenomenon that involves complex interrelated behavioural elements, lacks sufficient theory, 
and is not well understood in a developing country context. These are favourable conditions 
for adopting a case study approach (Stuart et al., 2002). The interest was to investigate how 
actors in a developing country setting understand and interpret threats to the resilience of 
their supply chains and what strategies they apply. Thus a qualitative case study approach 
was adopted where the aim was to generate explanation from analysis. It is acknowledged 
that qualitative data through in-depth interviews is important so as to get more detailed 
explanations to enhance understanding (Dubois & Araujo, 2007). And unlike, for example 
surveys, a case study approach is inherently flexible in that it enables the elicitation of rich 
data using a variety of data gathering techniques, such as interviews, personal observation 
and document analysis – this facilitates cross-validation of the findings (Seuring, 2008; Yin, 
2009).  
     One of the prominent debates is about the different weaknesses of case studies relative to 
surveys. For example there is a common critique pertaining to the trade-off between the depth 
of information and potential for generalisability of the findings. While the case study 
approach enables the examination of a problem in a greater depth (Boyer & Swink, 2008), it 
is mainly criticised for a lack of generalisability. Nevertheless, some scholars (e.g. Meredith, 
1998; Stuart et al., 2002; Yin, 2009) have discounted this criticism and argued that case 
studies can be generalised to theoretical propositions – case studies expand and generalise on 
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theories (analytical generalisation) rather than on populations (statistical generalisation) 
(Stuart et al., 2002; Ketokivi & Choi, 2014). Survey research is credited for its potential to 
provide generalisable findings (e.g. Christopher et al., 2011), but is mainly criticised for 
lacking in-depth information about the phenomenon. And given the nature of the study 
phenomenon as already explained above, case study using in-depth interviews can help in 
improving our understanding of how and why firms construct particular influences as threats 
to SCRES and particular responses as good and bad ways of dealing with them, especially in 
the context of a developing country – where such research has not been done before. And 
considering that SCRES is a feature of a system that is partially social, qualitative data will 
help to effectively understand the personal experiences, obtain information that is difficult to 
acquire through quantitative methods, understand underlying meanings in human interactions 
and get empirical insights in this under-researched area (Naslund, 2002).  
3.2.4. Techniques and Procedures 
This subsection mainly explains how the data was collected and analysed.  It highlights the 
choice of the cases, interview protocol, ethical concerns, pilot study, main data collection, 
data analysis and the quality of the research design. 
3.2.4.1. Selection of the Cases  
In qualitative research, the researcher’s judgment in selecting appropriate respondents is 
arguably more effective than the use of probability sampling (Malhotra & Birks, 2007). From 
the SCRES literature, there was a clear need to conduct research on the resilience of supply 
chains in the developing world, using a network as the unit of analysis. Thus based on the 
principles of theoretical sampling, where cases should be selected based on their theoretical 
relevance, while allowing for flexibility to change cases during the research process 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Stuart et al., 2002; Dubois & Araujo, 2007), the first criterion was to study 
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firms in the developing country context (Uganda). Secondly, only firms that formed a supply 
network were to be chosen, and these firms must have experienced supply chain problems. 
Further, these firms were to be located in Kampala (the capital of Uganda) and the 
surrounding industrial areas of Wakiso and Mukono – where the majority of Uganda’s 
manufacturing firms are located (Uganda Bureau of Statistics Report, 2011). Also, the 
network to be started was to include both local and multinational firms, which had been 
operating in the Ugandan context for at least 5 years. 
    Access began with JU, a beer manufacturing company where I had previously worked and 
where it was known several supply chain disruptions had been encountered. This company 
was also known to be connected in a supply network of many other local firms. Employees 
from JU later facilitated access to three of their suppliers: two sugar manufacturers (FU & 
GU) and one packaging materials producer (DU). Subsequent relevant firms were later added 
based on the data from the previous ones, in line with theoretical sampling. For example, it 
was decided that competitor firms and part-government-owned firms should be incorporated 
to reflect the recurring interview themes of unfair competition and corruption.  
     The arguments concerning the most appropriate number of cases for case study research 
are still inconclusive. For example, there is an ongoing debate on single versus multiple case 
studies. While some researchers (e.g. Dyer & Wilkins, 1991) advocate the use of single case 
studies on the ground that they provide rich theoretical insights, others (e.g. Yin, 2003) prefer 
multiple cases and in fact proceed to warn that researchers who opt to use single cases need 
to strongly justify their decisions. Multiple cases are credited for enabling analytical 
generalisation: they arguably enable replication of findings within cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Dubois & Araujo, 2007), and they thus enhance the external validity of findings and 
minimise observer bias (e.g. Barratt et al., 2011). Based on the aforementioned argument, this 
study used an embedded case study design of a supply network of multiple firms (Eisenhardt, 
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1989; Yin, 2009) – this supply network consisted of 20 manufacturing firms. One of the gaps 
identified in the current SCRES literature is the predominant use of a firm as the unit of 
analysis. Kim et al. (2015a) recently argued against the current firm level analysis of SCRES 
phenomena, suggesting that a supply network would be the appropriate level of analysis.  
     Furthermore, there is no agreement on the most ideal number of cases to use in a multiple 
case research. For example, Lewis (1998) recommends between twenty and thirty cases as 
the most appropriate to increase case diversity and enhance iterative triangulation, while 
Eisenhardt (1989) argued that a number between four and ten cases is suitable.  While it is 
clear that there is no consensus on the ideal number of cases that should be predetermined 
prior to data collection, theoretical saturation – a point of beginning to realise that marginal 
information has tremendously diminished (Eisenhardt 1989; Kaufmann & Denk 2011) has 
been suggested as the determinant for the appropriate number of cases. In other words, data 
collection should continue until when no new categories or dimensions emerge from 
additional data (Idrees et al., 2011; Manuj & Pohlen, 2012). In this study, data collection was 
valuable until seventeen firms when theoretical saturation was reached. Thereafter, three 
more firms were added in order to confirm that theoretical saturation was indeed attained as 
recommended by (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Thus, twenty companies were enough to 
meet the requirements of the study.  
The table below provides a summary of the twenty firms in the network studied 
(which have been anonymized and are referred to as AU, BU, and so on through to TU) 
including the complete list of interviewees, year of establishment, sizes and their products. 
Ten of these companies were locally based and the remaining ten were multinational 
corporations. These firms are of different sizes and years of existence. The biggest company 
in terms of employees has 7000 staff while the smallest employs 85. The oldest firm was 
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established in 1921 while the youngest was established in 2008. The table that follows 






























DU 1 MAOF (7years) 1997 400 Packaging materials 160,000 
FU 1 CMGR (13 years) 1930 7000 Sugar 240,000 
GU 1 SAME (13 years ) 1969 1900 Sugar 200,000 
HU 2 POMG (5 years),  MKTG (10 years) 2002 115 Concrete products 2,000 
JU 6 
PLMO (6 years),  PROM (6 years) , TMKG (5 years),  MAND (6 
years), SMKT(4),  RESG (3 years) 
2008 250 Alcohol (Beer) 4,000 
KU 2 MKTG (8 years),  GENL (10 years) 2001 300 Alcohol (Spirits) - 
OU 1 SMKT (1 year) 1994 200 
Steel products raw 
materials 
100,000 
PU 3 PROM (3 years),  PROC (12 years),  BRMG (3 years) 2003 - Foods & Beverages 60,000 
RU 2 LASS (5 years),  SMGR (8 years) 2002 500 Steel products 2,500 



















AU 1 MKTG (10 years) 1921 2000 Hair products 20,000 
BU 5 
SSUP (2 years),  DWMG (4 years), EXMG (22 years), SMGR (2 
years),  MERG (4years) 
1966 200 Foot wear 27,000 
CU 2 PSCO (15 years),  MKTG (11 years) 1960 230 
Steel & Aluminium  
& glass 
10,000 
EU 2 PROM (3 years),  DESU (7 years) 1991 250 Cement 50,000 
IU 3 BRMG (6 years), FING (4 years), BRMG (12 years) 1951 700 Alcohol (Beer) 627,800 
LU 4 ASMG (8 years),  PROC (5 years),  WARG( 5 years), ASDG (5 years) 1981 500 Paper products 30,000 
MU 2 COMP (6 years),  SCMG (1 years) 2007 250 Pharmaceuticals 87,500 
NU 2 INVG (8 years),  MKTG (1 years) 2006 200 Paints 500,000 
TU 1 CSMG (4 years) 1950 600 Alcohol (Beer) 1,000,000 
QU 2 PROC (6 years), PROM (8 years) 2006 300 Dairy products - 
 
Interviewees’ titles: Marketing manager (MKTG), Marketing officer (MAOF), Corporate Marketing manager (CMGR), Sales & Marketing executive (SAME), Production & Operations 
manager (POMG), Procurement & Logistics officer (PLMO),  Procurement manager (PROM), Managing director (MAND), Sales & Marketing manager (SMKT), Regional Sales manager 
(RESG), Trade marketing manager (TMKG), General manager (GENL), Brand manager (BRMG), Procurement officer (PROC), Logistics assistant (LASS), Sales manager (SMGR), Assistant 
procurement manager (APRO), Factory Engineer (FACE),  Sales Coordinator (SSUP), Distribution & Ware house manager (DWMG), Export manager (EXMG),  Merchandise manager 
(MERG), Production & Site coordinator (PSCO),  Depot supervisor (DESU), Finance manager (FING),Warehouse manager (WARG), Assistant Distribution manager (ASMG), Assistant Sales 





From table 3.1, it is shown that the studied firms were in diverse industries. These firms are 
interlinked in a network as either suppliers or buyers e.g. of raw materials and packaging 
materials. Figure 3.2 shows that companies DU and LU which manufacture packaging 
materials and other paper products supply many of the other companies – DU is the largest 
manufacturer of packaging materials in Uganda. Companies FU and GU are the largest sugar 
manufacturers and they supply sugar as a raw material to beer manufacturing firms IU, JU 
and TU. Also notable were the informal linkages between some of the firms which also 
facilitated access during data collection whereby employees in the already interviewed firms 
facilitated connection to their friends as potential interviewees in other firms. These informal 
networks were indeed very significant because “informal networking” later emerged in the 







































Figure 3.2: Formal and Informal Networks of the Firms Studied 
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3.2.4.2. The Case Study/Interview Protocol 
The case study protocol refers mainly to the interview questions (Yin, 2003). According to 
Eisenhardt (1989), archival records, interviews and direct observation are the most common 
sources of case study evidence. Open-ended questions (for semi-structured interviews) were 
formulated. The aim was to probe new areas that would emerge in the course of data 
collection, as suggested by Manuj & Pohlen (2012). The first theme concerned what 
manufacturing firms in Uganda perceived to be the threats to their supply chains. This probed 
different categories of threats, e.g. supply-side threats, demand-side threats, firm-level 
threats, and threats external to the supply chain. The interest was also in the corresponding 
strategies adopted to build resilience and, for each strategy, questions were asked about the 
outcome of its implementation, i.e. whether a strategy was successful or had adverse effects. 
The second theme concerned the relationships between threats and strategies, and what such 
interrelatedness meant for SCRES. The interview protocol was meant for guidance but more 
probing was made where interesting findings emerged. For example, one of the interesting 
findings was co-opetition as a SCRES strategy and more probing was done to ascertain how 
competitors could collaborate to mitigate threats to their supply chains. The protocol was 
piloted to ensure appropriateness for the main data collection as will be clarified later (in 
section 3.2.4.4). 
3.2.4.3. Ethical Concerns 
Research ethics relate to the conduct of research in a moral and responsible way in relation to 
the rights of those who become the subject of the study and/or are affected by it (Saunders et 
al., 2009). Yin (2009) advises researchers to consider ethical issues that may arise as a result 
of the nature of the study as well as method used to obtain data especially when studying a 
contemporary phenomenon in a real life context. Examples of such ethical issues include: 
protecting human subjects from any harm or deception, gaining informed consent from 
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potential respondents, protecting vulnerable groups, protecting privacy and confidentiality of 
information.  Although this study was considered relatively “low risk” with regard to ethical 
issues as per Lancaster University assessment of code of practice for ethical research, it is 
important for any study to abide by some ethical standards (Saunders et al., 2009). This study 
was guided by Lancaster University code of practice where the proposal together with the 
participant information sheet (to provide participants with information about the research) 
and the consent form (to enable participants make voluntary and informed consent) were 
assessed and approved by the university ethics committee. Ethics clearance was provided as 
required by the Lancaster University regulations. Thereafter, the participant information 
sheets and consent forms were sent to potential participants prior to data collection to enable 
them to make informed decisions regarding participation. 
3.2.4.4. The Pilot Study 
Several scholars have suggested reasons for conducting a pilot study prior to the main data 
collection. For example, Yin (2003) indicated that a pilot study is important to test and refine 
the interview protocol, develop the required research skills and to get an idea of the potential 
case firms for the main study. Christopher et al. (2011) argued that pilot studies can help to 
ensure clarity in the case study protocol and to gauge the actual time required to respond to 
questions in the main study. Furthermore, pilot studies arguably help to assess the potential 
willingness of interviewees to follow the case study protocol and to enable researchers 
prepare to handle unanticipated responses (Foster, 2013).  
A pilot study was conducted in the UK using face-to-face interviews with three 
professional managers who had occupied senior positions in manufacturing firms (a Senior 
Merchandise Manager, Process Engineer, and a Director of Manufacturing & Quality 
Systems) in firms whose manufacturing facilities were located in different countries (e.g. 
Turkey, the UK, India, China, Bangladesh & Brazil). These interviewees represented three 
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distinct manufacturing sectors i.e. Garments, Motor vehicle components and Mineral 
processing. As stated by Yin (2009), pilot studies may be conducted for reasons not related to 
the criteria for selecting the final cases, such as accessibility and geographical convenience of 
the informants as well as their knowledge of the study phenomena. Pilot interview data was 
collected through both digital voice recording and handwritten notes which were later 
transcribed and analysed. The pilot data collection process was helpful for improving 
interviewing skills in different aspects such as how to phrase questions so as to get the 
required information. It further provided an opportunity to get feedback from the respondents 
– this helped to adjust the questions that were deemed unclear and to estimate the likely 
minimum time of one hour for each interview for the main study. 
      Pilot data analysis helped to assess the validity of the research protocol by ascertaining 
whether the data represented the content of the protocol – whether there could be other 
important variables that were not included in the case study protocol – or variables that 
needed further probing and also to develop qualitative data analysis skills for the main study 
as analysis would begin during data collection in line with theoretical sampling. For example, 
some threats to SCRES were not well represented in the literature such as limited supply 
market, lack of internal coordination, dishonest customers and suppliers and power 
asymmetries but emerged in the pilot data. Further, the emergence from the data, of 
conditions that produce threats such as limited supply market helped to realise the need to 
include, in the main study, cases where many manufacturing firms have a limited supply base 
(e.g. many foods and beverages manufacturing firms in Uganda source sugar from a limited 
number of local sugar manufacturing firms. These sugar manufacturing firms also source 
their raw materials from limited sugarcane suppliers). Also the finding on power asymmetries 
indicated a need to include some firms which supply bigger customers (e.g. corporate 
customers or governments) and where such customers have many other alternative suppliers. 
Other than the aforementioned purpose, the pilot data is not used any further in the thesis. 
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3.2.4.5. Data Collection  
Data was collected through a cross sectional approach, beginning in the first week of January, 
2014 through to April, 2014. The strategy was to begin with the companies that had earlier 
accepted during the preliminary visits in August, 2013 and later to request for more 
connections to their relevant suppliers and/or customers. The use of the current respondents 
to connect to potential companies worked for most of the cases and gaining entry became a 
bit easier – this was mainly facilitated by both formal and informal networks between firms 
and employees (as earlier shown in Figure 4.3). Generally, gaining entry was facilitated by 
several factors including: having studied and worked in Makerere University – the oldest and 
biggest University in Uganda. In most of the companies, it was easy to find my former school 
mates, former colleagues, former or even current students at Makerere University. Most of 
these would be willing to provide any assistance including connection to other companies e.g. 
where their colleagues were working.  
     Although prior connections would be secured hitherto visiting most of the companies, it 
was sometimes challenging to pass some of the companies’ gates. The gatekeeping staff 
especially security guards would demand signing the visitors’ books indicating the 
department of interest and the reasons for the visit – and  whenever  I would give research as 
the reason, most of these gatekeepers would be reluctant and some would completely deny 
entry. Having bypassed the gate, the next challenge was the front office desk staff. In the 
Ugandan firms, most of these employees have relatively limited education and do not 
understand why people should do research. Moreover, the research culture in Uganda is still 
poor and most of the front office desk employees are instructed not to accept researchers to 
go beyond the reception. Beyond this, it was a bit easier because higher level managers were 
more receptive than the low level staff as most of them had done research before – some 
would even indicate they were enjoying being involved in research at a PhD level.   
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     Another interesting observation was that employees in marketing and sales were more 
receptive than those in other functional areas such as procurement. Although interest was also 
in the marketing staff, the first priority was procurement and/or supply chain. But after 
visiting a few companies, I realised that it would be easier to gain entry by mentioning 
marketing or sales rather than procurement. Hence I changed the strategy – to enter through 
marketing and sales in most of the cases and thereafter connect to other functions and it 
worked out well. A staff in marketing would easily provide connection to fellow staff in other 
departments. This is probably because since most were private companies with profit 
motives, they regarded people who visit marketing and sales as potential or current customers 
who deserved care. But they consider those who visit procurement as either current suppliers 
looking for business, demanding payments (since in the data, some companies revealed a 
problem of delayed payment to their suppliers) or potential suppliers looking for business. 
Data collection had initially been estimated to last only eight weeks, but by the end of the 
first month, it became clear that this target could not be attainable as few interviews had been 
conducted but with so many scheduled appointments.  
Data was mainly collected using interviews, which were supplemented with factory 
tours, viewing company websites and direct observation of documents, e.g. meeting minutes 
and delivery schedules – these helped in triangulating and supporting interview data. For 
example, direct observation of delivery schedules and disciplinary committee meeting 
minutes in some firms helped to further confirm the existence of threats like raw material 
delays and shortages and dishonest employees respectively. Further, viewing company 
websites and direct observation of documents helped in establishing profiles of the study 
firms that were later illustrated in Table 3.1. In total, 45 semi-structured, audio-recorded face-
to-face interviews lasting between 30 and 80 minutes were conducted with managers and 
other key personnel knowledgeable in supply chain related functions. All the 45 interviewees 
accepted to be audio-recorded. In fifteen companies, multiple respondents from each were 
96 
 
separately interviewed to minimise bias. But five companies were each represented by only 
one interviewee as getting more in the limited time proved difficult. Interviewees were 
chosen from different authority levels, providing different perspectives on the phenomenon of 
interest (see Table 3.1 for firm and interviewee details). For example, while factors such as 
labour disputes and payment delays (both suppliers and staff) were mostly revealed by e.g. 
procurement and logistics officers, Managing Directors and General Managers referred to 
threats such as dishonest employees. This approach has been encouraged in inductive 
research by Randal & Mello (2012).   
     Most of the interviews were conducted in quiet places such as meeting rooms and 
interviewees’ offices. However, five interviewees preferred the outside work environment but 
we would again look for relatively quiet venues. Initially, a second year Bachelor of Business 
Administration student at Makerere University was employed to assist in locating potential 
study firms. Most of the data was transcribed as soon as possible – mostly on the same day it 
was collected but there were instances where it was not possible e.g. where an average of 
three interviews per day were conducted in different locations for three consecutive days. But 
these would be transcribed during some of the days when there were no scheduled 
appointments. By transcribing the interviews as soon as possible, it would help to highlight 
interesting findings that would require more probing as recommended by Morse et al. (2002). 
This would guide the next interviews in terms of e.g. the questions to be emphasised, 
potential respondents and companies, thus supporting theoretical sampling.  
3.2.4.6. The Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis was a fragment of a supply network, i.e. some portion of the supply 
network that respondents referred to as their supply chains. The supply network fragments 
referred to were either part of the network illustrated in Figure 3.2 or outside it. Although the 
respondents were managers and other staff representing manufacturing firms, the data that 
97 
 
was collected and analysed was not about individual firms in isolation, but about their 
relationships with their upstream or downstream partners at different tiers. Thus, the network 
fragments analysed were at different levels and scales i.e. dyads or beyond dyads.  
     The difficulty of defining the unit of analysis in supply chain research has been previously 
acknowledged due to the subjective nature of what people in different firms refer to as their 
supply networks (e.g. Carter et al., 2015). And many of the previous SCRES researchers 
highlighted in Chapter 2 have not explicitly indicated their units of analysis (e.g. Blackhurst 
et al., 2011; Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; Mandal, 2012; Leat & Revoredo, 2013;  Johnson et al., 
2013; Scholten et al., 2014). Those who have highlighted their units of analysis (e.g. Wieland 
& Wallenburg, 2013; Brandon-Jones et al., 2014; Gölgeci & Ponomarov, 2014; Scholten & 
Schilder, 2015) have not attempted to justify their choices. Moreover, some of the units of 
analysis highlighted can be confusing. For example, Brandon-Jones et al. (2014) stated that 
their unit of analysis was a firm and its upstream suppliers. This is not clear as to whether or 
not there were multiple units of analysis (e.g. a firm, tier 1 suppliers, tier 2 suppliers etc.). A 
similar ambiguity is observed in Wieland & Wallenburg (2013) who considered their unit of 
analysis as a firm and its interface with suppliers and customers.  
     In this particular study, data collection focussed on how threats affect the supply chains 
and not how individual firms are affected by supply chain threats. Thus, in Chapter 4, the 
analysis was focussed on relationships between firms and their suppliers and/or customers at 
different scales and levels/tiers.  
3.2.4.7. Data Analysis  
Data was analysed inductively – generally following grounded analysis principles. Grounded 
analysis, which is closely linked to grounded theory, is considered appropriate for theory 
development where the structure develops from the data rather than forcing the data to fit into 
predetermined categories (Walker & Myrick, 2006). The use of grounded theory concepts is 
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encouraged in developing theory in supply chain research (Randal & Mello, 2012). A 
rigorous analysis was conducted and themes, patterns and categories were developed out of 
the data as recommended by Easterby-Smith et al. (2008). The aim was to avoid being 
constrained by prior theory, to remain open to being surprised by the data, and to make sense 
of the emerging surprises (Kaufmann & Denk 2011; Ketokivi & Choi, 2014). Repeated 
readings of the transcripts were first conducted in order to understand the data and identify 
data fragments that referred in some way to certain aspects of the research questions. Then 
tables were drawn in which segregated fragments of data were recorded and assigned codes 
which were continuously re-evaluated and modified where necessary through an iterative 
process as recommended by (Miles et al., 2014).   
     Data was then undertaken at two levels. First, a reductionist analysis to develop a category 
structure for the data. This structure was developed based on the prior knowledge of the 
literature (referred to as theoretical sensitivity), which is important in grounded analysis in 
order to understand and interpret the data and to differentiate between relevant and non-
relevant data (Glaser 1978; Mello & Flint, 2009; Charmaz, 2012). There were three high-
level categories: supply chain threats, SCRES strategies and strategy outcomes. A lower level 
set of categories was also developed through cross-case analysis (Barratt et al., 2011), 
comparing different instances of the same code. The category structure was refined by 
identifying differences and similarities among the categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), 
followed by merging and eliminating to reach consistency, as recommended by Miles et al. 
(2014). It was found at this stage, for example, that a whole set of conditions produced or 
compounded threats without actually being threats in their own right.  
     The second, integrative level of analysis involved the use of CAS to further understand and 
interpret the data through the identification of patterns in which threats (and conditions that 
lead to threats), strategies and outcomes were inter-related. The transcripts were used to 
identify links between the threats (and conditions that lead to threats); strategies and 
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outcomes that had been established by the interviewees (see Appendix 2). This produced a 
second network – not of firms but of conditions/threats/strategies/outcomes. Each node in this 
network is a condition, threat, strategy, or outcome with incoming and outgoing links. In 
other words, it is caused by a certain factor or set of factors and/or leads to an outcome or set 
of outcomes (positive or negative). The emergent network was then constructed, but it 
became too densely populated to enable the labelling of nodes and links; and can be used 
only to visualise the emergent complex network. In Chapter 5, a table (Table 5.1), histogram 
(Figure 5.1) and a network map (Figure 5.2) that summarise the data will be presented, and 
two distinct fragments of this network will be analysed. It was at this point in the analysis that 
it was found that many of the inter-relations themselves needed explanation – and the 
importance of context in explaining these inter-relations resulted in supplementing CAS with 
an embeddedness view. For example, threats or threatening conditions such as corruption, 
product counterfeiting, unfair competition, and dishonest employees originated from the 
supply network’s embeddedness in a developing country characterised by weak political and 
legal controls.  
3.3. Quality of the research design 
In order to ensure rigorous qualitative case study research, scholars have suggested different 
criteria – some contradicting each other depending on the different philosophical paradigms 
of researchers.  For example, Yin (2003) suggested the criteria for ensuring quality of case 
study research and how such criteria could be followed and this has been generally adopted 
by other researchers in operations management (e.g. Stuart et al., 2002; Stevenson & Spring, 
2007; Christopher et al., 2011). These quality measures include construct validity – which 
seeks to establish the correctness of operational measures for the study constructs. In this 
research for example, this was achieved through developing an interview protocol based on 
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the literature, piloting the protocol with informants who had occupied relevant positions in 
three distinct manufacturing firms, using multiple firms as sources of data, triangulation of 
data sources e.g. interviews, observation and company records, sending back a summary of 
the report to the interviewees for validation and using multiple respondents in most of the 
firms; Internal validity – which seeks to establish causal relationships and to distinguish them 
from spurious ones was ensured through using pattern matching through cross-case analysis; 
external validity – which concerns the generalisation of findings was achieved through using 
multiple cases and theoretical sampling to enhance analytical generalisation while reliability 
– which aims to ensure that the study can be repeated with the same results was achieved  
through adequate description of the study setting/context, using a documented and validated 
case study protocol and maintaining a case study database that provides an audit trail of the 
entire research process including the justifications for undertaking certain decisions.  
Although Yin (2003)’s quality criteria has been generally adopted in operations 
management, some other researchers (e.g. Kaufmann & Denk, 2011) have maintained that the 
concepts used e.g. validity are based on positivism. They instead advocated the adoption of 
Lincoln and Guba (1985)’s interpretive equivalents i.e. credibility, dependability, 
confirmability and transferability. Nevertheless, some of these contradictions are a matter of 
different interpretations of the concepts. For example, Kaufmann & Denk (2011) mentioned 
that transferability is a substitute for external validity and further argued that the former 
contradicts credibility. Other quality measures applied in this research included: 
 Ensuring fair dealing by incorporating different perspectives; attention to negative 
cases by explaining information that seemed to contradict the phenomena under study 
and reflexivity (being sensitive to the ways the research process and the researcher 
have influenced the data collected considering the role of assumptions and prior 
experience) (Mays & Pope 2000).  
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 Iterative interaction between data and analysis; by beginning analysis during data 
collection so that ideas emerging from data are reconfirmed in new data leading to 
new ideas that are further confirmed by the already collected data and verification by 
moving  back and forth to ensure alignment between research questions, literature, 
recruitment, data collection strategies,  analysis (Morse et al., 2002). 
 Choosing the right participants and allowing for flexibility to change the research 
questions and methods as suggested by Morse et al. (2002).  
 
In the next chapter (Chapter 4), the first level analysis of data will be presented to develop a 
category structure for the data, where the findings will be organised under three high-level 
categories: supply chain threats, SCRES strategies and strategy outcomes; as well as 
corresponding lower level set of categories developed through cross-case analysis. It is this 

















FIRST LEVEL ANALYSIS OF DATA 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the first level analysis of the study data – a somewhat reductionist 
analysis to develop a category structure from the data. This chapter provides a detailed 
account showing the richness of the data – thus it will be fairly extensive. The findings from 
this data analysis will be categorised under three higher level classes i.e. supply chain threats, 
supply chain resilience (SCRES) strategies and outcomes, and the sub-categories of these 
classes – presented in the form of text, tables and figures. This level of analysis will show 
that some threats and strategies identified from the data have not been acknowledged in 
SCRES literature before; and some of those which have been acknowledged are explained 
differently using empirical evidence unique to a developing country context. The chapter 
begins with a taxonomy of supply chain threats derived from the data, which are later on 
individually discussed (including the conditions leading to or compounding their occurrence) 
(4.2). This is followed by the taxonomy of resilience strategies (4.3), and outcomes of 
implementing particular SCRES strategies (4.4). Finally, concluding remarks are given in 
section 4.5, which points to further systemic investigation of the relationships among threats, 
strategies and outcomes in the following chapter.  
4.2. Supply Chain Threats 
Supply chain threats were first categorised into two broad types, as summarised in Table 4.1. 
1. Endogenous threats originating from within the supply chain, which were further 
divided into three categories (with corresponding lower level categories): supply-side 
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threats originating from upstream, firm-level threats originating from within the focal 
firm and demand-side threats originating from downstream.  
2. Exogenous threats originating from outside the supply chain, which were further 
divided into geopolitical threats and economic threats (with corresponding lower level 
categories).  
From the interview data on threats, it became clear that interviewees had a broad 
understanding of the term ‘threat’. Some responses referred to threatening events e.g. supplier 
delivery failure and others to threatening conditions that produced or compounded a threat 
e.g. long distance sourcing. According to the aim of this study, it was the informants’ 
construction of ‘threat’ that was instrumental. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Taxonomy of Exogenous & Endogenous Threats to the Supply Chain 
 
Exogenous Supply Chain Threats 
Geopolitical Threats Economic Threats 
Political instabilities, Geographical location 
(landlockedness), National politics, Government 
policy,  Weak legal system,  Corruption,   
Product counterfeiting,  In-transit raw material 
theft,  Communication barriers,  Natural disasters 
Informal sector,  Unfair competition,  Poor transport 
infrastructure, Unstable taxation, Exchange rate 
fluctuations,  Power shortages 
 
Endogenous Supply Chain  Threats 
Upstream Supply 
Chain 
 Focal Company  Downstream Supply 
Chain 
Supply-Side Threats Firm Level Threats Demand-Side Threats 
 -Power asymmetries 
related threats (stronger 
suppliers)  
-Long distance sourcing 
triggered threats 
-Limited local supply 
market 
- Product counterfeiting 
-Poor quality raw 
materials 
- Dishonest suppliers  
- Raw material delays 
and shortages  
- Financial difficulties of 
suppliers  





-Owner management behaviour 
-Dishonest employees 
-Insufficient skilled manpower 
-Poor internal coordination 
-Poor quality products 
-Payment threat (to suppliers/labour) 
-Financial difficulties (focal firm) 
-Procurement risk 
-Industrial disputes 
-Poor customer delivery performance 
 
-Power asymmetries related 
threats (stronger customers)  
-Dishonest customers/ 
distributors 
-Payment threat (from 
customers) 









4.2.1. Exogenous Supply Chain Threats 
4.2.1.1. Geopolitical Threats 
These can be described as potential governmental, natural and societal disruptions of supply 
chain operations across different geographical locations. The data revealed ten geopolitical 
threats highlighted in table 4.1, and discussed below:   
 
 Political Instabilities 
All of the 20 companies highlighted political instabilities as a threat to their supply chains.  
One of the reported causes of this threat was the chaotic political transitions in some African 
countries. The Route-to-Consumer Supply Manager for firm TU commented: “Whenever 
there is a political change, the business is affected.  For example wars in Southern Sudan and 
Congo deter us from exportation. The political factor affects business in Africa.” It was 
indicated that demonstrations, civil conflicts and wars that characterise these political 
transitions disrupt transport routes and cause shortages and delays of raw materials; and other 
utilities like fuel.  The seriousness of these disruptions to the supply chains can be manifested 
in the closure of some companies as reported by KU’s Marketing Manager: “Delay of raw 
materials is sometimes caused by political conflicts e.g. in Kenya. Our vehicles cannot move 
in politically unstable countries, so we do not produce and our market is affected…during the 
Kenya post-election violence, it was hard to import raw materials and some companies 
closed down.”  The political conflicts in Uganda were also highlighted as a supply chain 
threat as stated by KU’s Marketing Manager: “Even in Uganda when there are political 




     Interestingly, all 20 firms emphasised political instabilities in the neighbouring countries 
e.g. Kenya, Congo, Southern Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi as a major threat both to the 
upstream (by constraining raw material flows) and downstream (by disrupting delivery of 
products to customers). For example, GU’s Sales & Marketing Executive noted: “Sudan has 
been one of our main destinations and the war has affected our supply chain. Instabilities in 
Congo, Rwanda and Burundi affect our supply chain.” The different kinds of political 
instabilities identified from the data are summarised in Figure 4.1. The threat of political 
instabilities analysed above shows that the geographical context of a (part of a) supply chain 














 Geographical Location (Landlockedness) 
Firms revealed that the geographical location of Uganda as a landlocked country makes them 
vulnerable to certain supply chain threats. Six companies (TU, FU, JU, PU, MU, LU) 
indicated that when there is political chaos in Kenya, the flow of raw materials is disrupted 
resulting in delays and production stoppages. LU’s Assistant Sales Manager commented: 
“Being a landlocked country, most of our imported raw materials pass through Kenya. 
During the post-election violence we lacked raw materials, which constrained production.” 
This was further reiterated by PU’s Procurement Manager:  “When there was political 
violence in Kenya, all manufacturing companies in Uganda ran out of stocks of raw 
materials…Our raw materials could not be delivered via Mombasa. By the nature of our 
                          Political instabilities 
 
Local political conflicts 
(Chaotic transition) 
Politically unstable neighbours 
(Chaotic transition) 
 
Civil conflicts & wars in 
neighbouring countries 
Political demonstrations in 
Uganda 
Figure 4.1: Kinds of Political Instabilities Revealed in the Data 
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location in Uganda, whenever there are elections in Kenya, we expect violence…because we 
are a landlocked country.”  
     The interviewees further argued that the geographical location – being in a landlocked 
country – makes them vulnerable to other threats like poor road transport infrastructure in the 
transit country, resulting in or compounding raw material delays and high transportation 
costs. MU’s Supply Chain Manager revealed: “Uganda, being a landlocked country, most of 
the raw materials come from Europe by sea, and air is not cost- effective. There are delays 
because we need to transport them from Mombasa by road. The road infrastructure is also 
poor… It takes around fifteen days from the seaport to Uganda. Transporting from Mombasa 
to Uganda is costly.” The above findings demonstrate that political instabilities and poor 
transport infrastructure in the neighbouring country can be a threat to SCRES of firms in 
Uganda due to its geographical location (being landlocked) coupled with the fact that Kenya 
is the transit route.   
     The general observation here is that certain factors (e.g. political instabilities of the 
neighbouring country) can become threats to SCRES only if combined with certain 
conditions (e.g. being situated in a landlocked country, with the politically unstable 
neighbour being the only transit route). This also shows how threats can reinforce each other 
to constrain SCRES as shown in Figure 4.2. 










leading to  
Geographical location 
(In a Landlocked country) 
 Political instability  
(Political instability of the 
transit country) 
Threat to supply chain 
resilience through e.g. 
Raw material delays & 
shortages 
 
Figure 4.2: Combined Factors Form Threat to SCRES 
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 National Politics 
Two companies reported national politics as a threat to their supply chains. Interviewees from 
BU and PU argued that the delivery of products to customers is disrupted by frequent   
political demonstrations in Uganda led by opposition politicians purportedly against bad 
governance. They further argued that national politics perpetuates corruption where business 
success in Uganda largely depends on political connections and patronages; and politicians 
support the informal businesses instead of regulating them, which creates unfair competition 
– informal actors do not pay taxes and offer lower prices. It was reported that this is done as a 
means to achieve political capital in the form of support so as to maintain grip on power.  
PU’s Procurement Manager explained:“ …due to corruption, most of our competitors do not 
pay taxes on some materials…you know in Uganda things are handled with political 
influence and less professionalism...Some companies have closed due to the informal sector. 
Informal actors are favoured by politicians looking for votes.”  
     Company BU, which is in the fashion industry, indicated that the recently adopted 
multiparty system of governance has disrupted their supply chains – that political parties have 
adopted different colours as differentiating/branding features and this has greatly influenced 
customer choices. This has reportedly resulted in demand variations and subsequent demand-
supply mismatch risk – customers have become colour sensitive and increasingly 
unpredictable as claimed by BU’s Sales Manager: “One time we bought shoes in yellow 
colour which relates to one of the political parties [the ruling party]. Some people refused to 
buy…we are now colour sensitive. We aim to mix the colours but this is unpredictable and 
hard to sustain. Ensuring we have all colours full time is difficult. People also keep moving 
from one political party to another and demand becomes volatile.” This suggests there is a 
link between the system of political governance in a certain territory and the resilience of 




 Government Policy 
Eight companies (BU, DU, JU, RU, IU, FU, HU, MU) highlighted government policy as a 
threat to their supply chains. This includes supporting foreign investors and not protecting 
indigenous firms coupled with a discriminatory policy of selective subsidisation and tax 
exemptions, which facilitates unfair competition. BU’s Merchandise Manager commented: 
“The government policy of subsidising some investors selectively has affected us. The 
subsidised out-compete us on price. This may be due to corruption or political connections 
because some firms are given more years of tax exemptions than others.” Besides the 
consistently unpredictable tax increases, companies blamed the government policy on firm 
locations especially those that use the same agricultural raw materials. It was indicated that 
such policy contributes to the shortage of raw materials as stated by FU’s Corporate 
Marketing Manager: “The government policy of licensing new sugar companies and having 
them close to each other should be checked. The more we are close, the more we have to 
compete with few suppliers in that locality.”   
     Others like RU attributed distribution cost escalations and product delivery delays to the 
policy on truck load weight limits, while HU blamed the government for encouraging the use 
of counterfeit raw materials. HU and MU, whose main customer is the government, attributed 
late approvals, delayed deliveries and order cancellations to the government’s procurement 
policy that is time consuming and too bureaucratic. The Marketing Manager for HU, which 
manufactures concrete products, explained that by the time the government completes the 
procurement approval process, there is limited time left in which to manufacture and deliver 
the products. Yet, most of the government’s procurements are made for special occasions like 
celebrating independence anniversaries which are difficult to postpone. MU (the 
pharmaceutical manufacturing firm), which must order their expensive raw materials after 
government approval, also highlighted the government bureaucratic procedures as causing 
raw material delays and shortages. MU further argued that the government policy of allowing 
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donations to interfere with their operations poses threat to their supply chains. MU’s 
Company Pharmacist commented: “Donations affect us e.g. National Medical Stores 
[government entity] gives you forecast for raw materials and you purchase them.  But donors 
e.g. Global Fund donates part of that, but you already have raw materials. So these 
donations suffocate local firms. They disrupt the supply chain.”  
    From the data analysis above, it has been found that the different components of 
government policy can disrupt both the downstream supply chain (e.g. the bureaucratic 
procurement policy that affects production and delivery to customers), and the upstream 
supply chain (e.g. by producing other threats like raw material delays and shortages). The 
relevant components and consequences of government policy identified from the data are 






















 Weak Legal System 
Three companies (CU, TU, LU) indicated that a weak legal system characterised by weak 
laws and judicial corruption results in supply chain threats like product counterfeiting. CU’s 
Production and Site Coordinator observed: “Our laws are still weak and there are no specific 
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Figure 4.3: Government Policy and its Consequences 
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laws against counterfeits.” Companies argued that a lack of copyright laws in Uganda is 
responsible for increased copy right infringement. TU’s Route-to-Consumer Supply Manager 
commented: “Our original label/logo was copied and because of the weak Ugandan law 
compounded by corruption, it will take a long time to have copy right laws.” Company LU 
indicated that their customers exploit a weak legal system and a corrupt judiciary to default 
payment for goods offered on credit, leading to financial difficulties. LU’s Assistant Sales 
Manager argued: “After entrusting the distributor with goods worth millions, they disappear, 
refuse to pay or switch to competitors. We forward to the legal department to handle such 
cases. But sometimes these cases vanish due to corruption [bribery]”.  
     The above analysis shows that the absence or weakness of legal controls in the context 
where the supply chain is situated can disrupt the supply chain especially thorough failure to 
mitigate intentional threats like product counterfeiting and payment defaults by customers. 
 
 Corruption 
Eleven firms (TU, FU, BU, HU, LU, CU, PU, JU, GU, KU, MU) revealed that corruption in 
the form of bribery, conflict of interest, connivance, political favouritism and lack of 
transparency caused various supply chain disruptions. For example, JU’s Procurement 
Manager stated: “This poor road network should be attributed to a lack of political will and 
corruption in African countries including Uganda. Imagine, instead of constructing long-
lasting roads, money allocated is embezzled by employees…Corruption has now become part 
of the government and our daily activities. No bribe, no service, no survival.” It was 
highlighted that the need to pay bribes to customs officials during clearance leads to raw 
material delays and shortages. BU’s Sales Manager noted: “…By the time you deliver late, 
you miss the seasons and fashion changes…clearance at the boarder increases our lead time.  
Sometimes, we delay because others bribe customs officials in order to be cleared fast…” It 
was further reported that firms connive with government staff and dodge taxes leading to 
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unfair competitive practices such as price wars. JU’s Procurement & Logistics Officer stated: 
“Some competitors lobby the government and dodge or pay low taxes. There is corruption in 
government where beneficiaries pay less or no tax and end up charging a lower price which 
affects our customer base.” Bribery and conflict of interest was also reported as a cause of 
product counterfeiting as noted by BU’s Export Manager: “We are in touch with government 
and Uganda Revenue Authority [government body] to handle counterfeiters. They 
[counterfeiters] may be part of the investigators. They get a lot of profit and can bribe 
Uganda Revenue Authority and other government staff.”  
      Firms revealed that corruption is a source of ten other threats as illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
The fact that many threats originate from corruption reveals the interrelatedness of threats to 
SCRES and how some threats can play a more central role than others in causing disruptions.  
The seriousness of the threat of corruption can be revealed in the comment by PU’s 
Procurement Manager: “Five different companies have closed or sold in the last one year due 
to a fight on corruption…If Uganda Revenue Authority became serious with tax collections, 
some of them which depend on corruption and fraud will close.” The fact that some firms 
thrive on corruption which is a threat to others suggests that some factors can be perceived as 


































 Product Counterfeiting 
All firms argued that product counterfeiting was a threat to their supply chains in that it 
reduced their customer base, led to poor quality raw materials, caused reputational risk and 
rendered their products relatively expensive. It was reported that some customers have 
limited product knowledge and cannot differentiate counterfeits from genuine products. But, 
it was also acknowledged that some choose counterfeits deliberately as long they are cheaper 
than genuine products.  BU’s Sales Manager stated: “We sensitise our customers to know the 
quality of our products. But the customers buy counterfeit when they are aware.” A similar 
observation was made by OU’s Sales and Marketing manager, who argued that Ugandan 
customers are price sensitive – they buy counterfeit products deliberately as long as they are 
relatively cheap. Product counterfeiting was attributed to several other factors such as the 
presence of a weak legal system and lack of copyright laws as reported by company TU. Due 
to corruption, the anti-counterfeit officials are part of the counterfeit problem. LU’s Assistant 
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Sales Manager commented: “…Uganda National Bureau of Standards [government body] is 
sometimes compromised due to corruption in Uganda. They keep telling you that they are 
working on the problem but they are compromised by bribes…counterfeiters confuse our 
customers.” Some firms blamed the government policy for encouraging counterfeit products 
as revealed in the comment by HU’s Marketing Manager: “Everything in Uganda has been 
adulterated e.g. the kind of tensile or reinforcement is not the one recommended but this is 
what is in the market. Uganda National Bureau of Standards has recommended it so we use it 
knowing it is not on standard because it’s what is available locally. Importation means high 
price and it makes it hard to retain customers and compete.” Other firms attributed the 
counterfeit problem to sourcing from dishonest local suppliers and the growth of the informal 
sector as explained by HU’s Production and Operations Manager: “We have a problem of 
people who produce fake products. Our government is not yet strict on people who produce 
concrete. They cannot certify people who produce concrete and they do not oversee them. 
Some are not registered and nothing is known on how they work…no clear standards are set 
yet.”  
    Besides showing that threats can originate from other threats and produce other threats (see 
figure 4.5), the counterfeit threat also shows that customers can produce or compound threats 
to SCRES – the downstream part of the supply chain can thus be a potential source of threats 
to SCRES. The antecedents of product counterfeiting e.g. corruption, a weak legal system 
and local sourcing further show the role of context in building SCRES – the findings revealed 
that the government and customers in a developing country for example can support the use 






















 In-transit Raw Material Theft 
Five companies (BU, RU, GU, KU, PU) highlighted a theft of in-bound raw materials that 
disrupts production and delivery to customers.  KU’s Marketing Manager noted: “There is 
also a problem of robbers who steal our raw materials especially in Tanzania when our spirit 
is coming from Malawi…and during the process, we do not produce as expected and this 
affects our market.” Companies RU and GU argued that due to overseas sourcing, bulky raw 
materials have to be transported by sea which creates vulnerability to sea piracy. Further, due 
to poor transport infrastructure, loaded trucks get accidents along the way and thieves utilise 
the opportunity – sometimes thieves connive with company employees. LU’s Logistics 
Assistant commented: “Our raw materials are bulky and we have problems with 
transportation. We use water and we are affected by weather and piracy…” 
 
 Communication Barriers 
Five companies (PU, NU, HU, EU, KU) argued that their supply chains are disrupted by 
communication barriers. They contended that communication problems cause delays of 
materials and spares, coupled with a mismatch in specifications. PU’s Procurement Manager 
noted: “We have a communication challenge; sometimes Chinese suppliers do not know 
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Figure 4.5: Antecedents and Consequences of Product Counterfeiting 
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English…But communication problems cause delays and delivery of the wrong specification. 
The communication problem is also due to changing time zones, it becomes hard to 
communicate with the suppliers.” Besides language barriers, the interviewees reported a 
deficiency in communication infrastructure such as internet facilities as explained by HU’s 
Production and Operations Manager: “Another threat is that there are communication 
barriers. We use telephone and we can’t use internet. Sometimes I drive there myself. They do 
not have internet and it’s a big problem.” From this analysis, the different communication 








 Natural Disasters 
Five companies (QU, IU, FU, TU, GU) which mainly use agricultural raw materials pointed 
to unfavourable weather as a threat to their supply chains. This weather leads to scarcity of 
raw materials and production stoppages as explained by FU’s Corporate Marketing Manager: 
“Due to drought, the sugarcane was not mature enough. There was crop failure and the 
sugarcane had low juice content and the scarcity of raw materials led to production 
stoppages…The crop failure of 2011 started small but became too big and spread to the 
whole region and destabilized many supply chains.” TU revealed that unpredictable weather 
patterns not only affect their suppliers but also their customers – the majority of TU’s 
customers depend on income from agricultural products. The Route to Consumer Supply 
Manager commented: “Most raw materials e.g. maize, sorghum, cassava are locally grown. 
Outcomes 
-Delays of raw materials 
-Delays of spares 
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The weather pattern of Uganda is unpredictable. These are grown in specific areas. For 
example during dry spells, there is a scramble for raw materials with our competitors...Our 
customers in the rural areas who are the majority depend on agriculture – implying that in 
case of bad weather e.g. dry season, their disposable income is very low and this affects our 
supply chain downstream.”  
     Firms blamed both drought and too much rainfall as causes of shortages and poor quality 
raw materials. GU’s Sales and Marketing Executive revealed: “… In 2011, there was drought 
which affected sugarcane yields and the sugar prices shot up since we did not have raw 
material...Quality problems; sometimes the quality of sugar is not good due to the quality of 
sugarcane. This could be due to natural factors such as too much rain which destroys the 
sugar quality.” QU, which manufactures dairy products, highlighted a threat of disease 
outbreaks as leading to shortages and poor quality raw materials. QU’s Procurement Manager 
commented: “We have a problem of cattle diseases such as foot and mouth disease. During 
such a disaster, milk yields are low and at times of poor quality. These diseases break up 
unexpectedly and you already have orders.” IU highlighted a threat of floods in some parts of 
Uganda which hinder proximity to markets.  The forms of natural disasters highlighted in the 
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4.2.1.2 Economic Threats 
 
 Informal Sector  
Three companies (PU, HU, QU) indicated that the presence of a large informal sector was a 
threat to their supply chains – it was reported that informal actors do not keep records, are not 
formally registered and information about their activities is limited. Thus, they are not easy to 
regulate or assess for taxation purposes. By evading or avoiding taxes, they are better placed 
to sell at lower prices than formal firms and this causes unfair competition in the form of 
price wars. HU blamed informal actors for perpetuating product counterfeiting. It was further 
reported that the informal actors produce other threats like unfair competition, financial 
difficulties, raw material delays and shortages; and a reduced customer base. 
     The informal sector in Uganda dominates most of the industries. For example, information 
from the dairy sector revealed that it comprises approximately 80% of the market share. QU, 
which relies on milk from local farmers as a raw material, indicated that their supply chain is 
affected both in the upstream and downstream by informal actors. QU’s Procurement 
Manager noted: “Our major threat is the informal market. In this industry, the informal 
market is bigger than the formal one. These [informal actors] sell quite cheaply since they do 
not pay tax and since the majority of Ugandans are poor, we lose the market. But we also 
lose milk raw material because the informal market takes the largest portion.” The presence 
of a large informal sector was blamed on a lax government that survives on political 
patronage and unfavourable government policy e.g. on taxation. PU’s Procurement Manager 
observed: “Corruption is a big problem…Some companies have closed due to the informal 
sector where the government, due to donors withdrawing, has focused on squeezing the 
formal sector. The informal sectors do not keep records and taxes are assessed by estimation. 
So they squeeze us and this affects our revenues and financial stability.” The above analysis 
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reveals that the disruption caused by the informal sector originates from other threats and also 


















 Unfair Competition 
Fifteen companies (AU, TU, DU, OU, GU, BU, CU, HU, KU, JU, PU, LU, IU, RU, QU) 
highlighted unfair competition as a threat to their supply chains. OU, PU, JU, BU and KU 
indicated that their competitors engage in price wars because they evade taxes due to 
corruption either by bribing tax officials or manipulating their political connections. PU’s  
Procurement Manager commented: “We don’t have a level playing field…we declare 
truthfully to government…due to corruption, most of our competitors do not pay taxes on 
some materials. Hence our competitors beat us on price and this affects our sales [we 
experience] price wars where our competitors undercut us. We lose customers to our 
competitors.” Some firms complained that their competitors collude with suppliers to 
sabotage them through delayed raw material deliveries or total delivery failure. JU’s Sales 
and Marketing Manager stated: “Our competitors set aside a lot of money and bought our 
empties so that we fail to produce due to a lack of packaging materials. There is an instance 
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competitor company. So because he was related to our competitor, they delayed to supply 
us… We spent some time without production and this adversely affected our market”  
     Firms like HU blamed competitors for deliberately buying raw materials stolen from them 
by dishonest employees.  AU, JU and CU complained of sabotage by rivals through negative 
publicity and bad mouthing which affect their customer base. JU’s Trade marketing manager 
noted: “There are also sabotages from our competitors e.g. there is one time when our 
competitors went on saying that we were about to close down and this affected our reputation 
and customer confidence. It was hard to recover and regain our market share”  
     The above discussion about the threat of unfair competition can confirm how global 
systems are interlinked – it shows systems compete for limited resources and that attempts to 
build resilience in one system may affect another. The data shows that unfair competition can 
















 Poor Transport Infrastructure 
Seventeen companies (DU, OU, GU, BU, CU, EU, FU, HU, KU, JU, NU, PU, QU, MU, LU, 
IU, RU) reported that poor transport infrastructure causes supply chain disruptions. They 
argued that the road transport route particularly from the Kenyan ports of Mombasa to 
Uganda is dilapidated, causing raw material delays, quality problems, accidents and theft of 
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materials in-transit. PU’s Procurement Manager noted: “…driving long distances, trucks take 
forty five days from Mombasa to Kampala. Some of the roads are dilapidated and poorly 
lighted. We had a recent incidence of accident of a truck. If the raw materials are portable 
and there is an accident they get stolen.” Firms like JU attributed the problem of poor road 
infrastructure to government complacency and corruption.  JU’s Procurement Manager also 
explained how poor transport infrastructure affects both the upstream and downstream supply 
chain: “We generally have a problem of a poor road network during raw material transit and 
distribution of the finished products. This delays our production and at the same time affects 
our distribution and market activities.” The Procurement officer for QU, which relies on 
local farmers for raw material (milk), indicated that due to poor road network in Uganda; 
most of the farmers are not accessible and this results in delays and sometimes milk quality 
deterioration during transit.  
     The above finding shows that certain categories of threats can produce others that emerge 
at different points of the supply chain – poor transport infrastructure as an exogenous threat 
leading to endogenous threats e.g. poor quality, delays and shortages of raw materials. This is 
developed further in the next chapter. It also shows that the geographical location (being in a 
landlocked country where Kenya is the main transit route) creates vulnerability to certain 
external threats (e.g. poor transport infrastructure in Kenya) as illustrated in Figure 4.10 
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 Unstable Taxation 
Six companies (DU, GU, TU, JU, IU, PU) argued that an unstable taxation system disrupts 
their supply chain activities. Respondents explained that a persistent increase in taxes implies 
increasing prices to the advantage of the informal actors who dodge taxes – respondents 
revealed that this reduces their customer base. It was reported that there are instances when 
developed country donors withdraw or suspend financial donations due to corruption reports. 
And in a bid to compensate for the lost revenue, the government abruptly increases taxes on 
manufacturing firms. PU’s Procurement Manager observed: “Some companies have 
closed…the government due to donors withdrawing has focused on squeezing the formal 
sector… most of our competitors do not pay taxes on some materials… So they squeeze us 
and this affects our revenues and financial stability.”  
 
 Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
Five companies (BU, HU, JU, IU, RU) highlighted foreign exchange rate fluctuations as a 
threat to their supply chains. It was revealed that exchange rate fluctuations constrain 
planning, especially for raw materials whose prices sometimes escalate. This also leads to 
increased import taxes and subsequent burden transfer to consumers in the form of price 
increases – the downstream supply chain is affected in the form of reduced customer base due 
to inconsistent pricing. BU’s Export Manager stated: “When we import at a high rate, then 
the prices are affected and our market share reduces. Some of our competitors dodge these 
taxes by conniving with Uganda Revenue Authority staff because of corruption and reduce 
their prices.” Company IU argued that fluctuating exchange rates lead to raw material delays 
because high exchange rates result in delays – company officials take a long time to approve 




 Power Shortages  
Eleven firms (JU, AU, BU, CU, LU, MU, RU, HU, IU, NU, KU) highlighted the presence of 
power fluctuations and outages which affect their production operations. Power shortages 
also cause machine breakdowns leading to production stoppages and poor customer delivery 
performance. NU’s Inventory Manager stated: “Power goes off and you have an order but the 
generator can run only one machine. This means delaying the customer: sometimes there is 
no power for a full week.” Power shortages also lead to quality problems as reported by JU’s 
Procurement and Logistics Officer: “…we send products in the market and they are found to 
be of poor quality due to poor processing. In brewing, sometimes power goes off, it affects 
the product and after bottling there are problems.” Further, companies e.g.  AU and CU 
explained that power failures result in financial difficulties. AU’s Marketing Manager stated: 
“We have power shortages but we try to use our generator.  This is however expensive.  If we 
use a generator, we use almost 500 litres of diesel per day - approximately 1.5 million 
Ugandan shillings, putting us in a bad financial situation.” This threat of power shortages 
also shows how certain conditions specific to a developing country context can produce 
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     The foregoing section has shown that that threats and conditions external to the supply 
chain, not only disrupt the supply chain, but can also cause or compound other threats both 
internal and external to the supply chain. This shows how threats are interrelated. The next 
section analyses the endogenous threats (originating from within the supply chain) – 
categorised under supply-side threats, firm level threats and demand-side threats.   
4.2.2. Endogenous Threats 
4.2.2.1. Supply-Side Threats 
These threats originate from the upstream part of the supply chain (from suppliers). Ten 
supply-side threats were revealed by the data: power asymmetries related threats/stronger 
suppliers, long distance sourcing triggered threats, product counterfeiting, poor quality raw 
materials, dishonest suppliers, raw material delays and shortages, financial difficulties of 
suppliers, supplier delivery failure, reputational risk and limited local supply market.  
 
 Power Asymmetries (Stronger Suppliers)  
Four companies (EU, IU, MU, KU) argued they did not enjoy a level playing field during 
negotiations because their suppliers had stronger bargaining power. EU’s Procurement 
Manager argued:  “We have a problem of monopolies, for example our major supplier of 
fuels has monopolized the local market…they can dictate terms and price. Our foreign 
suppliers who deal in laboratory equipment – they are strong and there is a win-lose 
negotiation. They dictate terms and demand advance payments.” It was found that power 
asymmetries influence the implementation of SCRES strategies to increase visibility, 
proximity and information flow: strategies such as co-location where suppliers and buyers are 
expected to establish facilities near each other and hence reduce distance between them can 
be constrained by the buyer’s weaker power position. MU’s Company Pharmacist noted: 
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“…Those suppliers with high bargaining power may be complacent. Sometimes, they delay 
delivery and there is nothing we can do. We decided to deal with them through our parent 
company which has higher bargaining power...Due to high bargaining power of our parent 
company; some of the suppliers establish their facilities near it.”  
     The effect of power asymmetries discussed above shows that certain conditions affect 
SCRES in different ways e.g. by both producing threats and impeding the implementation of 
strategies to create resilience against threats. For example, power asymmetry can lead to 
supplier complacency and raw material delays; and also constrain co-location which would 
mitigate other threats e.g. from long distance sourcing like in-transit raw material theft as 







 Long Distance Sourcing  
Fourteen firms (AU, EU, FU, BU, CU, KU, JU, PU, SU, MU, RU, LU, HU, NU) argued that 
a long distance from suppliers due to overseas sourcing disrupts their supply chains by e.g. 
causing raw material delays and shortages. JU’s Sales and Marketing Manager argued:  “Raw 
materials can take a long time to reach us because of long distance sourcing and we exhaust 
the buffers. In fact as I speak, due to the exhaustion of our buffers, we are now on standstill. 
We cannot produce due to delayed raw materials and yet customers have already paid in 
advance.” It was reported that long lead times due to long distance sourcing creates a need to 
maintain huge stocks of raw materials for a relatively long period of time e.g. five months.  
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collaborative relationships with suppliers due to communication barriers and poor 
information flow. CU’s Production and Site Coordinator noted: “There is a breakdown of 
information and unreliable information due to the long distance from where we source our 
raw materials and it is difficult to establish collaborative relationships with suppliers …”  
     Firms like KU attributed the problem of a reduced customer base to long distance sourcing 
which causes raw material shortages and constrains production for a long period. KU’s 
Marketing Manager explained: “There is a delay in getting spirit, hungover remover and 
flavour. Sometimes we have one of the three and we cannot produce since they are used 
concurrently… The shortage of quality raw materials makes our customers shift to our 
competitors.” Firms like SU attributed the problem of long distance sourcing to a limited 
local supply market characterised by poor quality products. 
     The above finding shows how a threat to SCRES results from the context of a developing 
country. For example, a limited local supply market due to a low level of economic 
development can create conditions like long distance sourcing that in turns produce other 
threats e.g. raw material delays and shortages. This further shows that a threat can create 
conditions that produce another threat at the same point of the supply chain (upstream).  
 
 Limited Local Supply Market  
Sixteen firms (AU, CU, FU, KU, SU, LU, EU, HU, JU, MU, NU, RU, PU, IU, QU, TU) 
contended that a limited local supply market was a threat to their supply chains. It was found 
that even the available suppliers have quality problems. As a result, firms go for long 
distance/overseas sourcing. SU’s Factory Engineer argued: “There is a shortage of raw 
materials locally and the limited options are poor quality. We end up importing but again 
this causes delays due to distance and other uncertainties.” Firms like EU, HU and PU 
revealed that some of the few available local suppliers are monopolists who sometimes run 
out of stock of raw materials and fail to deliver thereby disrupting production.  PU’s 
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Procurement Officer noted: “Sometimes, we request the items and find they are not there. 
This affects our production schedules. As a result, we have to go for international sourcing 
but again there are uncertainties and delays. You can’t coordinate easily.” A limited local 
supply market with poor quality products is also an example of how the context of a 
developing country that is less industrialised can particularly affect SCRES. 
 
 Product Counterfeiting 
The threat of product counterfeiting has already been discussed under the geo-political 
category as largely exogenous. However, it was also interesting to find that some firms 
considered counterfeiting as an endogenous threat. It was reported that some suppliers – 
mainly locally based – are dishonest and are partly responsible for perpetuating product 
counterfeiting. Some suppliers produce counterfeits and supply them as genuine raw 
materials. EU’s Procurement Manager explained:  “They [suppliers] mix stones in our raw 
materials and this requires inspecting all the trucks. Counterfeiting is becoming a disaster in 
our supply chain…sometimes our raw materials are mixed with stones. In the last few 
months, we found people with a large inventory of sand mixed with cement packaged in our 
packages.” This example again shows the role of context in building SCRES where for 
example there is a culture of dishonesty and generally a lack of trust in buyer-supplier 
relationships that result in threats to SCRES.  
 
 Poor Quality Raw Materials 
All companies except AU and FU indicated that poor quality raw materials disrupted their 
supply chains.  This threat was linked to other threats like natural disasters, limited local 
supply market, procurement risk, owner management behaviour, communication barriers, 
dishonest suppliers, poor transport infrastructure, product counterfeiting and product 
characteristics. For example, QU’s Procurement Manager stated: “We face a problem of poor 
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quality raw materials and finished products due to the poor hygiene and handling practices 
of the farmers [suppliers] and distributors. Due to the nature of our products, appropriate 
handling and preservation are required…The situation is compounded by our poor transport 
infrastructure because dairy products need fast transportation.” Others blamed poor quality 
on dishonest suppliers who deliberately adulterate raw materials to increase the quantity as 
revealed by EU’s Procurement Manager. Further, it was reported that poor quality raw 
materials result in poor quality products and a loss of reputation. HU’s Production and 
Operations Manager for example explained: “Suppliers do not grade the materials…This 
leads to poor quality products…customers complain over poor quality and sometimes run to 
competitors. We have variations in sizes when it comes to raw materials e.g. stones…This 
[poor quality product threat] also damages our reputation.”  
     The threat of poor quality raw materials discussed above has further shown the specific 
conditions in a developing country e.g. poor transport infrastructural development can 
produce threats to SCRES. From Figure 4.13, it can further be seen that an exogenous threat 
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 Dishonest Suppliers 
Ten firms (CU, EU, JU, BU, LU, OU, QU, RU, IU, KU) revealed that dishonest suppliers 
(especially the locally based) cause disruptions to their supply chains, through for example, 
delivery failures, late deliveries, poor quality raw materials, connivance and supplying less 
quantity; and releasing confidential information to competitors. Firms like QU and JU 
revealed that some suppliers accept business even if they are aware they do not have the 
products or capacity to deliver. JU’s Procurement Manager noted: “Some suppliers take on 
orders they cannot manage. This is a problem because when they supply less, we run 
machines and produce less. This is costly at the firm level but it also affects our customers. 
When the beer gets finished, they [customers] order and when we fail to supply they shift to 
competitors.” The interviewees reported that dishonest suppliers cause unfair competition by 
conniving with their (interviewees’) suppliers and causing problems e.g. failure to supply, 
supplying late, supplying poor quality and revealing confidential information. CU’s 
Marketing Manager explained: “Sometimes the competitors connive with our suppliers to 
make sure that we are not supplied, supplied late or receive poor quality…We have this 
problem of deep relationship between our competitors and the suppliers. It is difficult to trust 
some of the suppliers we share with our competitors. This affects our production and delivery 
schedules.”  
     Some suppliers also inflate the costs of raw materials and deliver wrong specifications 
through connivance with firms’ employees. This results in financial difficulties, poor quality 
and shortages of raw materials. JU’s Procurement Manager stated: “They bring things below 
specification e.g. less quantity and quality and connive with our employees…If you receive 
less material, you end up miscalculating and you run out of raw materials unexpectedly.”  
     The threat of dishonest suppliers again shows how SCRES can be influenced by the 
context of a developing country characterised by dishonest practices. This threat further 
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shows that exogenous factors e.g. socially acceptable misbehaviour can cause an upstream 
threat of dishonest suppliers that cause other threats e.g. raw materials and shortages at the 
same point of the network, financial difficulties at the firm level and a reduced customer base 
in the downstream.  The various consequences of dishonest suppliers identified from the data 




















 Raw Material Delays and Shortages 
All firms reported a threat of raw material delays and shortages – some arguing that it causes 
production stoppages and customer delivery delays which reduced their customer base. JU’s 
Procurement Manager stated: “We cannot produce due to delayed raw materials and yet 
customers have already paid in advance.” Others like BU attributed material delays to poor 
transport infrastructure and corruption – arguing that delays and shortages create 
vulnerability to demand variations and order cancellations.  BU’s Sales Manager stated: “In 
the fashion industry, time is paramount.  By the time you deliver late, you miss the seasons 
and fashion changes…” 
Product counterfeiting 
Financial difficulties 
Reduced customer base 
Raw material delays and shortages  
Dishonest suppliers 
 
Unfair competition  
Poor quality raw materials  
Confidentiality risk 
 
Confidentiality risk  Supplier delivery failure  
Figure 4.14: Consequences of Dishonest Suppliers 
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     Companies like RU, MU and KU reported that materials can be delayed for more than six 
months which disrupts production and affects the downstream.  KU’s Regional Marketing 
Manager stated: “…We ran out of malt at the time when the beer was picking [when sales had 
started to grow]. We stayed without stock in the market for two months and it has taken us 
years to regain the market share we lost...we couldn’t know it would cause such long term 
impact.” FU, GU and QU, whose raw materials are mainly agricultural products, attributed 
raw material shortages to bad weather and an unfavourable government policy. FU’s 
Corporate Marketing Manager explained: “Inadequate supply of sugarcane causes disruption 
in the supply chain. There is a problem of sugarcane availability…The government policy of 
licensing new sugar companies and having them close to each other means stiff competition 
for few suppliers…Due to drought, there was crop failure…and scarcity of raw materials led 
to production stoppages.”  
      Other reported causes of raw material delays and shortages are other threats like financial 
difficulties, the informal sector, procurement deficiencies, poor internal coordination, and 
delayed payment to suppliers, power asymmetries (stronger suppliers), communication 
barriers, dishonest suppliers, unfair competition, exchange rate fluctuations, political 
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Figure 4.15: Antecedents and Consequences of Raw Material Delays and Shortages 
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Ten companies (FU, EU, KU, JU, NU, HU, IU, QU, LU, PU) argued that their supply chains 
are disrupted by the financial instability of their suppliers who sometimes deliver late, fail to 
deliver or close down.  Financial difficulties of suppliers were highlighted as one of the 
causes of supplier delivery failures as reported by LU’s Assistant Sales Manager:  “Supplier 
bankruptcy – some suppliers are dishonest and do not openly tell you whether they are in 
financial difficulty.  So they take up orders and fail to supply” Some suppliers have closed 
down due to financial difficulties as revealed by KU’s Marketing Manager: “Sometimes 
companies that manufacture spirit and paper are forced to close down due to failure to pay 
taxes. Sometimes, suppliers run out of finances or raw materials and stop production even 
when we have already placed the orders.” However, others attributed suppliers’ financial 
problems to their own (buying firms’) payment policies.  IU’s Finance Manager stated:  “At 
the company level, we have harsh policies on payment where we do not pay our suppliers 
early and they face financial problems.  We can take about 4 – 5 months to pay suppliers and 
sometimes they have loan obligations.” From the above analysis, it can be observed that one 
of the causes of the threat of financial difficulties of suppliers is the dishonest behaviour of 
the suppliers which is a reflection of the Ugandan context earlier highlighted in chapter 3.  
 
 Supplier Delivery Failure  
Thirteen firms (GU, EU, NU, RU, LU, CU, HU, IU, KU, JU, MU, FU, TU) indicated that 
they face a threat of supplier delivery failure which disrupts production and reduces the 
customer base. This was partly attributed to the financial problems of the suppliers as noted 
by EU’s Depot Supervisor: “Suppliers do not meet demand. When a lot of projects crop up, 
we face a challenge of a failure to meet demand…Sometimes suppliers are given orders and 
fail to deliver…Some suppliers have financial challenges and they fail to deliver.” RU 
attributed supplier delivery failure to overseas sourcing of raw materials. RU’s Sales 
Manager stated: “Some of our suppliers get raw materials from companies abroad and they 
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face problems of shortage of raw materials. So they sometimes supply in bits or completely 
fail.” LU attributed supplier delivery failure to dishonest suppliers who overestimate their 
capacity in a bid to win business.  Some other firms argued that supplier delivery failure is 
caused by poor quality materials. MU’s Supply Chain Manager noted: “Our suppliers also 
face raw material quality problems. Because they know we are strict on quality assurance, 
when they receive poor quality raw materials from their suppliers, they reject them and in the 
process, they do not fulfil our orders.” 
 
 Reputational Risk (From Suppliers)  
Companies PU and CU argued that they face reputational risk from suppliers due to, for 
example, financial and payment problems.  PU’s Procurement Manager stated: “At times, we 
have a financial problem … The suppliers complain [about payment] …We used to get raw 
materials but due to late payment…Our relationship and reputation were adversely 
affected.” PU further revealed that overseas suppliers generally have a negative perception of 
firms in Africa because they consider companies in Africa as not suitable to receive credit. 
This negative perception was attributed to African countries’ contextual factors such as 
corruption, political conflicts as well as the high rate at which firms collapse. PU’s 
Procurement Officer explained: “Most of the foreign suppliers do not consider African 
companies as creditworthy. Before they dispatch your containers you must pay in 
full…overseas suppliers have such negative perceptions…It might be due to wars, political 
conflicts, corruption or the high rate of collapse of companies.” CU attributed reputational 
problems to unfair practices by their rivals who spread negative publicity to the suppliers. 





4.2.2.2. Firm Level Threats 
The interviewees highlighted several threats which occur in the focal firm but are seen as 
threats to either the downstream or upstream supply chain, as discussed below: 
 
 Machine Breakdowns  
Seventeen firms (PU, HU, FU, SU, LU, AU, DU, OU, GU, CU, KU, JU, NU, QU, MU, IU, 
RU) identified machine breakdowns as one of the threats to their supply chains. These 
breakdowns are mostly caused by power shortages, poor maintenance and the use of second 
hand equipment. Surprisingly, misbehaving employees could deliberately destroy machines.  
JU’s Procurement Manager stated: “Machine breakdowns are caused by the rampant power 
outages, the workers and bad fuels…But it becomes hard when the breakdown is due to 
employees’ intentional actions due to late payment.” Firms reported that machine 
breakdowns disrupt production and cause poor customer delivery performance – some of the 
spares have to be sourced from overseas such as China, yet they are expensive and storing 
them ties up capital. SU’s Assistant Procurement Manager observed: “Machines breakdown 
and we stop production and run out of stock and this makes some of our customers shift to 
competitors.  The problem is that with spares, it is sometimes hard to anticipate which parts 
will be needed and this makes it hard to keep inventory of spares. And given that they are 
mostly sourced overseas, it sometimes takes a long time to receive them and this affects our 
production and the entire supply chain.” Some firms revealed that machine breakdowns can 
disrupt production for a long period of time. For example, GU’s Sales and Marketing 
executive observed that their company could stop production for two months.  
    Firms such as HU, LU and JU indicated that machine breakdowns cause process 
variations, poor quality products and order cancellations.  JU’s Procurement Manager 
commented: “Breakdown of machines…This also delays the production during repair of 
machines for instance a full week without production. It creates crisis where you have beer in 
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tanks and you don’t bottle and sometimes there are no products in the market. Sometimes this 
causes poor quality beer in the market because the process is disorganised.” The seriousness 
of the threat of machine breakdowns was emphasised by SU’s Factory Engineer: “A small 
machine breakdown here at the company led to stoppage of production and consequently loss 
of a big number of customers. The delivery of spares took a long lead time and this cost the 
company a lot of resources.” This statement shows that seemingly small events can cause 
significant effects on a supply chain’s resilience. 
      From the above analysis, it has been shown that machine breakdowns can be a cause of 















 Product Characteristics  
Six companies (BU, CU, HU, MU, RU, QU) indicated that the nature of their products was 
itself a source of supply chain disruptions. The Production and Site Coordinator for CU, 
which manufactures glass, aluminium and steel products observed: “Our products are 
fragile…storage is difficult and some of them are damaged during transportation.  We also 
incur a lot of insurance costs and a small accident can cause a lot of damage…there is a 
poor road network between Kampala and Mombasa.” RU and HU, that produce steel and 
concrete products respectively, identified the bulkiness of their products as a supply chain 
threat. They contended, for example, that this bulkiness coupled with poor road transport 
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Figure 4.16: Antecedents and Consequences of Machine Breakdowns 
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infrastructure causes excessive delays. Also, the bulkiness of raw materials makes it difficult 
to use alternative transportation modes such as air in the case of an emergency. LU’s 
Logistics Assistant noted: “Our raw materials are bulky and we have problems with 
transportation. We have to use water and we are affected by weather and piracy.”  
    BU argued that the short life cycle of their products was a threat because it affects planning 
and creates a backlog of unsold items, resulting in liquidity problems. BU’s Sales Manager 
commented: “In the fashion industry, time is paramount. By the time you deliver late, you 
miss the seasons and fashion changes…There are constant changes in customer demands and 
some products end up taking more than one year before being sold. We dispose them off 
cheaply and this affects our cash flows.” QU and MU identified the perishable nature of their 
products as a threat. QU’s Procurement Officer stated: “…because our products are 
perishable…a lot go bad. The life span of our products is a big threat.”  
      The threat of product characteristics demonstrates how threats to SCRES are 
interconnected and how they reinforce each other. For example, it was found that the 
perishability and bulkiness of the product could be compounded by another threat – that of 
poor transportation infrastructure.  Figure 4.17 summarises many other threats that originate 
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 Owner Management Behaviour  
Four companies (CU, KU, JU, LU) argued that owner managers fail to separate the 
companies’ operations from their own private affairs, which disrupts their supply chain 
activities. It was reported that the owners use a dictatorial management style and make 
unprofessional decisions regarding e.g. labour recruitment and the allocation of resources. 
CU’s Production and Site Coordinator noted:  “This Company operates informally; it is like 
sole proprietorship, allocating resources depends on owners without consultation. Sometimes 
they over expand and we face financial difficulties and fail to pay our suppliers…there is no 
board of directors and the owners use the money the way they like…we fail to fulfil 
customers’ orders and customers defect to competitors. This also affects the deadlines…You 
get jobs from clients but there is no money to fulfil the order.”  
     Most of these owner managers are not professionals but they perform responsibilities of 
professional staff causing financial losses. The owners’ behaviour was also blamed for 
causing a lack of internal coordination and procurement problems. JU’s Regional Sales 
Manager commented: “The owner makes decisions alone. There are purchases made without 
the knowledge of the procurement department. Last week the chairman [owner] told me there 
is a consignment of raw materials in transit but the procurement department is not aware. 
This kind of arrangement leads to the purchase of poor quality raw materials and de-
motivation of employees.” JU reported unfair treatment of employees where some are 
rewarded more than others unjustifiably, reducing employee cohesion. JU’s Procurement and 
Logistics Officer observed: “There is also a problem of lack of employee cohesion which is 
brought about by inequality in treatment of employees by the owners, for instance some get 
more salaries than others without justification…” The consequences of the threat of owner 




















 Dishonest Employees  
Twelve companies (GU, LU, IU, TU, JU, KU, EU, HU, BU, AU, NU, PU) reported a threat 
of dishonest employees. This involves employees conniving and stealing finished products 
and raw materials either while in transit or when stored within the company premises. HU’s 
Marketing Manager stated: “…we have thieves [employees] who steal cement…sometimes we 
would run out of stock unexpectedly affecting the clients and the company … we could not 
fulfil the orders, which reduces our cash flows. The sales staffs connive with clients and they 
know the base line price but they show you a different price and they share. Even internally, 
in stores the loading clerk would connive with the storekeeper, the sales person and the client 
so they would balance the stock but the physical stock would not exist.” There are also 
situations where employees connive with suppliers and record more quantity of raw materials 
than actually received, as stated by EU’s Procurement Manager: “When materials come in, 
staffs collude with suppliers e.g. they can deliver twenty tonnes and record twenty five 
tonnes.” 
      Some employees connive with suppliers and inflate the cost of raw materials, causing 
financial problems as reported by BU’s Export Manager:  “Some managers would connive 
with the suppliers and they inflate the cost of raw materials or record more than what was 
Poor quality raw materials 
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actually delivered. This would increase our production costs, prices and eventually scare 
away our customers.” Other employee misbehaviours reported included stealing company 
money, deceiving customers, deliberately producing poor quality products/product 
adulteration and destroying machines. JU’s Procurement Manager explained: “…The 
[employees] destroy machines, destabilize the processes and produce poor quality beer 
intentionally. Sometimes we are unable to supply or we supply spoilt beer…But it becomes 
hard when the breakdown is due to employees’ intentional actions.”  
    The threat of dishonest employees shows the importance of the cultural context in building 
SCRES – a culture where misbehaviour is socially acceptable among employees and where 
retaliation is considered as a way of resolving employee grievances rather than the rule of 
law. Another observation is the cyclic nature of relationships between threats where for 
instance dishonest behaviour of employees originates from the firms’ financial difficulties 
(causing payment problems) and causes more financial difficulties to the firm. Figure 4.19 

















 Insufficient Skilled Manpower  
Eleven companies (GU, MU, SU, JU, KU, CU, LU, PU, HU, EU, NU) highlighted a threat of 
insufficient skilled manpower.  Disruptive events such as machine breakdowns, poor quality 
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Figure 4.19: Antecedents and Consequences of Dishonest Employees 
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products, accidents, poor customer care and reduced customer base were partly attributed to a 
deficiency in employee skills.  KU’s Marketing Manager commented: “…We have unskilled 
staff that end up causing machine breakdown through for instance overloading…Using 
unskilled labour looks a small problem initially but it can lead to machine breakdowns, poor 
quality, accidents, production shortages, poor customer service and care; and generally the 
collapse of the entire supply chain.” EU and NU argued that employees do not efficiently 
handle customer complaints because it is difficult to get employees with sufficient skills.  
NU’s Inventory Manager stated: “…They fail to effectively address customer complaints and 
our customers end up shifting to our competitors.”  Further, unskilled employees indulge in 
malicious activities such as intentional destruction of machines thereby disrupting the 
production schedules. JU’s Procurement Manager noted: “…Lack of highly skilled 
employees…That is why they can damage or destroy machines intentionally.” Thus, from the 
analysis, it is observed that a lack of sufficiently skilled manpower can cause more threats as 













 Poor Internal Coordination  
Ten companies (BU, JU, GU, CU, HU, IU, KU, NU, PU, LU) identified a deficiency in 
internal coordination as one of the sources of disruptions to their supply chains. This poor 
coordination is characterised by functional silos and a mismatch in goals.  PU’s Brand 
Manager argued: “There is poor communication and lack of understanding between 
Poor quality products 
Poor internal coordination 
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departments e.g. procurement and marketing. There is a mismatch between what we 
[marketing] aim at and what they [procurement] aim at.” Some problems like raw material 
delays and shortages, procurement risk and misallocation of resources (causing financial 
difficulties) were partly attributed to a lack of coordination. JU’s Procurement Manager for 
example argued that an order of the same raw material can be made by finance, procurement 
and the owner concurrently and without each other’s knowledge. This is reiterated by PU’s 
Procurement Manager who observed: “We have a problem of internal coordination…There is 
a problem of information flow where people bypass the information hierarchy. Your 
subordinate needs something but instead communicates to the wrong departments…as an 
example, there are certain spares the user wanted, instead of communicating to procurement 
directly, he communicated to the technical manager...but this caused a lot of delay and idle 
machines. So we cannot produce and this affects our forecasts. This affects our buffers and 
may lead to shortage.”  
     Companies like CU and JU reported that poor internal coordination was responsible for 
the managers’ wrong decisions that lead to supply chain disruptions.  JU’s Trade Marketing 
Manager argued:  “For example production should get orders from marketing. Instead orders 
are got from somewhere else and sometimes a new brand is introduced without the approval 
of marketing. Due to limited capacity, the production of the brand required by customers is 
reduced and, instead, the newly produced brand is not preferred by the customers. This leads 
to a shortage in the market… thus affecting our revenue.” The antecedents and consequences 

























 Poor Quality Products  
Fifteen firms (HU, BU, LU, QU, JU, DU, KU, PU, IU, NU, FU, TU, RU, GU, OU) reported 
poor quality products as a threat to their supply chains. GU’s Sales and Marketing Executive 
argued: “Quality problems, sometimes the quality of sugar is not good due to the quality of 
sugarcane. This could be due to natural factors such as too much rain which destroys the 
sugarcane quality…poor quality leads to customer complaints.” One of the causes of poor 
quality products is power shortages, as explained by JU’s Procurement and Logistics Officer: 
“Quality problems, we send products in the market and they are found to be of poor quality 
due to poor processing. In brewing, sometimes power goes off, it affects the product and after 
bottling there are problems. Sometimes…we buy poor quality caustic soda...” Companies e.g. 
KU attributed the quality threat to insufficient skilled manpower while others e.g. JU and HU 
attributed it to poor quality raw materials and process variations due to machine breakdowns. 
HU’s Production and Operations Manager asserted: “We have variations in sizes when it 
comes to raw materials. We produce different product sizes and this is due to the equipment 
used by our suppliers. Customers complain about the sizes of the products but this is also due 
to machine breakdowns. Fixing machines after repair to the right positions is a problem.” 
But what appeared more interesting is that dishonest employees deliberately produce poor 
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quality products as noted by JU’s Regional Sales Manager: “Quality issues…sometimes, 
there are inconsistencies…poor quality sometimes in the production department. This could 
be due to dissatisfaction of employees with the salaries, they sometimes sabotage.” This 
further reinforces the role of the context in building resilience. Figure 4.22 shows that poor 















 Payment Threat (To Suppliers/Labour) 
Thirteen companies (AU, CU, BU, GU, JU, LU, PU, MU, KU, NU, IU, RU, HU) indicated 
that their supply chains are disrupted by late payment to suppliers / labour. This leads to raw 
material delays and shortages, machine breakdowns, poor quality products, failure to fulfil 
customers’ orders, loss of supplier confidence and trust, and suppliers’ refusal to advance 
credit. Interviewees attributed delayed payment to several factors such as inefficiency, 
company policies, delayed payment by customers, order cancellations and financial 
difficulties. For example, the Procurement Manager for PU noted that due to financial 
problems, they fail to pay suppliers on time. As a result, they lose reputation and suppliers do 
not deliver raw materials on time. 
     Firms like JU indicated that the payment problem, which may result from financial 
difficulties, also applies to employees – late payment of employees’ salaries can disrupt 
Dishonest employees 
Payment threat to suppliers/labour 
Raw material delays and shortages 









products   
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production through reduced employee productivity, intentional destruction of machines and 
the production of poor quality products.  JU and LU, for example, indicated how payment 
problems can result in financial difficulties and employee strikes that can disrupt the entire 
supply chain. JU’s Trade Marketing Manager explained: “Late payment of employees makes 
them less motivated and production is affected. This is a big problem since it also affects our 
revenues and may be a cause of failure to pay suppliers on time. Late staff payment is a 
problem that started small but has eventually affected the whole supply chain. Production is 
affected, the market is affected and we fail to get cash inflows to pay our suppliers.”  
     The above discussion shows how the payment threat originated, partly, from financial 
difficulties of the focal firm and produced other threats that again led to the original threat of 






















 Financial Difficulties (Focal Firm) 
Seventeen companies (AU, DU, PU, KU, JU, IU, FU, MU, LU, GU, EU, CU, BU, SU, NU, 
OU, HU) revealed that their supply chains are disrupted due to financial problems which for 
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example result in failure to pay their suppliers on time, leading to raw material delays, 
production disruptions and poor customer delivery performance. Dishonest employees and 
suppliers were listed among the causes of financial problems, as noted by BU’s Export 
Manager: “…Delays in raw materials. This is due to failure to pay suppliers on time. We are 
not financially stable…We could not have products to supply to our customers. We had a 
financial problem but this was due to mismanagement. Suppliers would connive with 
employees and inflate the cost of raw materials.” Others like CU attributed their financial 
difficulties to the behaviour of owner managers who make wrong financial decisions such as 
over expansion or diverting company money to their private use, leading to failure to fulfil 
customers’ orders.  
      Other causes of financial difficulties highlighted include political instabilities, order 
cancellations, poor internal coordination, procurement risk, demand variations, dishonest 
customers/distributors, power shortages and exchange rate fluctuations (these are separately 
discussed as threats in their own right). It was also found that financial difficulties lead to a 
failure to pay employees and suppliers; and employees retaliate by e.g. destroying machines, 
while suppliers refuse to advance goods on credit. For example, the Managing Director for 
JU observed: “We have a cash flow challenge. We do not pay suppliers on time and 
sometimes we completely fail to pay. We lose supplier confidence and they abandon us or 
demand advance payment, which we cannot afford.” In figure 4.24, it can be observed that 
the threat of financial difficulties originates from many other threats and causes other threats 






















 Procurement Risk  
Six companies (BU, EU, IU, MU, JU, PU) indicated that procurement related problems 
disrupt their supply chains.  BU, MU and EU pointed to a centralised procurement system 
where orders have to be approved by their parent companies located in different countries 
causing late approvals and delays. It was reported that such procurement system increases 
raw material path length and constrains visibility. MU’s Company Pharmacist noted: “… 
some of the materials were to be sourced through the parent company which made us fail to 
have direct contact with the suppliers. This would cause delays. Some materials were 
manufactured in USA and China but had to pass via India…”  Companies further pointed to 
the problem of uncoordinated procurement systems that lead to duplication, excessive 
purchases and capital tied-up; and shortages of raw materials as explained by JU’s 
Procurement Manager:  “You find the same order is placed by both finance and procurement. 
Here everyone can be a buyer… Also we buy more of one raw material and very less of the 
other, thus shortage of one and excess of the other yet they are needed concurrently. This 
leads to expiry and loss. It also leads to less supply of the product in the market.”  
     Companies like JU highlighted a lack of procurement planning. JU’s Procurement and 
Logistics Officer stated: “Late placing of orders. Most of our raw materials are from abroad. 
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The user departments place orders when it is late. So they do not consider the lead time. 
Hence there is delay in delivering raw materials and this affects production and delivery to 
the customers. In the long run there is financial distress leading to late payment to 
employees.” Other firms attributed procurement risk to owner management behaviour and 
poor internal coordination. For example, JU’s Regional Marketing Manager revealed that the 
owner makes purchasing decisions alone and delivery is made without involving the 
procurement department, which leads to poor quality raw material purchases. This shows that 
the threat caused by procurement originates from other threats and also causes other threats as 














 Industrial Disputes  
Six companies (KU, RU, GU, LU, AU, JU) highlighted industrial disputes especially 
employee strikes as an obstacle to their supply chains. Employee strikes are caused by late or 
low salary payments and generally poor working conditions. GU’s Sales and Marketing 
Executive explained: “We use both skilled and unskilled labour. They strike over working 
conditions and sometimes late payments and this leads to temporary closure and reduced 
output, which affects our market. This also leads to machine breakdowns. Sometimes…we 
stop production for about two months.” KU indicated that employee strikes not only disrupt 
production but also damage their corporate image. KU’s Marketing Manager commented: 
“Employee strikes due to late payments…There is no production and our image is damaged. 
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Raw material delays and shortages 
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When there is a strike, we do not produce and other companies take over our customers.” RU 
revealed that employee disputes affect the downstream supply chain. RU’s Sales Manager 
stated: “Strikes affect production, loading products and delivery to the market…Employees 
are not motivated due to low salaries that are even delayed. This reduces productivity and 















 Poor Customer Delivery Performance 
All the twenty firms highlighted a threat of poor customer delivery performance especially in 
the form of late deliveries to customers. Delivery delays create customer complaints, loss of 
trust and customer confidence thereby reducing the customer base. LU’s Assistant Sales 
Manager noted: “Late deliveries to customers – this is due to the lack of enough resources or 
lack of raw materials. Due to this, some of our customers defect to our competitors and end 
up not coming back. Late delivery brings mistrust because you are causing loses to 
customers” Companies attributed poor customer delivery performance to factors like 
machine breakdowns, financial difficulties, raw material delays and shortages, poor 
transportation infrastructure and government policy. For example, RU’s Sales Manager 
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Figure 4.26: Antecedents and Consequences of Industrial Disputes 
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cost…There are also road accidents due to e.g. poor roads… the government policy on the 
weight of trucks is unfavourable.”   
     Poor customer delivery performance is also caused by industrial disputes, natural 
disasters, owner management behaviour, poor internal coordination, demand variations, 
machine breakdowns, dishonest employees, stock theft, power shortages, product 
characteristics and customer characteristics. On demand variations for example, FU’s 
Corporate Marketing Manager stated: “…Sudden demand variations and we fail to meet 
customer orders. It is a natural phenomenon in our business…” And on poor internal 
coordination and dishonest employees, NU’s Inventory Manager explained: “Sometimes 
salespeople get orders when they are not aware whether we have raw materials. There is a 
lack of coordination between sales and production or stores. Sales people do not tell the truth 
to the customers about when we will deliver and sometimes we deliver late or fail 
completely.” 
     The threat of poor customer delivery performance shows how threats external to the 
supply chain, supply-side and firm-level threats can cause downstream threats. As observed 
from Figure 4.27, many other threats which have already been discussed, can cause poor 
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Figure 4.27: Antecedents and Consequences of Poor Customer Delivery Performance 
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4.2.2.3 Demand-Side Threats 
From the data, the demand-side threats (i.e. threats originating from the downstream part of 
the supply chain)  as summarised in Table 4.1 at the beginning of this chapter include  power 
asymmetries (stronger customers) , dishonest customers/ distributors, payment threat (from 
customers), financial difficulties of customers, order cancellations, demand variations, 
customer characteristics and reputational risk. These threats are discussed below. 
 
 Power Asymmetries (Stronger Customers)  
Eleven companies (DU, OU, CU, EU, JU, HU, LU, GU, MU, NU, RU ) reported a threat of 
high bargaining power of their customers.  It was reported that stronger customers use their 
power to exploit e.g. by influencing negotiations to gain more favourable terms with the 
threat to switch to competitors if their demands were not met. Some firms like MU, HU, RU 
and LU argued that powerful buyers are habitually known for excessively delaying payments. 
According to LU’s Assistant Sales Manager, the same customers continue to push for more 
credit before paying the amount outstanding or else they divert to other suppliers. An 
example was the Southern Sudanese government which was a customer to some of the firms 
but could delay payments for more than a year, causing financial difficulties. MU’s Company 
Pharmacist noted: “Our customers are mainly government and global companies that have 
higher bargaining power than us. Sometimes they use this advantage and delay payments 
affecting our operations like purchasing raw materials.” It was revealed that some stronger 
buyers prefer a win-lose situation by manipulating terms in their favour causing financial 
problems. For example, EU’s Deport Manager commented: “There are big customers who 
become threat…they influence negotiations and in most cases to our disadvantage and 
sometimes we run into financial problems as a result.” This shows power asymmetries – 
where customers are stronger than the focal firm – are mainly perceived as causing financial 




 Dishonest Customers/ Distributors  
Fourteen firms (LU, DU, JU, KU, CU, PU, BU, GU, FU, RU, HU, IU, SU, TU) indicated 
that their customers/distributors pose threats to their supply chains. Such threats include 
financial difficulties, as revealed by LU’s Assistant Sales Manager: “There are unpredictable 
customers who keep on dodging payment.  So they keep defecting from one company to the 
other. After entrusting the distributor with goods worth millions, they disappear, refuse to 
pay or switch to competitors.” GU and JU reported that some customers deliberately issue 
bouncing cheques while CU argued that some use political connections and corruption to 
abscond from payments. 
     Firms further reported misbehaving customers or distributors who connive with their 
(study firms’) employees and either manipulate the prices or load more quantity than was 
bought. HU’s Marketing Manager noted: “The sales staff connive with clients and they show 
you a different price and they share. We lose a lot of money…Even internally in stores, the 
loading clerk would connive with the storekeeper, the sales person and the client so they 
would balance the stock but the physical stock would not exist…we could not fulfil the 
orders.” Some distributors violate the companies’ pricing policies and set higher prices 
which reduce the customer base. DU indicated that some distributors deliberately accumulate 
debts and close down their businesses in order to dodge paying back. Others are 
compromised by competitors as reported by TU’s Route to Consumer Supply Manager: 
“Some distributors keep our stock and they distribute to the competitors’. Our market share 
is affected. Ugandans are not honest business people…our customers/distributors are not 
stable: they can any time withdraw from the business and begin a different one.” Figure 4.28 


















 Payment Threat (From Customers)  
Sixteen firms (AU, BU, CU, DU, FU, GU, HU, IU, JU, KU, LU, MU, NU, PU, RU, SU) 
highlighted a threat of payment from customers. This was attributed to power asymmetries 
(stronger customers), financial difficulties of customers and dishonest behaviour of 
customers.  Firms like MU, HU, RU and LU argued that some customers delay payments 
excessively and this creates financial difficulties – customers with high bargaining power 
such as governments can exceed a year without paying.  It was argued that this cripples 
operations and leads to failure to pay creditors such as suppliers on time. HU’s Marketing 
Manager commented: “…We deal with contract companies; they follow the procurement 
procedures, which delay the process. The government procurement procedure is bureaucratic 
and sometimes you get money after six months or even a year, so we do not get the 
anticipated revenue and we can’t manufacture and supply other clients.” Some dishonest 
customers take advantage of their political connections, corruption and a weak legal system 
to default payment as reported by CU’s Production and Site Coordinator: “There are 
customers who fail to pay and we declare them ‘bad debts’.  Some deliberate and you move 
to the building and find soldiers camped there.” The causes and effects of the payment threat 
identified from the data are illustrated in Figure 4.29. 
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 Financial Difficulties of Customers  
Four companies (EU, FU, RU, JU) indicated that the financial instability of their customers 
was a threat to their supply chains. Due to financial constraints, some customers do not pay 
on time and some completely fail to pay causing financial distress. JU indicated that some of 
their distributors close down their operations before paying the amount owing which leads to 
financial difficulties. JU’s Procurement Manager stated: “Some of our distributors completely 
run out of money and close shop before paying us. This affects us financially. We had such a 
distributor in Mbarara city and we lost billions of shillings.” Some attributed order 
cancellations to the financial difficulties of customers, as stated by FU’s Corporate Marketing 
Manager: “Order cancellations happen due to financial problems on the part of customers. 
After placing orders, customers realise they cannot raise money to pay and yet we have 
already invested in production. This puts us in a difficult financial situation.” 
 
 Order Cancellations  
Eleven companies (LU, HU, AU, CU, DU, OU, FU, BU, NU, MU, JU) highlighted a threat 
of order cancellations. These originate from machine breakdowns, financial difficulties of 
customers, government policy, corruption, raw material delays and shortages; and customer 
characteristics.  Companies like BU, NU and HU argued that order cancellations occur due to 
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Manager observed: “…Even with the big parastatals and corporations, they order wrong 
items and in due process they realise it’s not what they wanted and they later cancel the 
order.” MU attributed order cancellations to the government policies e.g. on donations, 
which makes customers cancel the orders. MU’s Company Pharmacist argued: “Sometimes, 
they cancel and say we have received donations…Donations affect us …we deal in high value 
items which are not easy to store due to tying up capital.  These raw materials have an expiry 
date of only two years and are hard to hold for a long time.” Some companies revealed that 
order cancellations lead to wastage and deterioration of items. The Distribution manager for 
NU noted: “Distributors order excess of what they need and the paint is stored for so long 
and they end up returning it and you find it has expired.”   
      Order cancellations were reported as a cause of financial problems and a failure to pay 
suppliers, as AU’s Marketing Manager noted: “…sometimes clients order and later 
withdraw. This distorts our revenue forecasts and yet we need money to pay for raw 
materials. In some cases, you find we had already ordered based on the projected revenue. 
So, we fail to pay suppliers on time and this is a big problem because they also need to pay 
their suppliers.” The antecedents and consequences of order cancellations are summarised in 

























 Demand Variations  
Fourteen companies (TU, DU, FU, GU, BU, EU, HU, JU, NU, PU, MU, RU, CU, OU) 
highlighted demand variations as a supply chain threat. Some, like NU, argued that demand 
variations result in unexpected orders which cannot be fulfilled given raw materials and 
general capacity limitations. Others like TU observed that demand variations can be caused 
by special political events or other seasonal events. But BU and FU maintained that demand 
variations are frequent and mostly unpredictable. Demand variations mean some of their 
products remain unsold causing a financial crisis, as reported by BU’s Sales Coordinator:  
“There are constant changes in customer demand and some products end up taking more 
than a year before being sold. We dispose them off cheaply and this affects our cash flows.” 
HU indicated that sudden demand increases may require extra raw materials which may be 
difficult to source given their suppliers’ capacity limitations. 
     Some other firms (mainly those using agricultural raw materials) attributed sudden 
demand variations to natural disasters (causing raw material shortages). For example, 
unfavourable weather, as reported by GU’s Sales and Marketing Executive: “There are 
instances of sudden increase in demand that exceeds capacity like the 2011 sugar crisis 
caused by drought that affected sugarcane yields.” MU, which manufactures pharmaceutical 
products, attributed demand variation to unstable government policy, especially regarding the 
Corruption 
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donation of drugs. MU’s Company Pharmacist argued that, after purchasing raw materials 
based on forecasts provided by the government, donors deliver drugs, prompting the 
government to cancel some of the orders – making demand unpredictable. The causes and 













 Customer Characteristics  
Seven companies (TU, FU, OU, QU, BU, HU, NU) indicated that the nature of their 
customers poses a threat to their supply chains. Some indicated that their customers have 
limited product knowledge, low purchasing power and are price sensitive.  OU’s Sales and 
Marketing Manager for example noted: “Customers do not know enough about the product 
and are price sensitive. They end up moving for competitors or importers from China which 
is relatively cheaper but of low quality…There is a problem of counterfeit especially from 
China. Customers do not mind quality but price.” Other firms like BU attributed the 
counterfeit problem to the nature of their customers, who buy counterfeit products 
knowingly. However, other firms like NU argued that customers have limited product 
knowledge which results in order cancellations, compounding financial problems. TU 
indicated that the nature of the economic activity of their customers makes them vulnerable to 
natural disasters e.g. prolonged drought which reduces their disposable income.  TU’s Route-
to-Consumer Supply Manager argued: “Our customers in the rural areas, who are the 
majority, depend on agriculture – implying that in the case of bad weather like a prolonged 
 Raw material delays and shortages 
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dry season, their disposable income is very low and this affects our supply chain 
downstream.” FU and HU attributed the low purchasing power of customers, on corruption, 
as FU’s Corporate Marketing Manager commented:  “Corruption would be a cause for the 
low purchasing power because money goes in the hands of few people. There are a lot of 
income disparities”. The antecedents and outcomes of the threat of customer characteristics 














 Reputational Risk 
Four companies (BU, KU, HU, QU) revealed a threat of loss of corporate reputation in the 
downstream caused by e.g. product counterfeiting, poor quality products, strikes and product 
withdrawals/ recalls. HU’s Production and Operations Manager commented: “Suppliers do 
not grade the materials…These lead to poor quality products… We withdraw the product but 
we incur a lot of transport costs of withdrawal from customers. This [withdrawal] also 
damages our reputation.” On reputational risk from product counterfeiting, BU’s Sales 
Coordinator argued:  “There are counterfeiters who sell products using our labels, customers 
complain and this reduces trust. This loss of reputation is hard to regain and it affects our 
performance in the market.” This finding shows that threats in the upstream (e.g. product 
counterfeiting) and those at a firm level (e.g. industrial disputes) can cause other threats that 
disrupt the downstream part of the supply chain.  
Product counterfeiting 
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     The above section (4.2) has analysed both the exogenous and endogenous threats to the 
supply chain, as claimed by respondents. Exogenous threats have been categorised under 
geopolitical threats and economic threats, while endogenous threats were categorised under 
supply-side threats, firm level threats and demand-side threats.  This section has revealed that 
most of the perceived threats are endogenous events, some of which are caused by conditions 
of continuous possibilities. Also observed was the very close connection between threats. It 
was found that some threats either cause other threats or originate from other threats, making 
it increasingly difficult to discuss each in isolation. Further, the role of the context of Uganda 
in either causing or compounding supply chain threats was evident. The next section (4.3) 
analyses the data on the strategies for creating resilience.  
4.3. Supply Chain Resilience (SCRES) Strategies 
The SCRES strategies identified from the data were broadly grouped into seven higher level 
categories (i.e. relationship management, supply management, demand management, 
information management, product management, financial management and human resource 













Table 4.2: Taxonomy of SCRES Strategies (Higher & Lower Level Categories) 
SCRES Strategies 
Higher Level Categories Lower Level Categories 
Relationship 
management 
Co-opetition, collaboration with government, collaboration with 
customers, collaboration with suppliers, Informal networking 
Supply management 
Backward integration, outsourcing, appropriate supplier selection, 
alternative transportation, multiple sourcing, supplier development, 
maintaining strategic stocks, buying instead of making (temporarily),  
effective contracting, local sourcing, order splitting, enhancing proximity 
to suppliers, procurement management,  quality management, exclusive 
sourcing, inter-branch stock transfer 
Demand management 
Creating customer flexibility, customer incentives, inventory 
management, product recalls, demand forecasting 
Information management 
Risk communication, market intelligence, increasing product knowledge, 
improving visibility, using information communication technology 
Product management Manufacturing flexibility, ensuring product security 





The following sub-sections will analyse, in detail, each of the resilience strategies outlined in 
table 4.2. 
4.3.1. Relationship Management Strategies 
 
 Co-opetition  
Five companies (PU, IU, RU, LU, HU) indicated that they collaborate with their competitors 
(co-opetition) to build resilience against disruptions caused by e.g. raw material delays and 
shortages, unfavourable government policy, unfair competition, machine breakdowns, 
dishonest customers/distributors and poor quality products. On dishonest 
customers/distributors for example, LU’s Assistant Sales Manager noted: “There is a need for 
good working relationships, especially between competing firms, in order to identify 
unethical customers…they [customers/distributors] disappear, refuse to pay or switch to 
competitors.” In some cases, buying firms encourage rival suppliers to collaborate by forming 
associations (triads) in order to enhance supplier efficiency and reliability through supplier 
development and other synergies, as stated by IU’s Brand manager: “We have arranged the 
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farmers to form groups so that they can benefit…By forming groups,… they can negotiate 
with the government for favourable terms which can also benefit us.  We also facilitate them 
with finance or seeds.”  
     Co-opetition also helps companies to buy raw materials for emergencies from competitors, 
as explained by RU’s Logistics Assistant: “You order but you are delayed…we have a 
collaborative relationship with our competitors from whom we buy raw materials for 
emergencies.” Firms like LU argued that co-opetition also helps to overcome disruptions 
from machine breakdowns.  In the case of machine breakdowns, either they request their 
suppliers to split the order between them and competitors, or subcontract their friendly 
competitors to process the entire customers’ orders on their behalf. Interestingly some firms 
revealed that co-opetition helps them to mitigate disruptions caused by raw material delays 
and shortages by borrowing raw materials from their competitors (without interest) and 
replacing the goods when their consignment arrives. PU’s Procurement Manager stated: “We 
work together with our competitors by getting raw materials from them and replacing them 
when ours are delivered … This kind of arrangement is facilitated by our networks as 
managers. We know each other and we communicate during crises to bail each other out. 
When they also face a crisis, they come to us for help.” 
     The co-opetition strategy explained above indicates that SCRES can emerge from a mutual 
interaction between the system and other independent, rival systems within the environment. 
And it is observed that co-opetition strategy is facilitated by another strategy of informal 
networking.   
 
 Collaboration with Government  
Eleven companies ( BU, EU, FU, IU, JU, RU, MU, KU, OU, PU, QU) indicated that they 
collaborate with the government to manage disruptions from threats like product 
counterfeiting, unfair competition, poor transport infrastructure, corruption, unstable taxation, 
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government policy, political instabilities, informal sector, payment threat (from customers) 
and raw material delays and shortages. On fighting product counterfeiting for example, OU’s 
Marketing Manager stated: “We work closely with Uganda National Bureau of Standards 
and Uganda Revenue Authority [government bodies]. We need protection from the 
government…lobbying to ensure the government helps us fight counterfeits, poor quality 
etc.” On natural disasters, shortages of raw materials and taxation, FU’s Corporate Marketing 
manager explained: “The drought… and the scarcity of raw materials led to scarcity of 
sugar…but we collaborated with the government of Uganda which gave us a duty free license 
to import sugar…to maintain the supply chain”.  
     Some firms, however, argued that collaboration with the government involving informal 
networks and lobbying is likely to facilitate threats such as corruption and product 
counterfeiting (the threat it is meant to mitigate).  Further, PU’s Procurement Manager argued 
that their collaboration with the government to mitigate unfair competition by revealing tax 
defaulters and evaders can lead to a closedown of some of their competitors. Thus, it was 
found that a strategy can affect two firms differently. For example, collaboration with the 
government helps MU to mitigate financial difficulties as MU’s Supply chain Manager noted: 
“We collaborate with the government so that we can operate better. The government 
supports us by paying us in time.” Yet some of the companies complained of late payment by 
the same government, leading to financial difficulties. HU’s Marketing Manager commented: 
“Sometimes, you get money after six months or even a year, so we do not get the anticipated 
revenue and we can’t manufacture and supply other clients.” Thus, while MU perceives the 
government as a source of resilience against the threat of financial difficulties, HU perceives 
it as source of the same threat.  This further confirms that it is difficult to generalise SCRES – 





 Collaboration with Suppliers  
Fourteen companies (AU, BU, CU, JU, PU, SU, QU, IU, OU, EU, LU, MU, NU, TU) stated 
that they collaborate with their suppliers to manage disruptions caused by e.g. a limited local 
supply market, long distance sourcing, raw materials delays and shortages, poor quality raw 
materials, financial difficulties, unfair competition and delayed payment to suppliers.  JU 
indicated that they maintain few suppliers in order to effectively build and maintain 
collaborative relationships with them to mitigate raw material shortages. Firms like NU 
revealed that collaboration helps them to be prioritised over competitors; and others argue 
that long term collaborative suppliers are more responsive and able to bail them out during a 
crisis. PU’s Procurement Manager commented: “We also collaborate with local suppliers, 
they buy from overseas, we don’t buy from them regularly but we buy from them once in a 
while to keep them in business. If the overseas suppliers face a problem, we tell them to bail 
us out.” Collaboration with suppliers is also necessary given the supply market is limited to 
avoid material shortages, as stated by SU’s Assistant Procurement Manager: “We have 
limited suppliers for certain industrial items such as spare parts, so we use collaborative 
relationships with suppliers in order to be prioritised.” 
     Firms reported different aspects of collaboration such as forming long-term contracts, 
information sharing, joint planning and Early Supplier Involvement (ESI) in product design. 
AU’s Marketing Manager explained: “…We have collaborative relationships and constant 
communication…we involve them [suppliers] in our new product design so that we share 
plans on how the new product development and marketing will be executed, including the 
availability of raw materials. Where necessary, we adjust the product design at an early 
stage. With this collaboration, we improve our visibility and we can easily and quickly 
respond to fashion changes. We do research and forecasts in the market and inform our 
suppliers accordingly.” This statement shows how collaboration with suppliers helps in 
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improving visibility and product design alignment with the supply chain, which in turn helps 
to build SCRES through enhancing agility.  
 
 Collaboration with Customers  
Eight companies (AU, LU, KU, OU, MU, DU, HU, NU) indicated that they develop 
collaborative relationships with their customers in order to manage disruptions from power 
asymmetries (stronger customers), machine breakdowns, demand variations, financial 
difficulties, product characteristics and poor customer delivery performance. Collaboration is 
implemented through activities like frequent visits to customers and involving customers in 
some of their operations. DU’s Marketing Officer stated: “Machine breakdowns create a big 
backlog of work. They [machine breakdowns] delay the jobs resulting in customer 
complaints. We talk with them and agree. We maintain collaboration with customers. We 
involve customers in our activities. We visit customers frequently to resolve their 
grievances.” Some companies indicated that they introduced specific programmes aimed to 
strengthen customer relationship management as a means to retain them during a disruption, 
as noted by AU’s Marketing Manager: “We had a problem of poor relationships with 
customers, but now we have put in place a programme called ‘Fidelity’ aimed to bring good 
relationships between the company and final users. We keep visiting customers to improve 
our relationship.”   
     Firms like KU revealed that collaboration with customers helps them to mitigate financial 
problems through short term borrowing. QU indicated that collaboration improves their 
visibility in the downstream supply chain, which facilitates monitoring and increases 
customer product knowledge. Collaboration also facilitates creating customer flexibility by 
requesting customers to wait (demand postponement) in the case of late delivery. HU’s 
Production and Operations Manager stated: “Unexpected demand increases, sometimes there 
are no raw materials at the suppliers’ side and the demand is high. We give information to 
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the clients and request for more time. Collaboration and communication help us to keep 
customers waiting.”  
     The above analysis also shows how SCRES strategies complement each other – 
collaboration with customers reinforces other strategies like visibility, monitoring, increasing 
product knowledge and creating customer flexibility/demand postponement.      
 
 Informal Networking  
Six companies (HU, KU, JU, PU, QU, EU) revealed that they use their informal connections 
to mitigate supply chain threats. For example, on threats of financial difficulties and delayed 
payment to suppliers, JU’s Procurement and Logistics Officer explained: “Sometimes we do 
not have enough money to pay suppliers on time. We call the supplier and explain the 
situation and they accept to wait. As individuals, we have personal relationships with 
managers in companies that supply us and this collaboration makes our work easy. We 
understand each other better at a personal level.” QU’s Procurement Manager indicated that 
personal relationships between employees can help in facilitating collaboration between firms 
and stated that: “… what matters most are the individuals within that system because the 
individuals’ collaboration determines the system collaboration. So to me, it is mostly about 
personal relationships”. 
      Informal networking helps firms acquire information e.g. regarding prices, to mitigate 
problems from price variations like a reduced customer base. PU’s Procurement Officer 
stated: “We benchmark on other companies that have been buying the item to tell us the price 
and suppliers. Some of these companies’ employees are our close friends. It is easy to 
approach them.” PU’s Procurement Manager revealed that informal networking between 
managers facilitates a co-opetition strategy – where firms borrow raw materials from their 
competitors in the case of delays. KU’s Marketing Manager indicated that informal networks 
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also help them mitigate financial difficulties by borrowing money from customers, stating 
that: “… I just give a phone call and money will be deposited without any agreement.”  
     Some companies however indicated the dark side of informal networks in building 
SCRES. For example, companies like BU, PU and JU argued that disruptions from unfair 
competition and corruption are facilitated by the informal networks between managers of 
competing firms and government officials. Thus, informal networking can reinforce other 
strategies. But it can also facilitate threats to SCRES. This therefore shows how it is difficult 
to generalise resilience – one factor can produce contradictory results to the same or different 
actors along the supply chain.  
 
4.3.2. Supply Management Strategies 
 Backward Integration  
Four companies (FU, GU, CU, LU) use backward integration to mitigate disruptions caused 
by a limited local supply market, supplier delivery failure, material shortages and delays, 
power shortages and poor quality raw materials.  Firms reported that they have expanded into 
their suppliers’ businesses so as to produce their own raw materials and utilities. Though 
interviewees conceded that this strategy is costly as it involves venturing into a different 
business, firms FU and GU, which are sugar manufacturers, revealed that they use their bi-
products. FU’s Corporate Marketing Manager stated: “With the shortage of power, we 
decided to generate our own power using our bi-products.” CU and LU indicated that they 
decided to produce their own raw materials to mitigate raw material shortages due to a 
limited local supply market and poor quality raw materials. LU’s Assistant Sales Manager 
stated: “…Limited supply market…But we do backward integration where we have bought 





 Outsourcing  
Five companies (EU, HU, JU, RU, LU) highlighted outsourcing as a strategy against threats 
like financial difficulties, poor customer delivery performance, raw material delays and 
shortages, poor transport infrastructure and dishonest suppliers. The outsourced activities 
highlighted were logistics related, including customs clearance, storage and transportation. 
RU’s Sales Manager stated: “Transport problems…We do not have enough trucks and this 
delays delivery and increases cost. But we outsource transportation.” Firms like LU 
indicated that outsourced service providers are specialised in respective areas and can easily 
respond to emergencies since they have spare facilities. Interestingly, included among the 
reasons for outsourcing, especially storage facilities, was to safeguard stock from being stolen 
by dishonest employees. HU’s Marketing Manager stated: “…we order massively and we 
find an independent store to keep it for safety. It is saleable and we keep it not to be stolen by 
our employees since it is rare material. Our competitors are willing to buy it from our 
employees expensively even if they are aware it is stolen from us.” This shows that an 
outsourcing strategy can complement another SCRES strategy of maintaining strategic stock. 
Further, outsourcing as a security measure against theft by employees shows a culture of 
dishonesty and lack of trust – where a company trusts third party providers more than its own 
employees and where a firm deliberately decides to buy materials stolen from its competitors.  
 
 Appropriate Supplier Selection 
Nine companies (OU, BU, EU, JU, PU, SU, MU, IU, TU) revealed that they select competent 
suppliers to mitigate supplier related threats e.g. product counterfeiting, poor quality raw 
materials (that lead to poor quality products), supplier delivery failures, dishonest suppliers 
and raw material delays and shortages.  JU, EU, MU and PU stated that supplier selection is 
facilitated by the use of Information and Communication Technology which helps in 
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maintaining a database of prequalified suppliers.  MU’s Supply chain Manager noted: “We 
have strict quality standards at the firm level…We do extensive vendor qualifications and 
quality assessment to ensure quality and delivery performance.” Some interviewees e.g. TU 
indicated that during supplier selection, they consider factors such as integrity and ethics, 
quality, financial capability and past performance/experience – and that market research, in 
part, helps to ascertain whether these criteria are met e.g. not employing child labour. Some 
companies further revealed that continuous supplier appraisal helps them in supplier selection 
or retention based on their performance. TU’s Route-to-Consumer Supply Manager noted: 
“We have a challenge of a poor grade of raw materials...We vet our suppliers yearly to 
determine whether or not to retain them.”  
 
 Alternative Transportation 
Three companies ( AU, LU, PU) revealed that although their main means of transporting raw 
materials is water, they sometimes use air as an alternative means of transport. AU argued 
that this alternative transportation is used when delays and shortages occur due to a long 
distance from suppliers. LU claimed that they air lift some emergency raw materials in the 
case of in-transit thefts or accidents, while PU revealed that they use alternative 
transportation to acquire spares in the case of machine breakdowns. PU’s Procurement 
Manager commented: “Sometimes we air lift raw materials instead of using water to keep the 
process going. Even if the insurance compensates, it takes some time, so we airlift as a last 
option. We airlift a small quantity and the supplier, meanwhile, dispatches”.  All of the three 
companies maintained that air as an alternative transport mode is used only for emergency 






 Multiple Sourcing  
Seventeen companies (BU, CU, EU, DU, HU, KU, JU, NU, PU, SU, QU, MU, LU, IU, RU, 
GU, OU) indicated they source from many suppliers to build SCRES against supply-side 
threats e.g. shortages and delays of raw materials, financial difficulties of suppliers, demand 
variations, supplier delivery failure, poor quality raw materials, dishonest suppliers, limited 
local supply market and product counterfeiting. For example, IU’s Brand Manager argued: 
“Very few suppliers have the capacity to deliver. They are not honest to reveal that they do 
not manage. So sometimes there are delays or they supply poor quality. This affects our 
ability to meet customer demand. Sometimes, we seek alternative suppliers. We have a pre-
list of reliable suppliers.”  
     Generally, firms indicated that multiple sourcing helps them to get alternative supplies in 
case of crisis, as the Procurement and Logistics Officer for JU explained: “There are items 
where we have few suppliers e.g. the suppliers of one of our additives are from Germany and 
in case they get a problem or are out of stock, production is affected…we use alternative 
suppliers in case the supplier does not have the required quality. We keep a database of 
suppliers using our ERP system.” Multiple suppliers are also maintained to spread risk 
through order splitting, as stated by PU’s Procurement Manager: “We keep a list of suppliers 
who are better in different aspects and we spread risk. We do not have big factories in 
Uganda to supply us. Thus, we look for more suppliers and divide the jobs according to their 
capacities.”  
 
 Supplier Development  
Ten companies (EU, FU, GU, JU, LU, QU, MU, IU, TU, SU) develop their suppliers to 
create resilience against threats like poor quality raw materials, limited local supply market, 
raw material delays and shortages, government policy, unfair competition and financial 
difficulties of suppliers. Companies reported that they develop suppliers using financial 
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incentives, technical assistance, training, transport facilities, land acquisition and bank 
guarantees. FU’s Corporate Marketing Manager explained: “We develop suppliers by giving 
them financial incentives, technical help, soft loans etc…because with a shortage of 
sugarcane, our production reduces thereby affecting our customers...there is a national sugar 
policy where each firm should develop its own suppliers without interruption.”  
     To ensure the successful implementation of the supplier development strategy, companies 
such as IU and FU revealed that they encourage competing suppliers to cooperate (co-
opetition). IU’s Finance Manager stated: “We used to advance money to the suppliers but this 
affects our cash flows…So we assist our suppliers by helping them get loans from banks, say 
by providing Local Purchase Orders (LPOs). We have encouraged farmers to cooperate and 
we enter into contracts with unions of farmers and help them acquire land and quality 
seeds.” 
     The idea of competing suppliers forming associations in the above statement shows the 
complementarity of SCRES strategies – it shows that co-opetition between suppliers 
reinforces a supplier development strategy. Supplier development further shows how 
resilience can emerge at the triadic level rather than individual firms in isolation.  
 
 Maintaining Strategic Stocks  
Sixteen companies (NU, LU, AU, TU, GU, BU, HU, KU, JU, PU, MU, IU, RU, EU, CU, 
DU) reported maintaining strategic stock as a way of creating resilience against threats such 
as machine breakdowns, raw material delays and shortages, financial difficulties of suppliers, 
demand variations, procurement risk, natural disasters and political instabilities. For example, 
EU’s Procurement Manager commented: “There are instances where we have machine 
breakdowns and there is increased demand we cannot meet. We try to stock as much as we 
can (buffer) using our depots.” Companies reported keeping buffers for a long period of time 
– some up to five months. AU’s Marketing Manager noted: “Since 2011, we put a program 
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for minimum stock level. Our source of raw materials is far away. So we keep stock for at 
least five months to cater for delays.” On the threat of disruption from natural disasters e.g. 
floods, the Brand manager for IU stated: “Natural calamities e.g. floods where you take a 
long time without accessing the market, due to impassable roads, e.g. in the North. East, we 
keep stockholding points near flood affected areas.” And on disruptions from political 
instabilities due to chaotic political transitions, CU’s Marketing Manager stated: “…Towards 
election in the neighbouring countries, we keep enough stock because we expect chaos…” 
But some firms like PU argued that maintaining strategic stock is limited by capacity 
constraints as stocks have to be kept for a long time due to long and unpredictable lead times.  
 
 Buying Instead of Making  
Five companies (FU, GU, EU, LU, RU) indicated that in the event of raw material delays and 
shortages, for example, due to natural disasters or sudden demand increases, they buy 
finished products from other manufacturers as a short-term measure to maintain customers 
during a crisis. GU’s Sales and Marketing Executive explained: “There is a problem of 
drought which destroys our raw materials…In 2011, there was drought which affected 
sugarcane yields and the sugar prices shot up since we did not have raw materials. To 
maintain our supply chain, we imported sugar in order to keep our customers.” This strategy 
is appropriate for short term disruptions – it was observed that buying finished products 
instead of manufacturing them reduces firms’ profitability – but it helps to ensure continuity, 
as revealed by company RU. The strategy of buying instead of making is also facilitated by 
co-opetition between manufacturing firms, which enables them to buy emergency finished 
products from each other, as explained by LU’s Assistant Sales Manager: “Shortage of raw 
materials…late delivery to customers brings mistrust. So we go to our competitors with 
whom we collaborate and buy finished products so as to make our clients happy.” This 




 Effective Contracting  
Twelve companies (AU, EU, DU, BU, CU, PU, IU, LU, JU, MU, OU, GU) indicated that 
they ensure properly drafted and detailed contracts to manage supply chain disruptions from 
e.g. limited local supply market, financial difficulties (focal firm), reputational risk, power 
asymmetries, payment threat (from customers), supplier delivery failure,  poor quality raw 
materials and raw material delays and shortages. For example, some firms reported that they 
enter into long term contracts with suppliers to mitigate raw material shortages but some e.g. 
DU maintained that such contracts should be flexible to cater for the needed adjustments in 
case of a crisis. Firms like BU indicated that they form appropriate contracts to mitigate 
disruptions from price variations by including specific clauses to define how variations 
should be handled. LU argued that they include clear terms and conditions in their contracts 
to guard against late payments by customers. EU argued that appropriate contracts 
prescribing clear terms and consequences of non-compliance are vital to mitigate disruptions 
from both the upstream and downstream supply chain. EU’s Deport Supervisor explained: 
“In most cases, we use the contracts to prescribe terms and consequences in order to guard 
against delivery failure and other non-compliance issues either from suppliers or 
customers.”  
     Some companies further reported that they make long term contracts especially for raw 
materials with limited suppliers so as to increase reliability, as PU’s Procurement Officer 
stated: “We book early in advance and sign contracts for consignment stocking. We maintain 
long-term contracts and collaboration with suppliers.” PU further indicated that due to 
storage capacity limitations and the need to minimise stock holding costs, they make 
framework contracts (where a big order is made but split into different deliveries for different 





 Local Sourcing 
Eight companies (DU, CU, IU, KU, JU, PU, MU, RU) indicated that they buy from local 
suppliers to manage disruptions from raw material delays and shortages (e.g. caused by long 
distance sourcing, political instabilities and procurement risk). JU’s General Manager 
explained: “For beer crates, we have only one manufacturer. Sometimes, the cost of 
transport is higher than that of purchasing an item. We plan to get alternative materials that 
can be available locally.” To some companies like RU, PU, KU, CU and DU, local sourcing 
was portrayed as a tentative strategy that is not sustainable in the long run. For example, PU’s 
Procurement Officer claimed that they source locally during delays to avoid stock outs and 
idle machines. This was further confirmed by PU’s Procurement Manager: “We don’t buy 
from them [local suppliers] regularly but we order from them once in a while to keep them in 
business. If the overseas suppliers face a problem, we tell them to bail us out.” The use of 
local sourcing as a tentative strategy could be due to its adverse outcomes, as will be 
discussed later (in section 4.4). 
 
 Order Splitting  
Two companies (MU and PU) indicated that they use order splitting to mitigate disruptions 
from raw material shortages and storage capacity constraints. This is done by ordering in bulk 
to avoid price variations but splitting the orders into different smaller deliveries for different 
periods of time to reduce stock holding. PU’s Procurement Manager explained: “Stock 
holding is a major problem…Instead of ordering and delivering at once, we breakdown 
deliveries…We split the dispatch, where the supplier releases a few containers per month. We 
give suppliers big purchase orders and tell them to dispatch /release in different months.” 
Another kind of order splitting is where a firm divides a big order among multiple suppliers 
so as to spread risk and reduce delays and shortages. PU’s Procurement Officer stated: “… 
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we spread risk.  We do not have big factories in Uganda to supply us. Thus we look for more 
suppliers and divide the jobs according to their capacities.” MU explained that order 
splitting – where raw materials are delivered in phases – requires the focal firm to also deliver 
in phases to the customers, and so on.  MU’s Company Pharmacist stated: “… we decided to 
breakdown the deliveries to customers so that we can begin processing earlier and supply in 
phases… but they [customers] would also adjust their distribution… to avoid holding a lot of 
inventory and deterioration.” PU’s statement shows that in order to avoid side effects, some 
SCRES strategies should be implemented consistently throughout the entire supply chain. In 
the above example, order splitting at a point in the supply chain can cause problems at 
another point if not consistently implemented. 
 
 Enhancing Proximity to Suppliers 
Companies MU and LU indicated that they increase proximity to the source of raw materials 
so as to create resilience against certain supply side threats related to long distance from 
suppliers e.g. raw material delays and shortages.  This can be ensured during supply chain 
design, by locating near the source of raw materials, as revealed by LU. But it can also be a 
supply chain redesign decision in the course of operation. For example, MU indicated that 
they ensure proximity through co-location where they use their bargaining power to have 
their suppliers establish facilities near them in order to improve communication, visibility and 
reduce delivery delays. MU’s Company Pharmacist explained: “The lead time is about 6 
months to get materials since the distance from where we source them is also very long. So 
we decided to deal with them through the parent company which has high bargaining 
power…some of the suppliers establish their manufacturing facilities near the parent 
company [co-location].” This shows that a condition e.g. high bargaining power of suppliers 
not only produces threats but can also constrain the implementation of certain strategies 




 Procurement Management  
Ten companies (MU, TU, IU, NU, CU, AU, JU, LU, PU, EU) indicated that they manage 
disruptions from power asymmetries, limited local supply market and raw material delays 
and shortages through effective procurement management. Companies like NU increase their 
bargaining power by consolidating purchases and buying in bulk so as to improve their value 
to suppliers and be prioritised during a risk event. Others like EU, PU and MU indicated that 
they procure their items through their parent companies to enhance their power. MU’s 
Company Pharmacist noted: “We used our parent company because, due to its bulk buying, 
they had high bargaining power and could get credits…Having many manufacturing 
facilities we can place big orders and part of it can be diverted to other branches.”  
     However, it was also argued that a decentralised procurement system can reduce visibility 
and cause delays, as stated by the Company Pharmacist for MU: “…some of the materials 
were to be sourced from the parent company, which made us fail to have direct contact with 
the suppliers…we requested to directly source some of the materials from suppliers.  This 
reduced lead times for materials from six months to one month.” Companies like JU, PU, 
MU, LU and TU highlighted the use of effective procurement planning to avoid unnecessary 
delays, shortage of raw materials, late payment to suppliers and emergency procurements. 
While some firms like AU reported purchasing exclusively from few suppliers as a means to 
ensure reliability and increased bargaining power, others e.g. LU indicated that they increase 
their bargaining power by facilitating competition between suppliers /competitive bidding. 
This shows how two seemingly contradictory strategies can achieve the same goal for 






 Quality Management  
Six companies (RU, MU, FU, BU, IU, PU) indicated that they manage the quality of raw 
materials to mitigate quality threats. Some firms like LU require suppliers to attach quality 
test certificates which are then shown to their customers to confirm adherence to standards. 
PU revealed that they developed a quality oriented culture based on a principle called 
‘Quality at source’ where quality orientation is built into their operational processes and each 
individual at any level is directly responsible to ensure quality. PU’s Procurement Officer 
stated: “Quality at source… where quality output is not only measured at the end of the 
production line but at every step of the production process and being the responsibility of 
each individual…” But others like BU indicated that they have specific established quality 
management teams to oversee quality related issues.   MU revealed that they conduct quality 
screening at different levels of the supply chain beginning with supplier quality audits and 
assessments. MU’s Company Pharmacist noted: “To avoid quality problems, we get 
materials from trusted suppliers.  There are several levels of screening from suppliers, at the 
parent company and internally at the firm level”.  
 
 Exclusive Sourcing  
Two companies (FU and AU) stated that they use exclusive sourcing arrangements to 
mitigate disruptions from e.g. a shortage of raw materials and a limited local supply market. 
They argued that the use of exclusive suppliers increases supplier commitment and reduces 
competition over raw materials where suppliers are few. AU’s Marketing Manager explained: 
“To overcome the problem of raw material shortages and few suppliers in the market, we 
have an established supplier for critical items with whom we have a long term relationship 
and who exclusively supplies only us. So the company cannot supply our competitors. Our 
competitors also have their own suppliers.” Company FU indicated that the use of exclusive 
suppliers reduces unnecessary competition over raw materials, which increases supplier 
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reliability and reduces price variations. FU’s Corporate Marketing Manager commented: 
“…because, with a shortage of sugarcane, our production reduces thereby affecting our 
customers...there is a national sugar policy where each firm should develop its own suppliers 
without interruption.”  
 
 Inter-branch Stock Transfer  
Three companies (AU, BU, MU) indicated that they manage raw material shortages and 
delays by transferring stock from one branch to another in different localities. It was argued 
that this strategy is appropriate for short term disruptions because, in the long run, stock in all 
the branches may get depleted. AU’s Marketing Manager stated: “Sometimes we get 
emergency stocks from our sister companies in Kenya or Tanzania in the case of a shortage. 
Also, if some items cannot be sold in Uganda, we take them to our sister companies in 
Tanzania and Kenya.” BU added that they hold stock in different locations (branches) 
strategically to cater for shortages. BU’s Sales Coordinator revealed: “…Since we have stock 
in different localities, in case of shortage, we shift some and transfer them to locations where 
they are needed.” Some firms like MU revealed that inter-branch stock transfer can be used 
to enhance bargaining power while overcoming the challenge of limited storage capacity 
through the consolidation of purchases (bulk buying) and later redistribution to different 
branches. This shows that the strategy of inter-branch stock transfer and that of procurement 
management (e.g. buying in bulk) reinforce each other.  
4.3.3. Demand Management Strategies 
 Creating Customer Flexibility  
Ten companies (RU, OU, SU, QU, JU, NU, BU, LU, HU, KU) indicated that they mitigate 
disruptions from threats like supplier delivery failure, delays and shortages of raw materials, 
poor customer delivery performance, poor quality products, power shortages and demand 
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variations by building flexibility into their customers. Firms like BU and RU revealed they 
convince customers to buy the available alternative products in the case of delivery failures or 
quality problems. RU’s Sales Manager explained: “We convince our customers to take 
alternatives...we would have a shortage for almost six months or a year…we would advise 
our customers to wait or to use alternative products.”  
     Another customer flexibility strategy revealed by firms like HU, JU, NU, LU, SU, KU, 
OU and RU is demand postponement in the case of delivery delays due to power outages and 
raw material delays and shortages. When there is a crisis, firms communicate with their 
customers and request them to wait and have their orders fulfilled at a future date. OU’s Sales 
and Marketing Manager commented: “In case of delays, we manage customer expectations 
by creating awareness and keep communicating with them and requesting them to wait”. 
Firms like NU, HU and KU argued that creating customer flexibility through demand 
postponement is facilitated by collaborative relationships with customers and effective 
communication. HU’s Production and Operations Manager commented: “…sometimes there 
are no raw materials at the suppliers’ side and the demand is high. We give information to 
the clients and request for more time. Collaboration and communication help us to keep 
customers waiting.”  KU argued that they offer incentives to their customers e.g. bonuses and 
discounts to motivate them to postpone their orders. The above further shows that SCRES 
strategies i.e. collaboration, risk communication and customer incentives facilitate customer 
flexibility.  
 
 Customer Incentives  
Ten companies (AU, DU, JU, OU, GU, EU, SU, LU, HU, RU) indicated that they use 
customer incentives to create resilience against disruptions from e.g. dishonest 
customers/distributors, power asymmetries (stronger customers), poor quality products, 
financial difficulties and a reduced customer base. Included among the incentives are free 
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products in case of poor quality, as DU’s Marketing Officer stated: “There are customer 
complaints and we sometimes sort out the poor quality products and replace them, 
sometimes, we give our customers extra free products.” Others like RU, HU and JU reported 
giving incentives such as trade credits, cash discounts, trade discounts and transport facilities. 
For example, HU’s Marketing Manager noted: “High bargaining power of customers… We 
use trade discounts to maintain them.” Other incentives reported include offering transport 
facilities to customers and sensitising them about the products, and how to distribute them. 
JU’s Trade Marketing Manager for example explained: “Inefficiency of distributors… Some 
do not have enough facilities, they close early and others are compromised by our 
competitors…We give them incentives like equipping them with knowledge of distribution 
through trade audits and conferences.”  
 
 Inventory Management  
Six firms (BU, JU, MU, NU, OU, QU) indicated that they effectively manage inventories to 
mitigate disruptions from raw material delays and shortages; and financial difficulties. One of 
the methods reported is rationing of the available stock proportionate to the value of customer 
orders. This is done when the available finished products cannot fulfil all the orders – each 
customer order is at least responded to as a means to maintain the customer base. QU’s 
Procurement Officer explained: “…dry season, we have shortages of raw materials and 
production is affected. We ration to ensure all our customers get something. We apportion 
proportionately according to customers’ orders. We do this so we don’t frustrate our 
customers because they also have their customers waiting for the product.” Other firms 
revealed that they mitigate financial difficulties resulting from overstocking as well as 
shortages by conducting regular stocktaking, developing inventory norms and inventory 
planning and forecasting.  NU’s Inventory Manager commented: “… there is delay due to a 
shortage of spare parts…Sometimes when we keep a lot of stock; it gets expired causing huge 
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financial losses.  We use our scorecard to ascertain which products are highly demanded so 
that we keep just enough stock.”  
 
 Product Recalls  
Thirteen firms (TU, DU, FU, GU, BU, HU, KU, JU, PU, QU, LU, IU, RU) indicated that 
they ensure effective product recalls as a reactive strategy to manage the potential adverse 
effects of poor quality and counterfeit products. This is applied when poor quality products 
have already infiltrated the downstream supply chain to mitigate adverse effects such as 
reputational risk, reduction in customer base, health hazards and litigation. QU’s Procurement 
Officer noted: “…Our distributors…we ensure they do not give their customers products that 
have gone bad in order to preserve our reputation because customers cannot understand that 
the problem is from distributors. We encourage them to give us back the damaged products 
and we replace them”. Firms e.g. PU, BU, and JU argued that product recalls should be 
conducted effectively e.g. after effective risk communication, explaining the threat to 
customers, compensation or replacing the poor quality products with the good quality ones 
and ensuring a quick response, as explained by PU’s Procurement Officer: “In case of 
complaint or realising that we sent a poor quality product in the market, we immediately 
communicate to customers and explain the problem to lessen the impact. Where possible we 
withdraw the product and replace with a better quality one”. The above shows that a product 
recall strategy can be reinforced by risk communication.  
 
 Demand Forecasting 
Four companies (PU, DU, MU, AU) highlighted demand forecasting as one of the strategies 
for mitigating supply chain disruptions. DU indicated that they avoid running out of stock by 
making projections based on customers’ orders. PU asserted that they minimise stock holding 
and ensure the continuous flow of raw materials by splitting orders based on their sales 
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forecasts. Other firms revealed that demand forecasting helps them mitigate the effects of 
unexpected policy changes and demand variations. For example, MU’s Company Pharmacist 
argued: “It was hard to maintain a buffer because the nature of our products is such that the 
policy changes. We decided to work with National Medical Stores [customer] so that they 
give us annual forecasts. Then we would communicate with the supplier and give them the 
annual forecasts and we would inform them that based on confirmation of orders, we shall be 
sourcing from you.” AU indicated that market intelligence helps in demand forecasting by 
providing information. Further, PU showed that demand forecasting facilitates order splitting, 
meaning these strategies reinforce each other.   
 
4.3.4. Information Management Strategies 
 Risk Communication  
Sixteen companies (SU, OU, CU, BU, QU, MU, HU, JU, AU, LU, NU, DU, IU, KU, EU, 
PU) identified risk communication as one of the strategies for building SCRES to disruptions 
from raw material delays and shortages, demand variations, political instabilities, unstable 
taxation, poor customer delivery performance, power shortages, machine breakdowns, 
supplier delivery failure, quality problems, payment threat to suppliers and product 
counterfeiting.  For example, on improving visibility and traceability to mitigate raw material 
shortages and delays, MU’s Company Pharmacist explained: “We conduct weekly control 
tower meetings.  We use video conferencing where we discuss with the suppliers to ascertain 
the status of materials and possible risks to delivery. So we have improved traceability… So 
in case of delays, some improvisation is made… The control tower meetings created a lot of 
coordination between the departments … and also to coordinate the supply chain members.” 
This example shows that the use of information and communication technology facilitates 
risk communication.  
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     Other firms communicate risks through meetings, publicity, personal visits, telephone and 
using internet platforms – some have cultivated a culture of monthly communication about 
quality threats, as explained by PU’s Procurement Manager: “Customer complaints on 
quality: On a monthly basis, we have a meeting of the entire company and we look at the 
complaints and discuss how to solve them…But in case of complaint or realising that we sent 
a poor quality product in the market, we communicate to customers and explain the problem 
to lessen the impact.”  It was found that risk communication helps to facilitate other 
strategies like co-opetition and creating customer flexibility (demand postponement). For 
example, HU’s Production and Operations Manager stated: “Unexpected demand 
increases…We give information to the clients and request for more time. Collaboration and 
communication help us to keep customers waiting.”  
 
 Market Intelligence  
Eleven firms (TU, OU, GU, BU, KU, NU, PU, LU, IU, RU, AU) indicated that they use 
market intelligence to gather information about the market especially competitors’ activities 
so as to detect and mitigate unfair competitive practices. For example, OU’s Sales and 
Marketing Manager noted: “What we do is to keep aware of our competitors actions e.g. 
pricing through our market intelligence.” LU indicated that they gather information about 
certain competitors with whom they share suppliers because they deliberately buy all the raw 
materials towards a potential crisis in order to disrupt their operations. LU’s Logistics 
Assistant stated: “We try to have knowledge of their [competitors’] activities because they 
can buy all the raw materials especially when the factory [supplier] is about to close for some 
time during facility upgrade or maintenance.” Market intelligence also helps in forecasting to 
ascertain potential demand variations as well as sharing information with suppliers and 
customers about potential threats like product counterfeiting.  AU’s Marketing Manager 
explained: “We also find out new changes in tastes and preferences and we try to be 
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innovative to create new products. We always do research and forecasts in the market and 
inform our suppliers accordingly. We advise them to stock in advance in case we predict 
price increases… We use our customers and wholesalers to gather market intelligence about 
counterfeit products.” 
 
 Increasing Product Knowledge  
Ten companies (BU, NU, RU, OU, PU, DU, KU, LU, CU, QU) stated that they increase 
knowledge of their products to mitigate disruptions from unfair competition, product 
counterfeiting, demand variations, reputational risk and poor quality products – it was 
revealed that these threats are partly caused by limited product knowledge.  BU, LU, KU and 
PU argued that they sensitise customers and the general public about the features of their 
products in order to fight product counterfeiting. KU’s Marketing Manager stated: 
“Counterfeits of our products…We use advertising and publicity showing the features of our 
products, alerting police etc…” Firms also educate customers to increase awareness about 
the quality of their products so as to manage unfair competitive practices – where rival firms 
reduce quality and reduce the price causing price wars and customer switching, as noted by   
RU’s Sales Manager: “…Price war. There are poor quality products from our competitors 
but which are cheaper…we try to give our customers some discounts and sensitise them 
about the quality of our products.”   
     Some firms reported that they use dealer forums and customer visits to sensitise their 
distributors about the products and how they should be handled in order to maintain product 
quality. QU’s Procurement Manager explained: “We sensitise our distributors on how to 
handle the product …We ensure they do not give their customers products that have gone bad 
in order to preserve our reputation.” NU revealed that product knowledge is also imparted to 
enhance employees’ customer complaints handling capabilities. NU’s Inventory Manager 
explained: “Our problem is a lack of product awareness among the employees. They fail to 
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effectively address customer complaints and our customers end up shifting to our 
competitors. But we are using the marking department to create this product awareness.”  
 
 Improving Visibility  
Nine companies (DU, MU, SU, AU, BU, IU, LU, CU, JU) argued that they improve visibility 
of their supply chains to improve transparency, traceability and information flow necessary to 
mitigate disruptions from supplier delivery failures, dishonest customers/distributors, raw 
material delays and shortages, poor quality raw materials, demand variations, in-transit raw 
material theft and payment threat from customers. Firms like DU and MU argued that their 
supply chain structures caused a lack of visibility, which resulted in failure to detect 
dishonest customers and raw material delays, respectively – visibility was reportedly 
increased by supply chain redesign through eliminating certain nodes which, for example, 
then reduced the lead time.   
   Firms like BU and PU indicated that visibility helps them monitor their supply chains to 
mitigate disruptions caused by dishonest field employees. BU’s Distribution and Central 
Warehouse Manager commented: “For thieves we have instituted security measures such as 
stopping loading at night… We use tracking system on the drivers. We have instances where 
employees connive with transporters to steal the items in transit.” LU and SU argued that 
increasing visibility and contact with suppliers helps them monitor raw material quality 
problems, while AU involves suppliers in the earlier stages of its product design processes in 
order to enhance visibility and manage raw material shortages to increase agility – this is 
facilitated by communication and collaboration with suppliers. AU’s Marketing Manager 
stated: “We involve them [suppliers] in our new product design… With this collaboration, we 
improve our visibility and time to market and we can easily and quickly respond to fashion 
changes.”  CU and MU indicated that they ensure visibility through supplier visits and using 
Information and Communication Technology, respectively. MU’s Company Pharmacist 
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asserted: “…we use video conferencing where we discuss with the suppliers to ascertain the 
status of materials.  So we have improved traceability towards fulfilling the order.”  This 
further reiterates the complementarity among SCRES strategies where strategies such as 
collaboration with suppliers and using information and communication technology reinforce 
supply chain visibility.  
 
 Using Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
Six companies (BU, HU, JU, IU, LU, MU) indicated that they use communication and 
information technology to mitigate disruptions from e.g. reputational risk, poor internal 
coordination and raw material delays and shortages. BU noted that they use telephone and the 
internet including social networking technology such as skype to coordinate internally and 
with their supply chain partners. HU revealed that they use information technology to 
enhance their reputation, attract and retain customers; and MU argued that they mitigate raw 
material delays by increasing visibility through video conferencing, which helps them to 
discuss with suppliers on the status of materials and possible threats that might constrain 
delivery. Others like JU argued that they use Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) to mitigate 
raw material delays and shortages by maintaining a database of redundant suppliers. 
Information and communication technology helps in enhancing corporate reputation and 
customer retention, as stated by HU’s Marketing Manager: “We use on line marketing, good 
and marketable websites, and this makes us attract and retain customers. It also enhances 
our reputation in the face of suppliers, potential customers and the general public.”  
4.3.5. Product Management Strategies 
 Manufacturing Flexibility  
Seven companies (NU, PU, OU, JU, DU, QU, MU) revealed that they build resilience to 
disruptions from demand variations, raw material delays and shortages, machine breakdowns 
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and insufficient skilled manpower by creating flexibility in their manufacturing processes. 
This includes product postponement (flexibility) during manufacturing. Firms like OU 
indicated that they keep components awaiting assembly to customer orders to mitigate 
demand variations. OU’s Sales and Marketing Manager stated: “We use order based 
manufacturing or postponement. We produce on order to avoid the problems of demand 
variations and fashion changes. So we produce what the customer requires.” PU, MU and 
NU indicated that the flexible workforce in their production processes is instrumental – in the 
event of a sudden increase in demand, they increase the number of labour shifts to enhance 
production. PU indicated they maintain multi-skilled staff in the production department who 
can be shifted between jobs to increase the quantity produced during a crisis. Others like JU 
indicated that they install multipurpose machines and shift jobs between machines in case of 
machine breakdowns or use machines to manufacture a different brand in case of raw 
material delays. JU’s Managing Director noted: “Sometimes, we experience stock-outs due to 
delay in supply or poor quality leading to production stoppages and this affects the supply in 
the market. But we try to use multipurpose machines such that when there are no raw 
materials for certain brands, there are no production stoppages. Also when some machines 
break down, others can perform the same task in their place.” 
 
 Ensuring Product Security  
Eight companies (AU, BU, DU, TU, MU, RU, PU, JU) revealed that they manage disruptions 
from e.g. product counterfeiting, dishonest employees and unfair competition by ensuring 
product security.  JU indicated that they use unique packaging to protect against competitors 
who withdraw most of the re-usable packaging material from the market with an intention of 
disrupting their (JU’s) production. Firms like BU, DU and RU revealed they install unique 
security features to protect the product against counterfeiting while MU revealed that they 
have built counterfeit detection systems into their products. Others e.g. PU and TU indicated 
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that they use tamper resistant and tamper evident product packaging. Further, they regularly 
monitor the market and change their packaging and labelling accordingly, as the Procurement 
Manager for PU, which manufactures bottled mineral water, explained: “We face a problem 
of counterfeits. We changed the label to metallic. We also changed the mould bottle. We also 
changed other features of the performance weight. No company can make a bottle of our 
neck-type.”  
4.3.6. Financial Management Strategies 
Ten companies (KU, JU, PU, MU, NU, IU, EU, LU, RU, BU, OU, CU) highlighted the use 
of financial management to mitigate financial related disruptions. These strategies are: 
borrowing from customers, effective credit recovery and insurance to recover from financial 
losses. 
 
 Borrowing from Customers 
 Companies like JU and KU reported that they borrow money from their customers. It was 
reported that raising capital through borrowing from customers is facilitated by the presence 
of informal relationships. The Marketing Manager for KU commented: “Sometimes when we 
have financial problems, our customers give us money in advance and we produce and 
supply them. It is sort of borrowing from customers. In return we give them business and 
retain them. It involves trust and loyalty and knowing each other at an individual level. I just 
give a call and money will be deposited without any agreement.” This statement shows that 
the SCRES strategy of borrowing capital from customers is enabled by the informal networks 






 Effective Credit Management  
Some firms indicated that in order to mitigate the payment threat – where dishonest 
customers or distributors for example deliberately refuse to pay for the goods advanced on 
credit, they reduce credit transactions, ask for collateral security before advancing credit or  
make appropriate contracts with clear terms and conditions regarding payments. For example, 
PU’s Procurement Manager stated: “…We ask [distributors] for deposits before we give them 
distributorship. So we use collateral and deposits to guard against those who are 
untrustworthy. We have come up with appraisals and reviews together with collateral e.g. 
buildings. So we ensure they put more valuable collateral to stop them from absconding and 
refusing to pay.” Others like RU reported they use effective credit recovery through 
monitoring the creditors as revealed by RU’s Logistics Assistant: “There are dishonest 
distributors. We have dishonest distributors. We have a customer relationship team with 
credit officers. We keep on checking on them so as to recover the money.” 
 
 Insurance  
Six companies (OU, CU, EU, KU, PU, RU) indicated that they insure against certain supply 
chain risks to get compensation and continue operating after the risk events. The risks insured 
include theft, those concerning product characteristics e.g. damages for fragile items and poor 
transport infrastructure e.g. accidents.  For example, CU’s Production and Site coordinator 
noted: “Our products are fragile. So storage is difficult and some of them are damaged 
during transportation. We also incur a lot of insurance costs and a small accident can cause 
a lot of damage.  Sometimes there is a poor road network between Kampala and Mombasa.  
But we insure against those risks so that the insurance pays.” Other companies insure their 
products against sea piracy and theft. PU’s Procurement Manager commented: “We try to 
recover the stolen raw materials through insurance company but there are hardships. Even 
recently we had broken voltage regulators but when we applied to the insurance company, 
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we have taken more than five months without getting response and we lose time in waiting.” 
EU indicated that they insure against supplier delivery failure. EU’s Procurement Manager 
stated: “We keep at least three suppliers to cater for contingencies. We give them money in 
advance and in case they fail to perform, the bank compensates us through insurance.”  
4.3.7. Human Resource Management Strategies 
 Employee Training  
Eight companies (BU, EU, HU, PU, SU, MU, LU, KU) indicated that they train their 
employees as a means to manage certain supply chain threats related to insufficient skilled 
manpower. BU claimed that training and mentoring staff helps them build an honest 
workforce and reduce dishonest employee behaviour.  BU’s Sales Manager noted: “We have 
a challenge of our staff that are unethical. They sell at a higher price and keep the 
balance…We do a lot of training and mentoring to build honesty.” On the threat of 
insufficient skilled manpower, MU’s Supply Chain Manager stated: “We had a problem of 
skilled manpower for specialised activities. We are recruiting and sponsoring workers to 
train in specialised areas.” The Depot Manager for EU argued that training employees not 
only helps in building skills, but also in building a good corporate culture that can strengthen 
internal coordination, communication and dialogue.  
     The section that follows analyses the outcomes of implementing some of the supply chain 
resilience strategies discussed above.  
4.4. Outcomes of Implementing SCRES Strategies  
Table 4.3 indicates the outcomes of certain SCRES strategies – not all strategies identified 
from the data had specified outcomes. From the data, it was found that the interviewees were 
mostly concerned with adverse or unexpected outcomes of adopting a particular strategy, e.g. 
side-effects or new threats. Where the outcomes of certain strategies were positive, 
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interviewees had no need to give further explanations. Only thirteen out of the thirty seven 
strategies that emerged from the data had adverse outcomes, suggesting that the remaining 
twenty four strategies had positive outcomes (or worked as expected). The negative aspect of 
implementing SCRES strategies has been largely neglected in the prior SCRES literature and 
a focus on this, in this section, is expected to contribute to our understanding of how SCRES 























Table 4.3: Outcomes of Implementing SCRES Strategies 
 
Strategies Outcomes 
Collaboration with suppliers  Confidentiality risk 
Limited flexibility to switch suppliers 
Poor customer delivery performance 
Supplier complacency 
Raw material delays and shortages 
Maintaining strategic stocks  Financial difficulties (focal firm)  
Stock theft  
Local sourcing Poor quality raw materials 
Product counterfeiting 
Financial difficulties (focal firm) 
Outsourcing Loss of control 
Exclusive sourcing Limited flexibility to switch suppliers 
Product recalls Distributor complacency 
Reputational risk 
Effective credit management Reputational risk 
Reduced customer base 
Quality management Raw material delays and shortages 
Employee training Labour turn-over 
Insurance  Poor customer delivery performance 
Co-opetition Confidentiality risk 
Procurement management Raw material delays and shortages 
 




4.4.1. Outcomes of collaboration with suppliers 
 Confidentiality Risk 
Companies LU and PU indicated that collaboration with suppliers results in confidentiality 
risk where sensitive information is leaked to competitors.  For example, LU’s Assistant Sales 
Manager explained: “The problem with collaboration and sharing our strategic information 
with suppliers is that when competitors also collaborate with the same suppliers, some leak 
our confidential information to competitors and we lose some of our competitive strength.” 
PU argued that the risk of losing confidential information makes them draft specific 
agreements with suppliers. PU’s Brand Manager stated: …“We share certain suppliers with 
our competitors… For big suppliers, with whom we collaborate, we still fear they can leak 
our secrets, e.g. our competitive strategies like new products. So we sign confidentiality 
agreements so that they do not release critical information.” 
 
 Limited Flexibility to Switch Suppliers 
Companies AU, JU, PU and BU indicated that collaboration with suppliers increases 
switching costs and limits flexibility to switch suppliers in case of a crisis or when new 
potentially better suppliers with more favourable terms emerge. BU’s Merchandise Manager 
explained: “Delays sometimes take up to three months and with such a shortage, our 
customers shift to competitors. We have specific suppliers with long-term collaborative 
relationships. But we find ourselves tied in a relationship and it becomes hard to switch 
suppliers.” JU argued that collaboration with suppliers requires supplier base reduction 
which can create, for example, dependence on few suppliers which can result in raw material 
delays and shortages. JU’s Trade Marketing Manager commented: “…It is important to keep 
one or a few suppliers to establish better and more collaborative relationships. The problem 
with dependence on one supplier is if ‘he’ becomes bankrupt, our business continuity is also 
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affected, we can’t get raw materials. We are tied.” This shows that the outcome of a certain 
strategy can cause the threat it was meant to mitigate.   
 
 Poor Customer Delivery Performance 
Company JU revealed that collaboration with suppliers calls for sacrifice. This is true for 
example when collaborating suppliers are unable to supply on time and they request to 
postpone delivery – affecting production schedules and leading to delayed delivery to 
customers. The Procurement and Logistics Officer for JU explained: “This was due to our 
collaborative relationship with them [suppliers]. But sometimes as you try to create a good 
relationship you sacrifice e.g. being patient and waiting due to the request from your supplier 
which affects production and delivery to customers. Customers may shift to competitors.”    
     The above example shows how implementing a resilience strategy may have inherent 
sacrifices that lead to more threats. It was found that establishing more collaborative 
relationships with suppliers to mitigate supply-side threats e.g. raw material delays and 
shortages, may result in further raw material delays and shortages. This may constrain 
production, leading to downstream problems of poor customer delivery performance and a 
reduced customer base.   
 
 Supplier Complacency 
MU indicated that collaborative and long term relationships with suppliers makes suppliers 
complacent and inefficient, especially if they realise that they have high bargaining power. 
MU revealed that some of the suppliers with whom they collaborate may not prioritise them 
or sometimes delay deliveries of raw materials during a crisis. MU’s Company Pharmacist 
stated: “Having long time collaborative relationships with suppliers…Those with high 
bargaining power may be complacent. Sometimes, they delay delivery.” Thus collaboration 
with suppliers can itself cause raw material delays and shortages.  
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4.4.2. Outcomes of Maintaining Strategic Stock 
 Financial Difficulties 
Nine companies (AU, PU, FU, MU, LU, GU, IU, JU, EU) indicated that maintaining strategic 
stocks to respond to raw material delays and shortages from e.g. long distance sourcing 
increases stock holding costs and ties up capital, particularly for expensive materials and 
spares. This results in the threat of running into financial difficulties. AU’s Marketing 
Manager stated: “Our source of raw materials is far away. So we keep stock for at least five 
months to cater for delays.  For example, materials arriving from Japan can take three 
months, which ties [up] our capital and creates financial problems.”  Companies like PU 
further revealed that they keep stock of finished goods to ensure supply continuity during 
machine breakdowns or repairs but such stocks lead to problems like expiry, which leads to 
financial loss. Further, the financial difficulties resulting from maintaining strategic stocks 
mean firms fail to pay suppliers on time or customs, resulting in a circular effect – further 
material delays and shortages. JU’s Procurement & Logistics Officer explained: “We place 
orders, but deliveries are delayed due to a lack of finances, for example to pay for customs 
clearance – sometimes because money is tied [up] in inventory ... [we] lack enough raw 
materials and this affects our production.”  
 
 Stock Theft    
Companies HU, LU and GU revealed that keeping a lot of buffers of raw materials to build 
resilience against raw material delays and shortages due to e.g. a limited local supply market 
attracts theft by dishonest employees. HU’s Marketing Manager stated:  “There are raw 
materials where we have one supplier in Uganda who also runs out of stock. Sometimes, we 
store a lot of cement but we have thieves [employees] … sometimes we would run out of stock 
unexpectedly, affecting the clients and the company … we could not fulfil the orders, which 
reduced our cash flows.”  
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     The above analysis shows that maintaining strategic stocks can produce negative outcomes 
due to socially acceptable misbehaviours of employees, resulting in problems like financial 
difficulties that affect both the upstream and downstream supply chain.  
4.4.3. Outcomes of Local Sourcing 
 Poor Quality Raw Materials 
Six companies (KU, HU, IU, JU, SU, PU) indicated that using local sourcing to mitigate raw 
material delays and shortages results in another threat of poor quality raw materials. This can 
in turn lead to the production of poor quality products and customer complaints. KU’s 
Marketing Manager explained: “… we use our own spirit [raw material] in Uganda when 
there are political problems in other areas or other delays. But the problem is that Uganda’s 
spirit is poor quality and when we use it we get problems in the market”. JU indicated that 
some dishonest local suppliers deliberately adulterate the raw materials and supply poor 
quality. JU’s Procurement and Logistics Officer noted:  “Some local companies supply poor 
quality items especially those not well established. Some deliberately adulterate the materials 
to gain more profit. The less trusted suppliers begin dodging if the product is poor quality 
and payment has already been made.” 
 
 Product Counterfeiting 
Company PU revealed that local sourcing is susceptible to product counterfeiting as some 
counterfeiters take advantage of local market knowledge. Further, some local suppliers are 
themselves counterfeiters, as PU’s Procurement Officer explained: “… to avoid stock out, we 
source local. But local sourcing is costly … We also avoid counterfeit. Counterfeiters take 





 Financial Difficulties 
PU and DU revealed that local sourcing can cause financial difficulties because local raw 
materials are expensive. Thus local sourcing is sometimes used as an emergency sourcing 
strategy especially when outsourced materials are delayed. This leads to paying for redundant 
raw materials in case the overseas consignment is finally delivered.  DU’s Marketing Officer 
stated: “…When there are delays, we go to the local market for some items. But these are few 
and expensive...So delays increase our costs whereby we look to the local market and we 
already have consignment on the way, which becomes expensive.” PU argued that local 
sourcing should be used in the short run as an emergency strategy because it is not financially 
sustainable. PU’s Procurement Officer asserted: “…We incur the cost of buying local to avoid 
keeping our machines idle. Sustained local sourcing can lead to financial problems”. 
     The above further shows how a resilience strategy against a threat at a point in the supply 
chain can produce a different threat at the same or different point in the supply chain. For 
example, local sourcing to mitigate an exogenous threat like political instabilities can create 
endogenous threats like financial difficulties and poor quality raw materials.    
 
4.4.4. Outcome of Outsourcing 
 Loss of Control 
EU and JU indicated that they use outsourcing to mitigate disruptions from delays and the 
theft of inventory by dishonest employees.  However, it was argued that engaging 
independent firms to perform certain functions deprives firms of control over processes and 
employees, resulting in the loss of flexibility to respond to certain risk events. EU’s 
Procurement Manager commented: “We outsource logistics since doing it in-house is 
financially challenging…The outsourced firms are independent and the challenge is how to 
control them. Employees are under a different management. They can’t have the flexibility we 
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need. We cannot for example force them to work overtime in case of abrupt demand.” This 
means outsourcing as a strategy to mitigate delays can cause other delays resulting from a 
loss of control, which limits flexibility.  
4.4.5. Outcome of Using Exclusive Sourcing 
 Limited Flexibility to Switch Suppliers 
Company AU argued that the use of exclusive sourcing creates dependence on suppliers and 
high switching costs, which limits flexibility to change suppliers in the case of a crisis such as 
supplier bankruptcy or inefficiency which can result in raw material shortages. AU’s 
Marketing Manager explained: “To overcome the problem of a raw materials shortage and 
few suppliers in the market, we have an established supplier for critical items with whom we 
have a long term relationship and who exclusively supplies only us…It becomes hard to 
change suppliers.” Thus, the strategy of using exclusive suppliers to create resilience against 
raw material shortages may in turn lead to the same threat through limiting flexibility to use 
alternative sources of raw materials.  
 
4.4.6. Outcomes of Product Recalls 
 Distributor Complacency 
Firm QU, which manufactures perishable products, indicated that their distributors are 
complacent about product quality since they are aware that spoilt products have to be 
withdrawn at the manufacturer’s expense. PU’s Procurement Officer explained: “We 
encourage them [distributors] to give us back the damaged products and we replace them. 
But we sometimes incur a lot of losses from these damages. Some distributors become 
complacent knowing that after all we shall withdraw the product and they do not preserve 




 Reputational Risk 
Some firms argued that product recalls are made to mitigate the consequences of poor quality 
products. HU however argued that these recalls can damage corporate reputation as well. 
HU’s Production and Operations Manager commented: “…customers complain over poor 
quality and sometimes run to competitors... This also damages our reputation as product 
recall attracts public attention.” This further shows how a strategy to build SCRES against a 
threat can in the end cause the original threat.  
4.4.7. Outcomes of Effective Credit Management  
 Reputational Risk  
Company BU reported that the financial management strategies used to create resilience 
against financial difficulties like reducing credit transactions or demanding cash payments 
resulted in downstream threats of loss of reputation and customers’ switching to competitors 
– further reducing cash flows. BU’s Export Manager noted: “We have a problem of delayed 
payments by our customers and this brings us several financial difficulties. The company 
policymakers have decided to demand cash transactions and this has made some customers 
abandon us and shift to our competitors further reducing our reputation and sales revenue.”  
 
 Reduced Customer Base  
Companies BU and DU revealed that the financial management strategy of reducing credit 
transactions can result in a threat of reduced customer base affecting the downstream supply 
chain. DU’s Marketing Officer for example argued: “… when our long-term customer closed 
down. We lost a lot of money… We got financial problems. We reduced credit to customers as 
a financial management strategy. We are now stringent. This has however reduced our 
customer base.” This reduction in customer base caused by stringent credit management was 
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again implicated in causing financial problems as BU’s Export Manager noted: “The 
company policy makers have decided to demand cash transactions and this has made some 
customers abandon us and shift to our competitors further reducing our sales revenue.” 
4.4.8. Outcome of Quality Management 
 Raw Material Delays and Shortages 
Company MU indicated that they build resilience against poor quality raw materials by 
conducting quality screening at different levels of the supply chain e.g. at suppliers’ sites, the 
parent company and firm level. But it was argued that such quality checks result in raw 
material delays and shortages.  MU’s Company Pharmacist observed: “To avoid quality 
problems, we get materials from trusted suppliers. There are several levels of screening at 
the suppliers’ site, parent company and internally at the firm level. Something can be 
advantageous in the upstream but disadvantageous downstream e.g. quality screening 
upstream but delays downstream.” This further confirms that a strategy to enhance resilience 
against a particular threat at a certain point of the supply chain may create a different threat at 
another point.  
4.4.9. Outcome of Employee Training 
 Labour Turn-over 
Four companies (CU, LU, KU, MU) indicated that they train employees to mitigate the threat 
of insufficient skilled manpower. However, this sometimes doesn’t solve the problem – 
employees move to other companies after acquiring skills. KU’s Marketing Manager 
explained: “We have unskilled staff that end up causing machine breakdowns through for 
instance overloading; and also causing injuries but we have sent some of our technical staff 
to India and Kenya to gain skills…Sometimes when they are trained they go to other 
companies where they get increased salaries.” This further shows how a strategy to create 
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resilience against a certain threat can produce consequences that cause or compound the 
original threat.  
4.4.10. Outcome of Insurance 
 Poor Customer Delivery Performance  
Company PU revealed that the use of insurance against in-transit raw material theft causes 
problems downstream. It was argued that compensation takes too long, resulting in poor 
customer delivery performance.  PU’s Procurement Officer explained: “Theft of materials 
during shipping but we aim to recover the stolen raw materials through the insurance 
company but there are hardships... we applied to the insurance company, we have taken more 
than 5 months without getting a response and we lose time in waiting, which leads to delayed 
delivery to our customers. Relying on insurance in Uganda constrains our operations.”  
4.4.11. Outcome of Co-opetition 
 Confidentiality Risk 
Company PU argues that co-opetition helps in information sharing for benchmarking 
purposes as well as borrowing raw materials in the event of delays. However, co-opetition 
creates susceptibility to confidentiality risk. PU’s Brand Manager stated: “We share certain 
suppliers with our competitors but we try as much as possible to keep confidentiality… We do 
not collaborate with some of our competitors for confidentiality reasons.”  
4.4.12. Outcome of Procurement Management  
 Raw Material Delays and Shortages 
Companies JU, MU and TU revealed that in order to overcome procurement related problems 
(like high bargaining power of suppliers that may cause supplier complacency, unfavourable 
sourcing terms and raw material delays and shortages); they manage procurement by e.g. 
consolidating purchases and buying through the parent company. It was also argued that this 
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strategy mitigates some of the problems but increases the raw material path length and 
reduces visibility (contact with suppliers). Firms reported that this in turn causes more raw 
material delays, as explained by the MU’s Company Pharmacist: “We used our parent 
company because, due to its bulk buying, they had high bargaining power …this would also 
reduce prices of raw materials … [but] this  made us fail to have direct contact with the 
suppliers. This would cause delays. Some materials were manufactured in the USA and 
China but had to pass via India.” MU reported that when they switched to sourcing some of 
the materials directly from suppliers rather than consolidating with the parent company, the 
lead time for materials reduced from six months to one month. This suggests that the strategy, 
which they had previously used to mitigate raw material delays and shortages (i.e. buying 
through the parent company), had instead caused the same threat.   
 
4.5. Concluding Remarks 
The data analysis in this chapter sought to develop a category structure from the data. This 
resulted in taxonomies of supply chain threats, SCRES strategies, and outcomes of 
implementing the strategies. The aim was to understand what actors in a developing country 
context perceive as threats to their supply chains and identify the SCRES strategies adopted 
and their outcomes in a linear way, as portrayed in the SCRES literature. This was in 
response to Research Question 1. The table in Appendix 2 presents a summary of the firms’ 
responses to each of the threats, strategies and outcomes discussed in this chapter.  
     The table in Appendix 2 will show that particular threats are more dominant than others. 
For example, political instabilities, raw material delays and shortages, product counterfeiting 
and poor customer delivery performance have been experienced by all the firms. Other 
threats e.g. natural disasters, communication barriers and national politics have been 
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identified in not more than five companies each. Further, strategies like collaboration with 
suppliers, multiple sourcing, risk communication and maintaining strategic stocks have been 
used more widely than others. Furthermore, financial and quality problems were the more 
widely highlighted outcomes of SCRES strategies. Finally, a summary of the general 
observations from findings that appear to be particularly interesting is provided. This will act 
as a springboard for the next chapter (Chapter 5). These observations include the following: 
 
General observations 
1. Firms’ Broad Understanding of the Term “Threat” 
From the interview data on threats, it became clear that interviewees had a broad 
understanding of the term “threat”. Some responses referred to threatening events and others 
to threatening conditions that produced or compounded a threat. For example, some of the 
findings like long distance sourcing, power asymmetries and being located in a landlocked 
country were highlighted by some respondents as threats to SCRES. Yet, these can be 
considered as threatening conditions – not threatening events which are emphasised in the 
SCRES literature. 
 
2. Firms Concerned with Both Chronic Threats and Endogenous Threats.  
Table 4.4a shows 1) how many distinct types of threat (as listed earlier in Table 4.1) fall 
under the headings of exogenous or endogenous; and 2) how many firms cited at least one 
threat in each category. As stated earlier and based on the accounts of the interviewees, 
endogenous threats originate from the within the supply chain, while exogenous threats 
originate from outside the supply chain. Firstly, Table 4.4a shows that all the 20 firms cited at 
least one threat in each broader category of endogenous and exogenous. This suggests 
Ugandan firms consider threats to their supply chains as both endogenous and exogenous. 
Table 4.4a also indicates that endogenous threats constituted 65.2% of all the threats that 
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emerged from the data. Similarly, Table 4.4b further summarises the distribution of firms 
over threats, strategies and outcomes that were comprehensively illustrated in Appendix 2. 
From the distribution of firms in Table 4.4b, it can be seen that each of the 20 firms cited 
more of endogenous threats than exogenous threats. This suggests most of the perceived 
threats to SCRES in Ugandan firms are endogenous rather than exogenous. These findings 
are in contrast to the prior SCRES literature, which focusses on both large-scale discrete 
events and exogenous events.  
     Further, most of these endogenous threats are chronic, suggesting that Ugandan firms are 
mostly concerned with chronic threats, e.g. product counterfeiting, raw material delays, 
financial difficulties, machine breakdowns, etc. rather than large-scale discrete events. For 
example, only 5 firms highlighted natural disasters (e.g. drought and diseases) but 17 referred 
to machine breakdowns, 20 referred to both raw material delays and shortages, and product 
counterfeiting; and 17 referred to machine breakdowns. Please see the complete distribution 
of firms over threats summary in Appendix 2. And for the summary of the number of firms 
identifying individual threats, strategies and outcomes (see Appendix 3).   
Table 4.4a: Summary Count of Endogenous and Exogenous Threats; and Respective Number 
of Respondent Firms from the Data 
 
Categories of threats Number of 
Threats per 
Category 
Number of Firms 
Citing Threats in  





Geo-political 10 20 
Economic 6 17 
Total number & 
percentage of 
exogenous threats  




Supply-side 10 20 
Firm-level 12 20 
Demand-side 8 16 
Total number & 
percentage of 
endogenous threats 







Table 4.4b: Number of Threats, Strategies & Outcomes Cited by Each Firm 
 
 Respondent Firms 
 AU BU CU DU EU FU GU HU IU JU KU LU MU NU OU PU QU RU SU TU 
Categories                     
Threats                     
Exogenous Threats 4 10 7 6 4 7 8 11 9 10 8 8 7 5 4 11 6 8 2 8 
Endogenous Threats 11 18 20 11 17 15 16 23 17 24 21 21 17 19 11 18 12 17 10 10 
                     
Resilience Strategies                     
Relationship Management 2 2 1 1 3 1 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 4 3 2 1 1 
Supply Management 6 6 6 4 8 5 6 3 8 8 3 10 11 3 3 9 2 6 3 4 
Demand Management 2 3  3 1 1 2 3 1 4 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 3 2 1 
Information Management 3 5 3 3 1 0 1 2 4 3 3 5 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 
Product Management 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 
Financial Management  0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 
Human resource management 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
                     






3. The Role of the Ugandan Environment in the Perceived Threats and Strategies 
Some of the interesting threats to SCRES appear to be particularly arising from the context of 
Uganda earlier described in Chapter 1. For example, corruption and a weak legal system, 
which have not been previously considered in supply chain risk and resilience literature, have 
been identified as threats to SCRES.  Further, the explanations for some of the threats that 
were identified in the data but which are already highlighted in the SCRES literature have 
been grounded in the study context and their explanations differ from those in the literature.  
For example, the threat of political instabilities is caused by being located in a landlocked 
country and relying on Kenya as a transit route, which makes political disruption that 
impedes transportation to, and through, Kenyan ports a problem for Ugandan suppliers and 
distributors. Analysis further showed that the threat of political instabilities is caused by e.g. 
chaotic political transitions in the Ugandan neighbouring countries of Kenya, Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Southern Sudan.  
   Similarly, some SCRES strategies are evidently either facilitated or constrained by the 
Ugandan environment. For example, co-opetition where rival firms borrow raw materials 
from each other could be attributed to a socially acceptable practice of sharing; and 
maintaining strategic stocks, which was reportedly constrained by theft from dishonest 
employees who view theft as a socially acceptable practice. The following table (4.5) shows a 
summary of the threats to SCRES that were reportedly caused or compounded by the 






Table 4.5: Threats Caused or Compounded by the Ugandan Political, Cultural and Geographical Environment 
 
 Threats  Consequences (associated threats)  
POLITICAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Political Instabilities  Raw material shortages and delays, poor customer delivery performance  
National Politics Informal sector, unfair competition, demand variations 
Weak Legal System Product counterfeiting 
Government Policy 
 
Raw material delays and shortages, order cancellations , unfair competition, unstable taxation e.g. 





Unfair competition, dishonest customers/distributors, raw material delays and shortages,  product 
counterfeiting, reduced customer base, weak legal system, poor transport infrastructure, order 
cancellations 
Product Counterfeiting  Reduced customer base,  reputational risk, poor quality raw materials 
Informal Sector  
 Unfair competition, raw material delays and shortages, reduced customer base, product 
counterfeiting, financial difficulties 
Unfair Competition  
Raw material delays and shortages, Reputational risk, poor customer delivery performance, 
reduced customer base        
Dishonest Suppliers 
 
 Financial difficulties,  supplier delivery failure,  poor quality raw materials,  raw material delays 
and shortages, unfair competition, Product counterfeiting,  reduced customer base 
Dishonest Customers/Distributors 
Financial difficulties,  Poor customer delivery performance,  reduced customer base, payment 
threat (from customers)  
Reputational risk (Negative Perceptions of 
Overseas Suppliers)  
Raw material delays and shortages 
Dishonest Employees 
 
Machine breakdowns, poor quality products, reputational risk,  reduced customer base,  financial 
difficulties, stock theft, Poor customer delivery performance, In-transit raw material theft 
Owner/Management Behaviour 
  
Procurement risk, financial difficulties, poor internal coordination, poor customer delivery 
performance, poor quality raw materials, payment threat (to suppliers/labour) 
Customer Characteristics   
Product counterfeiting,  demand variations, reduced customer base, poor customer delivery 
performance, order cancellations 
GEOGRAPHICAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Geographical Location/Landlockedness  Poor transport infrastructure and political instabilities in the transit route country 
Long distance sourcing (Due to Spatial 
Proximity) 
Raw material delays and shortages, communication barriers & poor information flow 
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4. Behavioural Influence on Threats and Strategies 
Some of the threats to SCRES identified were behavioural: they resulted from the behaviour 
of both supply network actors and other actors in the environment. Threats like owner 
management behaviour, dishonest employees, dishonest local suppliers, dishonest 
customers/distributors, corruption and poor internal coordination are clearly behavioural in 
nature. Some other threats that are seemingly non-behavioural like machine breakdowns, 
poor quality products, financial difficulties and product counterfeiting were caused by some 
of the behavioural factors mentioned above; and certain other social customs and practices. 
For example, it was found that dishonest employees deliberately destroy machines, connive 
with suppliers to inflate the costs of raw materials; and some dishonest local suppliers were 
supplying counterfeit raw materials. In the current SCRES research, behavioural factors have 
received less attention; and those that have been highlighted, like collaboration and social 
capital, have been shown only to be strategies for creating resilience, not as threats to 
resilience.  
  
5. The Need for a Systemic Analysis of Threats, Strategies and Outcomes 
Some of the threats, strategies and outcomes discussed in this chapter were not previously 
considered in the literature. Thus, in itself, this chapter makes some contribution to the 
literature. However, it was clearly difficult to explain supply chain threats in isolation. The 
causes or consequences of threats from a certain group of companies were identified by 
others as threats in their own right – thus the interrelatedness of threats was observed. For 
example, company JU reported that the threat of financial difficulties results in late payment 
to workers. In retaliation, they destroy machines, disrupt production and produce poor quality 
products deliberately. From the summary in Table 4.5 above, it is shown that certain threats 
produced or compounded other threats. It was also revealed from the data that some SCRES 
strategies reinforce each other e.g. informal networks reinforcing co-opetition; co-opetition 
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reinforcing supplier development; and using information and communication technology 
facilitating visibility and supplier development. The findings on the outcomes also revealed 
that some resilience strategies had adverse outcomes that reduce SCRES – including what 
some interviewees had identified as threats.    
      
Finally, it is argued here that, although this chapter attempts to develop taxonomies of 
threats, strategies and outcomes, individually and separately, it was clear from the findings 
that threats are interrelated and so are the strategies to mitigate them – threats lead to 
strategies, which can sometimes have adverse outcomes that require further strategies to be 
deployed. This inter-relatedness appears fundamental to how supply chains as Complex 
Adaptive Systems behave when any attempt is made to intervene in them. The second level 
of analysis is therefore intended to be more theoretical and to address this general question of 
how strategies, the threats which provoke them and the outcomes that arise, are all related. It 
is this second level of analysis that constitutes the main attempt at theory building. The table 
in Appendix 4 shows how the interrelationships were identified from the data; and these were 













SECOND LEVEL ANALYSIS: USING CAS AND EMBEDDEDNESS THEORY 
FRAMES 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents a more integrative analysis of findings using the CAS and 
embeddedness theoretical frameworks. The chapter begins with the CAS perspective which 
calls for a systemic analysis of the inter-relationships among threats (and associated 
conditions), strategies and outcomes. These interrelationships are identified from the data and 
the network constituted by these links and nodes is tabulated (Table 5.1) – this is reinforced 
with a graph and a network map (in 5.2). Two example fragments from this network are 
discussed (in 5.2.1. and 5.2.2) to show that the systemic nature of threats and strategies to 
mitigate them produce non-linear outcomes. Later, an embeddedness framework is adopted to 
explain important features of the relationships identified and the insights into resilience that 
can be gained from an embeddedness standpoint are highlighted (5.3). The chapter ends in 
5.4 with the concluding remarks, mainly indicating that the behaviour of a supply chain as a 
CAS – in this case its resilience – is determined by its embeddedness.  
  
5.2. The Complex Adaptive Systems Interpretation 
A central feature of a CAS is the way that intervention in the system can produce unexpected, 
successive adaptations within the system to the intervention, and in turn to the adaptations 
themselves. The analysis here is therefore concerned with the network of inter-relationships 
among threats (and associated conditions), strategies and outcomes that shows this quality of 
responding to endogenous and exogenous threats. The nodes from this network are given in 
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Table 5.1, which counts the number of incoming, outgoing and total links to the other nodes 
for each node. This network consists of nodes that are conditions, threats, strategies or 
outcomes with directed edges showing causation as claimed by the interviewees. These nodes 
are the categories earlier discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
 
Table 5.1: Nodes in the Network of Conditions, Threats, Strategies and Outcomes Ranked 
According to Total number of Links (Sum of Links into & out of the Node) 
 




Links out of 
the Node 
Total No. of 
Links 
1 Raw material delays and shortages 23 27 50 
2 Financial difficulties (focal firm) 18 12 30 
3 Poor customer delivery performance 20 6 26 
4 Reduced customer base 20 1 21 
5 Poor quality products 8 12 20 
6 Poor quality raw materials 10 9 19 
7 Product counterfeiting 7 12 19 
8 Machine breakdowns 6 12 18 
9 Demand variations 4 13 17 
10 Unfair competition 5 12 17 
11 Payment threat (to suppliers/labour) 5 11 16 
12 Collaboration with suppliers 7 7 14 
13 Risk communication 13 0 13 
14 Government policy 0 12 12 
15 Corruption 0 11 11 
16 Dishonest employees 1 10 11 
17 Effective contracting 10 1 11 
18 Limited local supply market 0 11 11 
19 Order cancellations 6 5 11 
20 Reputational risk 8 3 11 
21 Supplier delivery failure 2 9 11 
22 Collaboration with customers 6 4 10 
23 Collaboration with government 10 0 10 
24 Dishonest customers/distributors 1 9 10 
25 Dishonest suppliers 0 10 10 
26 Improving visibility 10 0 10 
27 Multiple sourcing 9 1 10 
28 Poor internal coordination 2 8 10 
29 Poor transport infrastructure 2 8 10 
30 Maintaining strategic stocks 7 2 9 
31 Payment threat (from customers) 3 6 9 
32 Product characteristics 0 9 9 
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33 Coopetition 7 1 8 
34 Informal sector 2 6 8 
35 Local sourcing 4 4 8 
36 Political instabilities 1 7 8 
37 Procurement risk 2 6 8 
38 Appropriate supplier selection 6 1 7 
39 Creating customer flexibility 7 0 7 
40 Financial difficulties of suppliers 1 6 7 
41 Increasing product knowledge 6 1 7 
42 Power shortages 0 7 7 
43 Supplier development 6 1 7 
44 Customer characteristics 1 5 6 
45 Insufficient skilled manpower 0 6 6 
46 Order splitting 5 1 6 
47 Outsourcing 5 1 6 
48 Owner management behaviour 0 6 6 
49 Power asymmetries (stronger 
customers) 
0 6 6 
50 Communication barriers 1 4 5 
51 Customer incentives 5 0 5 
52 Industrial disputes 1 4 5 
53 Informal networking 3 2 5 
54 Insurance 4 1 5 
55 In-transit raw material theft 3 2 5 
56 Natural disasters 0 5 5 
57 Procurement management 3 2 5 
58 Using Information Communication 
Technology 
4 1 5 
59 Backward integration 4 0 4 
60 Effective credit recovery 1 3 4 
61 Long distance sourcing 1 3 4 
62 Manufacturing flexibility 4 0 4 
63 Product recalls 2 2 4 
64 Stock theft 2 2 4 
65 Confidentiality risk 3 0 3 
66 Demand forecasting 3 0 3 
67 Employee training 1 2 3 
68 Ensuring  product security 3 0 3 
69 Exchange rate fluctuations 0 3 3 
70 Exclusive sourcing 2 1 3 
71 Financial difficulties of customers 0 3 3 
72 Limited flexibility to switch suppliers 2 1 3 
73 Market intelligence 3 0 3 
74 Power asymmetries (stronger 
suppliers) 
0 3 3 
75 Quality management 1 2 3 
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76 Unstable taxation 1 2 3 
77 Alternative transportation 2 0 2 
78 Buying instead of making  2 0 2 
79 Distributor complacency 1 1 2 
80 Enhancing proximate to customers 2 0 2 
81 Geographical location 
(Landlockedness) 
0 2 2 
82 Inter-branch stock transfer 1 1 2 
83 Inventory management 2 0 2 
84 National politics 0 2 2 
85 Weak legal system 1 1 2 
86 Borrowing from customers 1 0 1 
87 Enhancing proximity to suppliers 1 0 1 
88 Labour turnover 1 0 1 
89 Loss of control 1 0 1 
90 Supplier complacency 1 0 1 
 
     From Table 5.1, it can be seen that there are certain nodes both with many incoming and 
outgoing links – including the threats of raw material delays and shortages, financial 
difficulties (focal firm), poor customer delivery performance, poor quality raw materials and 
poor quality products. For example, there are 23 links into and 27 links out of the threat of 
raw material delays and shortages node. Likewise, there are 18 links into and 12 links out of 
financial difficulties (focal firm) node. This suggests they have many antecedents and are also 
outcomes of many other actions, e.g. side-effects of other resilience strategy 
implementations. Such highly connected threats (or hubs) are difficult to control because they 
occur and affect resilience in multiple ways – meaning they deserve much attention. For 
example, the data shows that the threat of financial difficulties (focal firm) can result from 
other threats like dishonest employees and suppliers and can lead to raw material delays and 
shortages due to failure to pay suppliers on time. This also affects the downstream supply 
chain by constraining production and delivery to customers. Financial difficulties can also 
lead to failure to pay employees who retaliate by destroying machines and deliberately 
producing poor quality products. But financial difficulties can also be an outcome of 
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resilience strategies like maintaining strategic stocks and local sourcing to mitigate raw 
material delays and shortages caused by long distance sourcing.  
     Further, it is observed from Table 5.1 that the top ranked nodes, for example the top five 
which have 20 links and above, are all threats that are internal to the supply chain. This 
suggests that the most important threats to SCRES in the context studied are perceived to be 
endogenous rather than exogenous threats. In support of the first level analysis, most highly 
ranked nodes are chronic, continuous problems, e.g. product counterfeiting, machine 
breakdowns, demand variations, supplier delivery failures, etc. A discrete and potentially 
catastrophic threat like natural disasters, for example, had only 5 outgoing links (and no clear 
causes). The first level analysis in chapter 4 shows that only 5 companies highlighted natural 
disasters. However, 17 referred to machine breakdowns and all the 20 firms to raw material 
delays and shortages.  
     Figure 5.1 presents a histogram that illustrates the degree distribution of the links between 
nodes. The figure supports Table 5.1 in showing there are a relatively small number of nodes 
involved in a large number of the links, connecting the network together. For example, there 






Figure 5.1: Degree Distribution of Links between Nodes 
 
     The Gephi software was then used to construct the network map in order to visualise the 
nature of the network as a whole of threats, strategies and outcomes that emerged. The 
generated network became too complex and densely populated to include labels of the nodes 


























Figure 5.2: A Gephi Software Generated Network of Threats (and Conditions), Strategies 
and Outcomes 
 
     The above network shows that resilience involves complex relationships – not linear 
relationships, between threats and strategies. Although many of the prior studies have focused 
on strategies for building resilience, without identifying the threats that provoke such 
strategies, the interconnectedness revealed by this study confirms that threats, strategies and 
outcomes should be considered jointly, if we are to understand resilience.  Figure 5.3 that 
follows will show that some scholars (e.g. Zsidisin & Wagner, 2010; Pettit et al., 2013), who 
have studied threats and resilience strategies simultaneously, typically emphasise that supply 
chain threats can be linked to resilience strategies in a linear way. This suggests that building 
resilience may only be about identifying threats and corresponding strategies (e.g. Pettit et al., 
2013). Figure 5.3 compares this prior perspective with the findings from this study, which 
have shown that resilience is about a complex set of threats, strategies and outcomes that 


















To analyse the network qualitatively, particular fragments were isolated from the larger 
complex network. To find the starting point of a fragment, threat nodes with no observable 
causes or precedents were identified. This was followed by tracing forward the successive 
adaptations exhibited in the network to this threat. A certain network fragment is complete 
when the last node has no observable effects or forms a closed loop. The point of analysis 
here is to reveal the general characteristics of the relationships and what this tells us about 
resilience, not to identify a canonical set of network fragments – so in what follows, two 
examples are presented only to show how CAS can help interpret and improve our 
understanding of SCRES. In reality, the network fragments are all interconnected in some 
way because the network is completely connected: there are no sub-networks that have no 
connections with the rest of the network. Thus – as will be theorised later – there is an 
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2. Pettit et al. (2013) 
Theft 
Flexibility, redundancy 
(multiple sourcing & 
strategic stocks) 
Examples of the Typical Perspective in the Prior Literature Findings of This Study 
Financial instability of 
suppliers 
 
Long distance sourcing 
 
Poor quality raw materials 
 







Collaboration with government, 
ensuring security  
 
Labour disputes 
Figure 5.3: Typical Perspective in the Prior Literature on the Relationships between Threats and SCRES 
Strategies, Compared with the Findings of this Study 
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5.2.1. Example One –The Threat of Limited Local Supply Market and Successive Adaptations  
Sixteen firms (AU, CU, FU, KU, SU, LU, EU, HU, JU, MU, NU, RU, PU, IU, QU & TU) 
highlighted the threat of a limited local supply market. Twelve of these companies argued 
that this leads to long distance sourcing, resulting in the upstream threat of delays and 
shortages of raw materials and spares. If a firm runs out of raw materials, this can halt 
production, which then disrupts the downstream network. In CU, long distance sourcing 
causes communication and information flow problems, which make it difficult to establish 
collaborative relationships with suppliers, causing further delays and shortages. Some firms 
(e.g. AU, FU, LU, MU, IU, JU, EU, HU & PU) respond to raw material shortages from long 
distance sourcing by maintaining strategic stocks. But this increases stock holding costs, 
including from theft, and ties up capital, particularly for expensive materials and spares. This 
results in the threat of running into financial difficulties. AU’s Marketing Manager stated: 
“Our source of raw materials is far away. So we keep stock for at least five months to cater 
for delays. For example, materials arriving from Japan can take three months, which ties 
[up] our capital and creates financial problems.” Further, the financial difficulties resulting 
from maintaining strategic stocks mean firms fail to pay suppliers on time or customs, 
resulting in a circular effect – further material delays and shortages. JU’s Procurement & 
Logistics Officer explained: “We place orders, but deliveries are delayed due to a lack of 
finances, for example to pay for customs clearance – sometimes because money is tied [up] in 
inventory ... [we] lack enough raw materials and this affects our production.” Figure 5.4 


































     Firms such as KU, RU & PU indicated that they use local sourcing to mitigate the 
disruptions caused by long distance suppliers, but they conceded that this compromises 
quality, which negatively affects their downstream customers. Some companies (e.g. AU, 
CU, SU, MU, RU, JU, LU, & PU) indicated that they mitigate delays by developing 
collaborative relationships with suppliers, but AU, PU and JU argued that forming deep 
relationships limits flexibility to switch suppliers when faced with a crisis, causing further 
delays and shortages.  
 PU, RU and LU reported that co-opetition, a form of collaboration with rival firms, helps 
create resilience against raw material delays and shortages. Interviewees claimed that they 
borrow materials from other firms (without interest) and replace the goods when their 
consignment arrives. PU’s Procurement Manager stated: “We work together with our 
competitors by getting raw materials from them and replacing them when ours are delivered 
Raw material delays & 
shortages  
Failure to pay 
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customs   
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Constrained information flows  
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Figure 5.4: Effects of Limited Supply Market on SCRES 
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… This kind of arrangement is facilitated by our networks as managers. We know each other 
and we communicate during crises to bail each other out.” This co-opetition strategy based 
on informal networks and social relations shows how SCRES may emerge from a mutual 
interaction between the system and other independent, rival systems. It demonstrates how the 
resilience of a supply chain as a CAS can be interlinked with other systems. The data also 
shows that this is facilitated by the embeddedness of the supply network, as will be explained 
later. Informants from LU, for example, reported that they exchange information with 
competitors to mitigate threats, e.g. reporting on dishonest distributors. But it was also 
revealed that co-opetition can present confidentiality risks. For example, PU’s Brand 
Manager stated: “We do not collaborate with some of our competitors for confidentiality 
reasons…” This implies that co-opetition can help to build resilience against supplier related 
threats, e.g. raw material shortages and delays, but it can also produce threats, e.g. related to 
information leakage. PU’s Procurement Manager also indicated that some competitors use 
their informal, social networks to bribe government officials to evade or pay fewer taxes, 
which results in unfair competition. 
The effects described above produce the non-linearity that is characteristic of a CAS. 
There is no simple, linear relationship between the disturbances experienced by the supply 
network and the reliability and availability of the final product – because they are mediated 
by a series of adaptations and effects within the network. The threat of a disturbance (delays 
and shortages of spares and raw materials) is shaped by another threat (limited local supply 
market), which triggers a condition (long distance sourcing), with the adaptation to this (e.g. 
maintaining strategic stocks) creating other threats (such as financial losses from tying capital 
up in stock). This in turn can lead to other threats and circular effects, including the 
reoccurrence of the original threat (e.g. raw material delays and shortages) but with different 
antecedents (e.g. a failure to pay suppliers or customs). Firms such as CU further revealed 
that they find it difficult to implement SCRES strategies (e.g. collaboration with suppliers) 
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against other threats due to communication barriers and poor information flow created by 
long distances from suppliers. Thus, a particular condition can affect resilience through 
multiple routes – first, by producing threats; and second, by constraining the implementation 
of other resilience strategies.  
This analysis shows that the consequences of a particular threat and/or condition, as well 
as the mitigating strategies at any point, can propagate through the supply network. Thus, in 
the process of trying to attain resilience, risk migrates rather than becomes resolved, e.g. as 
one threat becomes transformed into another. This migration of one kind of risk to another is 
generally accompanied by a movement from one point in the supply network to another (e.g. 
from upstream to downstream) – and this will be further revealed in the second example. In 
this first example, an attempt to mitigate a threat originating from the supply side (e.g. limited 
local supply market or raw material delays and shortages) caused firm level threats, such as 
financial difficulties, which caused other upstream threats such as failure to pay suppliers and 
raw material delays and shortages. Further, an attempt to mitigate these raw material delays 
and shortages through local sourcing produced a threat of poor quality raw materials and 
products that affected downstream supply chain by reducing the customer base. 
5.2.2. Example Two – The Threat of Dishonest Employees and Successive Adaptations 
Twelve firms (GU, LU, IU, TU, JU, KU, EU, HU, BU, AU, NU, & PU) indicated that 
dishonest employees disrupt the production and delivery of their products through, for 
example, product adulteration, which leads to poor quality products that affect a firm’s 
reputation with its customers; malicious machine damages (leading to breakdowns), which 
also affect product quality and require stock holding (with its associated problems); and stock 
theft, which has direct financial implications for the firm. Firms such as BU, EU, and HU 
argued that the culture of dishonesty through connivance is deeply entrenched in employees. 
But dishonest behaviour is sometimes caused by the late payment of salaries (due to financial 
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difficulties). For example, JU’s Regional Sales Manager explained that their field-based sales 
personnel sometimes disappear with company money when salaries are delayed. Likewise, 
JU’s Procurement Manager commented that workers: “… stop working, destroy machines, 
destabilize the processes and produce poor quality beer intentionally. Sometimes, we are 
unable to supply or we supply spoilt beer.” Such behaviour produces an obvious non-
linearity for the network, whereby relatively minor perturbations become amplified through 
cycles of repeated delay and protest, as evident in the closed loops of causation in Figures 5.5 
and 5.6. This non-linearity seemed clear to the informants. For example, TU’s Trade 
Marketing Manager explained: “Late staff payment is a problem that started small but has 
eventually affected the whole supply chain. Production is affected, the market is affected and 
we fail to get cash inflows to pay our suppliers.” Firms such as BU attempt to overcome 
financial difficulties so they can pay employees by using financial management strategies 
(e.g. by reducing customer credit limits and demanding cash payments). But this leads to 
reputational risk and the loss of customers, further reducing financial inflows. BU’s Export 
Manager noted: “The company policy makers have decided to demand cash transactions and 




































    
     Employee misbehaviour is a threat in its own right but it also produces other threats, e.g. 
financial difficulties, and limits the implementation of SCRES strategies against other threats. 
For example, stock theft hinders the use of strategic stocks for safeguarding against shortages 
and delivery failures, as noted by HU’s Marketing Manager: “Sometimes, we store a lot of 
cement but we have thieves [employees] … sometimes we would run out of stock 
unexpectedly, affecting the clients and the company … we could not fulfil the orders, which 
reduces our cash flows.” JU argued that a loss of income due to employee misbehaviour 
results in further staff payment problems, which in turn leads to further misbehaviour – a 
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In general, the network fragment examples discussed above help to confirm that the 
supply network should be seen as a CAS. Interventions, in the form of strategies aimed at 
responding to threats do not have simple, self-contained outcomes. Adaptations and 
consequences propagate over time and space. And the relationships between the threats 
experienced by the network and the ultimate effects are evidently non-linear and generally 
stochastic. The result is the migration of supply chain risks and a process of continuing 
adaptation. The examples demonstrate that, in building SCRES, we should be concerned with 
both the network of firms and the network of threats and conditions that produce threats, 
strategies and outcomes. Yet although the effects experienced are broadly explained by 
seeing the supply network as a CAS, the CAS framework offers little help in analysing the 
effect of context. The two examples discussed above have shown how the initiating threats, 
and many of the causal influences that have been discussed, characterise the Ugandan context 
that was earlier highlighted in Chapter 1. They show how instrumental this context is, in 
explaining why the inter-relationships that have been identified manifest. This is supported 
by Table 5.1, where most of the nodes that have no incoming links are grounded in the 
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context, e.g. government policy, corruption, insufficient skilled manpower, and geographical 
location (landlockedness). Hence, another theoretical framework – embeddedness – is 
adopted to understand how the presence of the supply network, or part of it, in a developing 
country affects its resilience. An alternative theoretical lens that would potentially help to 
interpret the data would be the institutional theory (e.g. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), as some 
findings like government policy and corruption that reportedly produce threats to SCRES 
seem to reflect the institutional pressures. But embeddedness incorporates institutions (e.g. 
Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997; Zhang, 2014) and institutions can also be embedded in other 
situations (Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997). And the embeddedness perspective goes beyond 
institutions and includes other relevant non-institutional influences, which were revealed by 
the data as causing a threat to SCRES such as geography.  
 
5.3. The Embeddedness Perspective 
Embeddedness is a multi-disciplinary concept that has been given a number of different 
meanings (e.g. Polanyi, 1944; Granovetter, 1985; Halinen & Törnroos, 1998; Hess, 2004; 
Choi & Kim, 2008). For example, Hess (2004) defined embeddedness “as the set of social 
relationships between economic and non-economic actors (individuals as well as aggregate 
groups of individuals, i.e. organizations), which in turn create distinctive patterns of 
constraints and incentives for economic action and behaviour”. Meanwhile, Halinen & 
Törnroos (1998) defined embeddedness as “companies' relations with, and dependence on, 
various types of networks.” What is common to these definitions is the idea that economic 
actors exist in, and are influenced by, networks of relationships with other economic or non-
economic actors, either directly or indirectly (Choi & Kim, 2008). This means embeddedness 
can be both voluntary and involuntary.  
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Scholars have suggested various categories of embeddedness. For example, Halinen & 
Törnroos (1998) proposed six types of embeddedness: social, political, market, technological, 
temporal and spatial. Meanwhile, Hess (2004), drawing on Polanyi (1944), Granovetter 
(1985), and Halinen & Törnroos (1998), proposed three categories: network (including 
structural and relational embeddedness), societal (including cultural and political 
embeddedness), and territorial. Based on the findings from this study, Hess’ (2004) 
categorisation seems especially relevant. The first category – network embeddedness –
comprises of structural and relational embeddedness. On the one hand, structural 
embeddedness refers to the value of a firm's structural position in a supply network that 
involves informational and reputational benefits and is influenced by some monitoring and 
controlling mechanisms (Kim, 2014). Thus, it denotes the degree of dependency of a 
company on its direct and indirect business partners in supply networks (Choi & Kim, 2008). 
Highly structurally embedded supply networks are characterised by well-established patterns 
of exchange that occur at multiple levels, high frequency of interactions, responses to events 
based on a set of routines and the presence of  transaction-specific physical investments (Kim 
et al., 2015b). On the other hand, relational embeddedness refers to the strength of 
relationships between firms in the supply network that influences the level of integration 
between them (Kim, 2014). Relational embeddedness is characterised by trust, commitment, 
free information sharing; and relational norms and shared values that govern conflict 
resolution (Kim et al., 2015b).   
     But in this particular study, the interest is not in the way that a supply chain embeds a 
particular organisation, but in the way the supply chain is embedded in a developing country 
– so the  focus is not on the network (relational and structural) embeddedness. This is 
different from prior supply chain research adopting an embeddedness perspective, which has 
focused on network (structural and relational) embeddedness. The notable recent exception is 
Wu & Pullman (2015), who also acknowledged the dominant focus of prior studies on 
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structural and relational embeddedness. The failure to focus on cultural embeddedness, for 
example, makes it difficult to understand how and why supply network agents choose to act 
the way they do and how their actions affect the supply network (Wu & Pullman, 2015), 
Further, this prior supply chain work has portrayed embeddedness as a positive phenomenon 
or facilitator (e.g. Choi & Kim, 2008; Bernardes, 2010; Gligor & Autry, 2012; Kim, 2014). 
For example, Choi & Kim (2008) explained that firms’ understanding of their suppliers’ 
structural embeddedness (described as the configuration of network of relations with 
suppliers and customers at different tiers) facilitates supplier selection and management, 
which in turn mitigates supplier performance related risks e.g. through identifying financially 
unstable suppliers. Similarly, Kim (2014) showed how an understanding of the supplier 
structural embeddedness helps to increase the level of integration between a buying firm and 
the suppliers e.g. through appropriate information exchanges.  
     Kim (2014) further argued that managing the information on the positional advantage of a 
supplier (structural embeddedness) helps in mitigating risks related to the deviant behaviours 
of suppliers, and to gain access to novel information and innovative ideas embedded in a 
network. Other scholars like Kim et al. (2015b) have explained how both structural and 
relational embeddedness between supply chain partners enhance systemic innovation through 
e.g. knowledge sharing and relationship management. Similarly, Bernardes (2010) argued 
that relational embeddedness enhances innovation, which is important for customer 
responsiveness (agility). As earlier observed, the foregoing discussion presents 
embeddedness as an entirely positive phenomenon in supply chain management. 
     Indeed, the prior literature on embeddedness beyond operations and supply chain 
management partly supports the above positive view of embeddedness. It is argued that 
embeddedness can improve collaboration, adaptation and responsiveness (Uzzi, 1997). 
Moreover, all embeddedness outcomes mentioned above e.g. increased knowledge sharing, 
collaboration, adaptation, agility, and innovation have been linked to improving SCRES (e.g. 
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Christopher & Peck, 2004; Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; Pettit et al., 2013; Golgeci & 
Ponomarov, 2013; Rajesh & Ravi, 2015). However,  it is also argued that embeddedness can 
be a source of constraints to SCRES, e.g. by promoting unethical practices (Granovetter, 
1985; Prechel & Morris, 2010) and increasing vulnerability to exogenous shocks and 
information asymmetry (Uzzi, 1997). This can be clearly understood if we consider the 
broader context in which the supply network is embedded, rather than how the supply 
network embeds entities within it. This position was recently supported by Wu & Pullman 
(2015), who contended that the behaviour of supply network partners and general 
configuration of the supply network is mainly determined by its cultural embeddedness. This 
study therefore focuses on the following three categories of embeddedness, which are related 
to the findings in Table 5.2: 
1. Cultural embeddedness: the collective understanding of beliefs, values and symbols 
that provides scripts, which guide economic strategies and goals (Dequech, 2003). 
Previous researchers (e.g. Granovetter, 1985; Hess, 2004) have argued that firms are 
embedded in certain cultural influences which constrain rational economic choices.  
Ethical reasoning, decision making and behaviour; and resultant management 
practices are embedded in different national cultures and hence vary across cultures 
based on how employees in the different cultures evaluate the legitimacy of certain 
customs and practices (Thorne & Saunders, 2002; Bandelj, 2008; Chevrier, 2009).  
2. Political embeddedness: the manner in which economic institutions and decisions are 
shaped by a struggle for power that involves economic actors and non-market 
institutions, including national policies and state legal frameworks (Hardy et al., 
2005). Political embeddedness is especially relevant to the contemporary global 
supply chains since the activities of different political stakeholders in different 
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countries influence business practices e.g. considering the role of political networks 
and lobbying in business transactions (Hardy et al., 2005).    
3. Territorial embeddedness: concerning the geographical location of business, e.g. 
spatial proximity, and different networks of relationships in that location (Halinen & 
Törnroos, 1998; Filippi et al., 2011). Territorial embeddedness includes transportation 
infrastructure, price of transportation and the nature of the land and ground in a given 
location which influence supply chain activities (e.g. Hess, 2004; Filippi et al., 2011). 
In Table 5.2 below, the categories of embeddedness i.e. political, cultural and territorial, 
identified from the data will be presented together with respective components and examples 
of threats they produce or compound, as reported by the interviewees. These have been 
discussed at length in Chapter 4, which presented all the relevant findings under a category 
structure of threats, strategies and outcomes. Table 5.2 therefore provides a summary of the 












Table5.2: Aspects of Embeddedness Revealed in the Data: Political, Cultural & Territorial Embeddedness 
 
Category 
Components & Sample Evidence from the Data  (these are 
discussed in details in Chapter 4) 




Political Instabilities  
 Chaotic political transitions that result in demonstrations, civil 
conflicts, and wars. 
 Local political conflicts, such as opposition demonstrations 
followed by violent police crackdowns  
 Political instabilities of neighbouring countries e.g. Kenya and 
Southern Sudan 
    “Sudan has been one of our main 
destinations and the war has 
affected our supply chain. 
Instabilities in Congo, Rwanda and 
Burundi affect our supply chain.”( 
GU’s Sales & Marketing 
Executive) 
- Raw material shortages 
and delays 




 Politically connected firms use their political networks to gain 
favours e.g. tax exemptions and cash hand-outs, which 
promotes unfair competition 
 National politics perpetuate corruption where business success 
in Uganda largely depends on political connections and 
patronages.  
 Politicians have engaged with and boosted the informal sector 
instead of regulating it - as means to achieve political capital 
and acquire votes to maintain their grip on power 
 Different political parties have adopted different colours as 
distinguishing features, which has greatly influenced customer 
choices especially in the fashion industry. 
     “Due to corruption, most of our 
competitors do not pay taxes on 
some materials…you know in 
Uganda things are handled with 
political influence and less 
professionalism...Some companies 
have closed due to the informal 
sector. Informal actors are 
favoured by politicians looking for 
votes.” (PU’s Procurement 
Manager)  




 Selective subsidisation and tax exemptions that create unfair 
competition 
 Policy on taxation involving unexpected tax increases 
 Policy on counterfeits where the government standards body 
(Uganda National Bureau of Standards) recommends the use 
of counterfeits rather than fight them  
 Policy on weight limits for carriage trucks leading to 
distribution cost escalations and delivery delays 
 Bureaucratic procurement policy that leads to late approvals 
and payments 
    “The government policy of 
subsidising some investors 
selectively has affected us. The 
subsidised out-compete us on price. 
This may be due to corruption or 
political connections because some 
firms are given more years of tax 
exemptions than others.” (BU’s 
Merchandise Manager) 
- Raw material delays 
and shortages 
- Order cancellations  
- Unfair competition  
- Unstable taxation e.g. 
unexpected hikes 
- Poor customer delivery 
performance 
- Demand variations 
- Product counterfeiting 
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 Donations highlighted among the causes of order cancellations 
especially for pharmaceutical firms which lead to prolonged 
storage of the initially procured raw materials  
 
Weak Legal System 
 Weak laws, including on copyright, and corruption responsible 
for frequent copyright infringements 
 Due to weak legal system, customers default on  payment, 
leading to financial crisis 
     “Our original label/logo was 
copied and because of the weak 
Ugandan law compounded by 
corruption, it will take a long time 
to have copy right laws”. (TU’s 
Route-to-Consumer Supply 
Manager) 




 Firms reported corruption e.g. in the form of bribery, conflict 
of interest, connivance, political favouritism and lack of 
transparency 
 The culture of corruption mainly originates from government 
complacency, government policy and national politics where 
political connections influence business  
 Corruption exacerbates the threat of taxation where some 
firms pay taxes while others do not.  
 Firms indicated that corruption leads to the withdrawal of 
donations by developed countries prompting the government 
to hike taxes as compensation for the lost revenue. 
     “We are in touch with government 
and Uganda Revenue Authority 
[government body] to handle 
counterfeiters. They 
[counterfeiters] may be part of the 
investigators. They get a lot of 
profit and can bribe Uganda 
Revenue Authority and other 
government staff.”(BU’s Export 
Manager) 




- Raw material delays 
and shortages  
- Product counterfeiting 
- Reduced customer base  
- Weak legal system 
- Poor transport 
infrastructure 
- Order cancellations 
Product Counterfeiting  
 Product counterfeiting is partly perpetuated by the nature of 
Ugandan customers who prefer low price to quality. Thus, 
they buy counterfeits knowingly as long they are cheaper than 
genuine products 
 Ethical culture where government employees responsible for 
fighting counterfeiting are themselves counterfeiters 
 Unethical local suppliers who deliberately deliver counterfeit 
raw materials 
      “We have a problem of people who 
produce fake products. Our 
government is not yet strict on 
people who produce concrete. They 
cannot certify people who produce 
concrete and they do not oversee 
them. Some are not registered and 
nothing is known on how they 
work…no clear standards are set 
yet.” (HU’s Production and 
Operations Manager) 
- Reduced customer base 
- Reputational risk 
- Poor quality raw 
materials 
Informal Sector  
 Managers in some industries are not willing to formerly 
register their businesses mainly to avoid taxes. This creates 
unfair competition e.g. about 80% of actors in the dairy 
industry are unregistered.  
    “Our major threat is the informal 
market. In this industry, the 
informal market is bigger than the 
formal one. These [informal actors] 
sell quite cheaply since they do not 
- Unfair competition 
- Raw material delays 
and shortages 
- Reduced customer base 
- Product counterfeiting 
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pay tax and since the majority of 
Ugandans are poor, we lose the 
market. But we also lose milk raw 
material because the informal 
market takes the largest portion”. 
(QU’s Procurement Manager)  
- Financial difficulties 
Unfair Competition  
 Price wars because some firms avoid or evade taxes due to 
corruption either by bribing tax officials or utilising their 
political connections 
 Firms use connivance to sabotage their competitors’ supply 
chain operations. For example, they collude with suppliers so 
as not to deliver raw materials to their competitors or at least 
to deliver late 
 Some firms bribe the competitors’ distributors so as to stop 
them from displaying or selling their (competitors’) products 
 Culture where firms subject their competitors  to negative 
publicity and bad mouthing 
 Firms connive with their competitors’ employees and buy 
stolen raw materials. Such culture perpetrates theft of stock, 
thereby constraining the holding of strategic stock as a 
resilience strategy  
     “We don’t have a level playing 
field…due to corruption; most of 
our competitors do not pay taxes on 
some materials. Hence our 
competitors beat us on price and 
this affects our sales [we 
experience] price wars where our 
competitors undercut us. We lose 
customers to our competitors.” 
(PU’s  Procurement Manager)  
- Raw material delays 
and shortages 
- Reputational risk 
- Poor customer delivery 
performance 
- Reduced customer base        
Dishonest Suppliers 
 Some local suppliers are dishonest and unreliable. They are 
deceptive about  their capacity and they accept orders that they 
fail to deliver 
 Suppliers have a culture of accepting business even if they 
know they do not have the products  
 Some suppliers promote unfair competition by conniving with 
the companies’ competitors to deny them raw materials, 
supply late, supply poor quality or reveal confidential 
information 
    “They bring things below 
specification e.g. less quantity and 
quality and connive with our 
employees…If you receive less 
material, you end up 
miscalculating and you run out of 
raw materials unexpectedly.” (JU’s 
Procurement Manager) 
- Financial difficulties 
- Supplier delivery 
failure 
- Poor quality raw 
materials 
- Raw material delays 
and shortages 
- Unfair competition 
- Product counterfeiting 
- Reduced customer base 
Dishonest Customers/Distributors 
 Customers or distributors refuse to pay for the products they 
are supplied with on credit and keep defecting to different 
companies 
 Customers issue post-dated cheques without funds on their 
accounts while others use their political connections to dodge 
payments for products 
     “After entrusting the distributor 
with goods worth millions, they 
disappear, refuse to pay or switch 
to competitors.  But we forward to 
the legal department to handle such 
cases. But sometimes these cases 
- Financial difficulties  
- Poor customer delivery 
performance 
- Reduced customer base 




 Some customers connive with company employees and either 
manipulate the prices and share the difference or load more 
quantity into lorries/containers than bought 
 Distributors intentionally and secretly close down their 
businesses to dodge paying for the products advanced to them 
on credit   
 Some opportunistic distributors are bribed and compromised 
by competitors to malice the companies they distribute for            
vanish due to corruption [bribery].” 






Negative Perceptions of Overseas Suppliers  
 Some overseas suppliers have a negative perception of firms 
from African countries (e.g. corrupt, likely to collapse) leading 
to denying them trade credit. 
“Most of the foreign suppliers do not 
consider African companies as 
creditworthy. Before they dispatch 
your containers you must pay in 
full…overseas suppliers have such 
negative perceptions…It might be 
due to wars, political conflicts, 
corruption or the high rate of 
collapse of companies.” (PU’s 
Procurement Officer) 
- Reputational risk 
leading to raw material 
delays and shortages 
Dishonest Employees 
 Employees connive and steal finished products and raw 
materials while in transit or when stored on the company’s 
premises 
 Employees connive with suppliers and record more quantity of 
raw materials than actually received  
 Some employees connive with suppliers and inflate the cost of 
raw materials  
 Some employees inflate the prices of finished goods and sell 
at more than the prices set by the company (retaining the 
difference)  
 Employees steal company money, deceive customers, 
deliberately produce poor quality products and cause machine 
breakdowns, sometimes as a retaliation against low and 
delayed salaries 
    “The sales staff connives with clients 
and they know the base line price 
but they show you a different price 
and they share. Even internally, in 
stores, the loading clerk would 
connive with the storekeeper, the 
sales person and the client so they 
would balance the stock but the 
physical stock would not exist.” 
(HU’s Marketing Manager) 
-  Machine breakdowns 
-  Poor quality products  
-  Reputational risk 
-  Reduced customer 
base  
-  Financial difficulties 
-  Stock theft 
-  Poor customer 
delivery performance 
-  In-transit raw material 
theft 
Owner/Management Behavior 
 In most local firms, top managers are the owners: they resist 
formal structures and fail to separate the companies’ 
operations from their own private affairs.  
 Top managers intervene in professional activities, such as 
procurement, and cause procurement risk by either making 
   “The owner makes decisions alone. 
There are purchases made without 
the knowledge of the procurement 
department. Last week the 
chairman [owner] told me there is 
- Procurement risk  
- Financial difficulties 
- Poor internal 
coordination  




duplicate purchases or purchasing poor quality items 
 Unfair treatment of employees by top management where 
some are rewarded more than others unjustifiably resulting  in 
e.g. employee unethical behaviour  
a consignment of raw materials in 
transit but the procurement 
department is not aware. This kind 
of arrangement leads to the 
purchase of poor quality raw 
materials and de-motivation of 
employees.” (JU’s Regional Sales 
Manager ) 
- Poor quality raw 
materials 
- Payment threat (to 
suppliers/labor) 
Customer Characteristics   
 Customers prefer low price to quality which increases 
vulnerability to unfair competition involving price wars 
 Ugandan customers are willing to buy counterfeit products 
knowingly (as long as they are cheaper) 
 Customers have limited product knowledge and this leads 
them to submit wrong specifications  
 Some customers economically depend on agriculture – in the 
case of bad weather, their income is very low  
    “Customers do not know enough 
about the product and are price 
sensitive. They end up moving for 
competitors or importers from 
China which is relatively cheaper 
but of low quality…There is a 
problem of counterfeit especially 
from China. Customers do not mind 
quality but price.” (OU’s Sales and 
Marketing Manager) 
- Product counterfeiting 
- Demand variations 
- Reduced customer base 
- Poor customer delivery 
performance 




 Uganda is a landlocked country and most raw material imports 
have to pass through neighbouring Kenya. 
 Political chaos in Kenya disrupts the flow of raw materials 
resulting in delays and production stoppages  
 Vulnerability to threats caused by poor road transport 
infrastructure in the transit country - Kenya  
 “Uganda, being a landlocked country, 
most of the raw materials come from 
Europe by sea, and air is not cost- 
effective. There are delays because 
we need to transport them from 
Mombasa by road. The road 
infrastructure is also poor… It takes 
around fifteen days from the seaport 
to Uganda. Transporting from 
Mombasa to Uganda is costly.” 
(MU’s Supply Chain Manager) 
-  Poor transport 
infrastructure and 
political instabilities in 




 Overseas sourcing of most raw materials and long distances 
from the suppliers  
 Long distance sourcing leads to maintaining huge stocks of 
raw materials for longer periods of time  
 Difficulties in maintaining collaborative relationships with 
distant suppliers due to communication barriers and poor 
information flow 
   “Raw materials can take a long time 
to reach us because of long 
distance sourcing and we exhaust 
the buffers. In fact as I speak, due 
to the exhaustion of our buffers, we 
are now on standstill. We cannot 
produce due to delayed raw 
materials and yet customers have 
already paid in advance.” (JU’s 
Sales and Marketing Manager)  
- Raw material delays 
and shortages 
- Communication 





 As can be observed from Table 5.2, the categories of embeddedness can overlap. Although 
a factor such as corruption can be analysed from a cultural perspective – where people may 
view it as a norm – it can also be argued to be a political factor arising from a weak legal 
system, government policy, or a lack of political will. Similarly, factors such as a weak legal 
system could be perpetuated by culture, such as where the civil society legitimises bribery. 
Further, a supply network may be embedded in political and cultural milieus due to its 
territorial embeddedness, e.g. being located in a generally underdeveloped continent with 
political immaturity and economic constraints. The remainder of this section will discuss the 
insights into resilience that can be gained from an embeddedness standpoint. 
5.3.1. Embeddedness as Both an Enabler and Inhibitor of SCRES 
The data revealed some evidence that embeddedness can enable SCRES. For example, 
through co-opetition, competitors borrow raw materials from each other to mitigate raw 
material delays. This is facilitated by the actors’ involvement in informal networks, which 
develop in a supportive cultural context. However, it was also found that embeddedness is a 
source of threat. Firms such as BU and CU attributed specific threats, such as delays and 
damage to fragile consignments – as a result of poor transport infrastructure – to the 
embeddedness of the supply network in a political and cultural context that exacerbates 
corruption. JU’s Procurement Manager argued: “This poor road network should be attributed 
to a lack of political will and corruption in African countries including Uganda … It is public 
knowledge. Corruption has now become part of the government and our daily activities. No 
bribe, no service, no survival.” Other threats were found to originate from territorial 
embeddedness, such as being located far away from the source of raw materials and in a 
landlocked country, which creates vulnerability to political instabilities in the transit route 
country. For example, PU’s Procurement Manager explained: “When there was political 
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violence in Kenya, all manufacturing companies in Uganda ran out of stocks of raw 
materials … They could not be delivered via Mombasa.” 
5.3.2. Embeddedness Causing Unexpected Adverse Outcomes from SCRES Strategies 
This study found that some SCRES strategies yielded unexpected adverse outcomes as a 
result of embeddedness. For example, maintaining strategic stocks to guard against the raw 
material delays and shortages that result from long distance sourcing may become ineffective 
due to cultural acceptance of employees stealing the stock. This is not a consequence that is 
evident from prior empirical work on SCRES that has been conducted in Western countries. 
Further, although informal networking can create resilience against certain threats (e.g. 
financial difficulties and raw material delays) and reinforce strategies (e.g. co-opetition), it 
can also act as a barrier to SCRES due to cultural and political embeddedness (e.g. when 
firms use their informal networks to avoid taxes). JU’s Procurement & Logistics Officer 
stated: “Some competitors lobby the government and dodge or pay low taxes. There is 
corruption in government where beneficiaries pay less or no tax and end up charging a lower 
price, which affects our customer base.”  
5.3.3. Different Categories of Embeddedness Combining to Produce Threats to SCRES  
The notion that the embeddedness of the supply network is both direct and indirect (Choi & 
Kim, 2008) appears to be due to its overlapping nature – being voluntarily embedded in one 
aspect implies automatic embeddedness in another (see Figure 5.7). In the data for this study, 
for example, it was found that being (voluntarily) territorially embedded in a landlocked 
country (e.g. as a location decision) implies also being embedded in the conditions of the 
transit neighbouring country involuntarily. This can be a source of vulnerability, e.g. in the 
case of political instabilities. This suggests that combinations of different forms of 
embeddedness (e.g. territorial and political) can produce threats that would not occur if one or 
234 
 
the other form were not present. For example, it can be argued that being embedded in a 
landlocked country may not be a threat to a firm’s SCRES as long as there is no political 
instability in a neighbouring transit route country. Similarly, political instability in the 
neighbouring country only becomes a threat only if a company is operating in a landlocked 
country and the politically unstable neighbouring country is in its major transit route. LU’s 
Assistant Sales Manager, for example, explained: “Being a landlocked country, most of our 
imported raw materials pass through Kenya. During the post-election violence [in Kenya] we 
lacked raw materials, which constrained production.” 







5.4. Concluding remarks  
The above findings provide important insights for furthering our understanding of SCRES. It 
was found, for example, that threats and strategies are interrelated in the sense that strategies 
to build SCRES may produce adverse outcomes in the form of new or former threats, either 
at the same or a different point of the supply network. Equally, resilience strategies may 
conflict or mutually reinforce each other. The relationships between supply chain 
phenomena, and the points where they occur in the supply chain, were reportedly caused by 
the factors emanating from the context in which the supply chains are situated. This suggests 
that the way the supply chain becomes a system is explained by its embeddedness – because 
it is embeddedness that produces or explains the nature of many of the relationships between 
threats, strategies, etc. Thus to build SCRES, we need to understand that the behaviour of a 
Territorial Embeddedness 
     (in a landlocked country) 
Political Embeddedness 
(political instability of the 
transit country) 
Threat to SCRES 
(through e.g. raw material 
delays and shortages) 
Results in 
Figure 5.7: Combined Territorial and Political Embeddedness 
Forming a Threat to SCRES 
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supply chain as a CAS is influenced by its embeddedness. Together, the CAS and 
embeddedness views therefore explain risk migration in the supply chain. And risk migration 
implies that resilience is potentially an unending process of adapting both to threats and the 
outcomes of prior adaptations. This is one of the main contributions of this research which 























DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this research has been to explore Supply Chain Resilience (SCRES) in the context 
of a developing country. This was motivated by the paucity of empirical studies on SCRES in 
the extant literature, with those that have been conducted focussing on a developed country 
context. But it is clear that developing countries are important in global supply chains and 
also face supply chain disruptions – some of which are not only unique but can result in 
disastrous consequences, including fatalities. Further, evidence suggests that the 
consequences of supply chain disruptions in developing countries can propagate to the 
developed world. Thus, there has been a need to investigate the perceived threats to supply 
chains in developing countries and to examine how firms attempt to create resilience to these 
threats. A case study analysis of a supply network of 20 manufacturing firms in the 
developing country of Uganda was conducted, leading to the research findings, which are 
reflected upon in this final chapter. This chapter therefore contains the following four 
sections:  Discussion of the contributions from the study (6.1), theoretical implications (6.2), 
developing propositions about SCRES and meaning of SCRES from the findings (6.3), 
implications of the findings for practice (6.4); and finally, the limitations and future research 
implications (6.5). 
6.1. Research Contributions 
The contributions of this thesis are built upon two research questions formulated based on the 
gaps earlier identified in the SCRES literature:    
RQ1: What are the elements of supply chain resilience in a developing country? 
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 What do manufacturing firms in Uganda perceive to be the threats to their supply 
chains? 
 What strategies do they adopt to build resilience to these threats? 
 What are the outcomes of implementing these strategies? 
RQ2:  How are threats and strategies interconnected with the outcomes? 
 What does this interconnectedness mean for supply chain resilience? 
     The first research question was answered in Chapter 4 which analysed and presented the 
findings in three broad categories and their respective sub-categories. These categories are: 
the perceived threats to SCRES, the strategies adopted to build resilience to these threats and 
the outcomes of implementing such strategies. As earlier mentioned in Chapter 4, this thesis 
concentrated on the negative outcomes because where strategies worked or had positive 
outcomes, interviewees did not need to provide further explanations. Moreover, investigating 
these negative outcomes is in itself a contribution, as besides their significant implication for 
SCRES, they have not been considered in the SCRES literature before. Although there are 
various benefits of adopting SCRES strategies, recent research points to the need to also 
empirically investigate the adverse outcomes of these strategies as suggested by 
Kamalahmadi & Parast (2016). The second research question was answered in Chapter 5, 
where the data analysis involved identifying the network of inter-relationships among threats 
(and associated conditions), strategies and outcomes, with directed edges showing causations 
as claimed by the interviewees. The emergent network of causations was qualitatively 
analysed and interpreted using a CAS theory frame. This was subsequently supplemented by 
an embeddedness perspective, resulting in new insights about SCRES. The findings from this 
research have resulted in the research contributions discussed here below. 
     To begin with, this study provides empirical evidence from a developing country context 
based on a supply network analysis. With the exception of a few notable studies (e.g. 
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Brandon-Jones et al., 2014; Scholten & Schilder, 2015), most of the studies on SCRES to 
date have used a firm as the unit of analysis (e.g. Gölgeci & Ponomarov, 2013; Gölgeci & 
Ponomarov, 2014; Ambulkar et al., 2015). Thus, by analysing a supply network of 
manufacturing firms, this study responds to the recent suggestion by Kim et al. (2015a) that a 
more appropriate level of analysis for SCRES phenomena would indeed be a supply network. 
In addition, the developing country context has provided novel findings that have not been 
considered before in the SCRES research which as hitherto established, focusses on the 
developed world. For example, findings on the perceived threats to SCRES suggest that firms 
in Uganda are mainly concerned with chronic threats like raw material delays and shortages, 
financial difficulties, machine breakdowns, product counterfeiting and quality problems, 
rather than the large-scale catastrophic events. This is in contrast to the previous empirical 
studies on SCRES, which have emphasised the high-profile catastrophic, discrete events, e.g. 
terrorist attacks, the global financial crisis, rail crashes and Hurricane Katrina (e.g. Rice & 
Caniato, 2003; Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; Johnson et al., 2013; Scholten et al., 2014).  In this 
study, the data revealed that seemingly small threats which are mainly chronic may have 
considerable consequences, and this is arguably due to the non-linearity that characterise 
supply chains as complex adaptive systems. Further, it is logical that, over time, these chronic 
threats may weaken the capacity of the supply chain to respond to large-scale events, 
meaning SCRES can be gradually lost. 
   Second, this study has enabled a comprehensive empirical analysis of threats to SCRES.  
Most of the previous studies on SCRES do not expressly discuss the threats facing supply 
chains that call for resilience – they only focus on the strategies for building resilience (e.g. 
Gölgeci & Ponomarov, 2013; Wieland & Wallenburg, 2013; Brandon-Jones et al., 2014; 
Gölgeci & Ponomarov, 2014; Ambulkar et al., 2015). Yet, the notion that the resilience of a 
supply chain should be analysed from the Complex Adaptive System (CAS) perspective (e.g. 
Day, 2014) suggests that threats and strategies should be analysed systemically and jointly, if 
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we are to understand how resilience is potentially gained or lost. Zsidisin & Wagner (2010) 
moved in this direction by linking SCRES practices to risk sources but only considered 
supply-side threats. Arguably, only Pettit et al. (2010) analysed a comprehensive list of 
supply chain vulnerabilities and argued that they should be counterbalanced with 
corresponding resilience capabilities, in order to attain the desired SCRES. However, like the 
rest of the studies on SCRES, both of these studies did not consider the outcomes of 
resilience strategies. And while they seem to suggest that supply chain threats can be linked 
to resilience strategies in a linear way, this study found that threats, strategies and outcomes 
are so interconnected to the extent that they form a complex network across different points 
of the supply network, further increasing its complexity. 
      Furthermore, some of the (sources of) threats to SCRES that have emerged from this 
study like corruption, dishonest employees and a weak legal system, were not considered in 
both Pettit et al. (2010) and Zsidisin & Wagner (2010) or elsewhere in the broader SCRES 
literature. While these previous empirical studies were conducted in the developed world, this 
study finds that threats such as mentioned above reflect the context of a developing country 
in which the supply chains are embedded. Also, some of the threats identified in this study 
and which are already highlighted in the SCRES literature, have been explained with new 
empirical evidence grounded in the context and different from that in the prior works. For 
example, the threats of theft and national politics were also identified by Urciuoli et al. 
(2014) but explained differently from how they are explained in this research. Theft, for 
example, was explained as an exogenous threat perpetrated by sea pirates while the threat of 
national politics was explained in terms of resource limitation and allocation failures in some 
countries that result in failure to combat security problems (Urciuoli et al., 2014). In contrast, 
the findings of this study reveal that theft is also an endogenous threat that is perpetrated by 
firms’ own employees, and the threat of national politics is explained in terms of political 
patronages and politicians’ perpetuation of unfair competition through e.g. corruption and 
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encouraging informal actors who dodge taxes. This unique explanation reflects the context of 
a developing country that will be discussed further as the effect of embeddedness. The above 
discussion is further summarised below in Table 6.1. 
 
 
Table 6.1: Comparing Some Findings with the SCRES Literature 
 
Existing SCRES literature  
Examples of prior 
empirical work  
Understanding of SCRES Findings from this study 
Rice & Caniato, 2003; 
Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; 
Johnson et al., 2013; 
Scholten et al., 2014.   
Emphasis on high-profile 
catastrophic, discrete events, 
e.g. terrorist attacks, the global 
financial crisis, rail crashes 
and Hurricane Katrina 
Threats to SCRES are mainly chronic 
like raw material delays and shortages, 
financial difficulties, machine 
breakdowns, product counterfeiting 
and quality problems.  
Rice & Caniato, 2003; 
Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; 
Johnson et al., 2013; 
Scholten et al., 2014.   
Emphasis on exogenous 
threats like terrorist attacks, 
the global financial crisis, rail 
crashes and Hurricane Katrina 
SCRES is about both endogenous 
threats and exogenous threats. The 
most important threats as observed in 
Chapter 5(Table 5.1) are endogenous 
(i.e. they originate from within the 
supply chain).  
 
Gölgeci & Ponomarov, 
2013; Wieland & 
Wallenburg, 2013; 
Brandon-Jones et al., 
2014; Gölgeci & 
Ponomarov, 2014; 
Ambulkar et al., 2015. 
These studies focussed only on 
SCRES strategies suggesting 
SCRES can be understood by 
e.g. investigating strategies 
without simultaneously 
considering threats and 
outcomes of these strategies 
Supply chain threats and conditions 
that produce threats; strategies and 
outcomes should be analysed 
systemically and jointly rather than 
individually and separately, if we are 
to understand how SCRES can be 
gained or lost.  
Pettit et al. 2010; 
Zsidisin & Wagner, 
2010. 
Supply chain threats and 
resilience strategies or 
capabilities can be segregated 
and linked in a linear way 
Supply chain threats and conditions 
that produce threats; strategies and 
outcomes are so strongly 
interconnected to the extent that they 
form networks of causations occurring 
at different points of the supply 
networks. 
 
     Third, in this study, Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) theory lens has been used to 
interpret the data. Although prior studies have proposed CAS as an appropriate lens for 
understanding SCRES (e.g. Hearnshaw & Wilson, 2013; Day, 2014), this is the first 
empirical work on SCRES that ascertains CAS’ practical utility. Using the CAS theory lens, 
this study found that SCRES phenomena cannot be easily explained in a linear, sequential 
way – they should be explained systemically rather than individually and separately. For 
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example, it became difficult to organise the data under different components of CAS since 
threats and strategies are interrelated and so are the components of a CAS.  
     Fourth, this study found that although CAS is useful, it is not sufficient on its own to 
clearly explain SCRES in a developing country. A supply network can be viewed as a CAS, 
but it is also important to understand the context in which the network is situated. Some of 
the most prominent threats and adverse outcomes of SCRES strategies were caused by the 
distinctive political, cultural and territorial embeddedness of the supply network in a 
developing country. This study therefore contributes by showing that both CAS and 
embeddedness are needed to jointly explain SCRES. In so doing, the study extends the 
application of embeddedness in supply chain and operations management research, where 
embeddedness has been portrayed as a purely positive concept, beyond its prior primary 
focus on the structural and relational dimensions of network embeddedness (e.g. Choi & 
Kim, 2008; Bernardes, 2010; Gligor & Autry, 2012; Kim, 2014). Only Wu & Pullman (2015) 
have recently considered cultural embeddedness, showing it to be a facilitator in cooperative 
networks in a developed country context. But empirical evidence from this research shows 
that cultural embeddedness in a developing country can also be an inhibitor of SCRES. 
Further, although embeddedness had been linked to supply chain risk (e.g. Song et al., 2012; 
Nyaga et al., 2013), and to both adaptation and responsiveness (Uzzi, 1997), it has not 
previously been applied to facilitate understanding of SCRES.  
     Finally, data analysis using CAS and embeddedness perspectives jointly revealed the 
phenomenon of ‘supply chain risk migration’, whereby implementing a particular resilience 
strategy produced another threat, either at the same or a different point in the supply network. 
The ‘supply chain threat migration matrix’ is introduced below in Figure 6.1 to illustrate that, 
in the process of creating SCRES, a threat can migrate from one form to another and/or from 
one point in the supply network to another. The horizontal axis in Figure 6.1 represents the 
threat (T) while the vertical axis represents the point in the supply network (N), e.g. in the 
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upstream or downstream. The bottom left-hand quadrant (T1NA) represents the initial point 
NA, which is threatened by T1. An attempt is therefore made to mitigate threat T1. Threat 
migration may manifest in three forms, i.e. T2NA, T1NB or T2NB. The bottom right-hand 
quadrant, T2NA, shows the transformation of a threat T1 into another threat T2 at the same 
point in the network NA. For example, analysis showed that mitigating the upstream threat of 
raw material delays and shortages by keeping strategic stocks resulted in financial 
difficulties, leading to another upstream threat of loss of reputation with suppliers due to a 
failure to pay them (see section 5.2.1). The top left-hand quadrant, T1NB, shows the 
migration of threat T1 to a different point in the network (NB). For example, mitigating the 
threat of financial difficulties resulting from defaulting customers by demanding cash 
payments resulted in a reduced customer base and cash inflows – leading to an upstream 
threat of failure to pay suppliers (financial difficulties) (see section 5.2.2). Finally, the top 
right-hand quadrant, T2NB, shows the migration of a threat (T1 to T2) and of the point in the 
network where the threat is experienced (NA to NB). For example, analysis revealed that to 
mitigate the upstream threat of dishonest suppliers who adulterated products and supplied 
poor quality materials, some companies screened quality at suppliers’ sites and conducted 
audits. But this caused raw material delays, which disrupted production schedules and led to 





























      
     The above discussion illustrates that in the process of creating resilience, some of the risks 
may not be totally eliminated – they may migrate rather than get solved. The concept of risk 
migration can be traced to the risk literature (e.g. Grabowski & Roberts, 1997; Alcock & 
Busby, 2006), but it has not previously been considered in supply chain risk and resilience 
research. Thus, unlike much of the available literature, which appears to view resilience as 
being an outcome and about responding to isolated events, this study has shown resilience to 
be a process of continual adaptation. This adaptation does not only apply to external events as 
emphasised in the literature (e.g. Rice & Caniato, 2003; Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; Johnson et 
al., 2013) but also to endogenous and chronic threats by also producing other threats that 
need further adaptations and so on. This is further supported by the relationships that 
emerged from the data, which were in the form of networks of conditions, threats, strategies 
and their outcomes at different points of the supply network (see section 5.2), meaning 
SCRES is not only about the network of firms but also about the causal network of threats 
and conditions that produce the threats, strategies and outcomes. An explanation for the 
prominence of this feature of the data was the embeddedness of the supply network, which 
produced conditions that rendered SCRES strategies ineffective or even counter-productive. 
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Figure 6.1: Supply Chain Threat Migration Matrix in the 
Continual Process of Creating Resilience 
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To date, no SCRES research has argued for resilience as a process, but beyond supply chain 
and operations management, scholars (e.g. Luthar et al., 2000), in their conceptual work, 
suggested that resilience in child development is a dynamic process and not a specific 
attribute of a child – where the latter would mean that some children can never have what it 
takes to be resilient, because they naturally do not possess the quality of resilience. Similarly, 
SCRES being revealed as a process in this research logically suggests that it is non-stationary 
and can be lost or gained with the passage of time. This supports Hamel & Valikangas 
(2003)’s conceptual analysis that resilience involves continuous reconstruction and response 
rather than merely responding to and rebounding from a one-off crisis. 
 
6.2. Theoretical Implications 
The findings of this study have some implications for the theories used i.e. complex adaptive 
systems and embeddedness. The literature on complex adaptive systems earlier discussed in 
Chapter 2 highlights features of such a system like non-linearity. In particular, previous 
researchers discuss the CAS features and relate them to the features of a supply chain (e.g. 
Pathak et al., 2007; Wycisk et al., 2008; Hearnshaw & Wilson, 2013; Day, 2014).  However, 
what they fail to explain is how and why a CAS becomes a system. This thesis contributed in 
showing that it is embeddedness that causes interconnections between different phenomena 
or entities to form a system. For example, it was found from the data that some firms use co-
opetition as a resilience strategy, where competitors borrow raw materials from each other to 
mitigate raw material delays. This was reportedly facilitated by the actors’ involvement in 
informal networks, which develop in a supportive cultural environment in which such actors 
are embedded. This example shows how embeddedness connects the otherwise independent 
firms to form a system. The findings also revealed that it is due to embeddedness that 
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resilience strategies produce contradictory outcomes, sometimes resulting in non-linearity 
e.g. where certain actions and their effects result in closed loops.  
     Further, as earlier mentioned this study extends the application of embeddedness 
framework in the supply chain and operations management literature, beyond its prior focus 
on the structural and relational dimensions and being portrayed only as a positive 
phenomenon (e.g. Choi & Kim, 2008; Bernardes, 2010; Gligor & Autry, 2012; Kim, 2014). 
This thesis argues that the cultural, political and territorial embeddedness can also be a 
hindrance or even counterproductive to supply chain and operations management. It was 
found for example that it is embeddedness that causes the phenomenon of risk migration 
earlier discussed. 
6.3. Developing Propositions about Supply Chain Resilience 
From the above research contributions, the following propositions are developed about 
SCRES: 
     First, the findings revealed that the most important threats and conditions that affect 
resilience in the developing country context studied were chronic, although large scale 
discrete events like natural disasters were also highlighted. Further, most of the important 
threats (i.e. those with many links) as observed in Chapter 5 (Table 5.1) originated from 
within the supply chain. This shows that resilience is about chronic events and conditions, 
catastrophic threats as well as endogenous and exogenous events and conditions. And figure 
6.1 shows that these threats may migrate across the network when attempts to mitigate them 
are made. This was found to be due to interconnectedness where adaptation to threats may for 
example result in other threats requiring more adaptation and so on. The relationships 
between threats, strategies and outcomes were evidently a consequence of the embeddedness 
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of the supply network in the context of a developing country. This leads to the following two 
propositions:  
Proposition 1: Supply chain resilience is a continual process of responding to threats and 
responding to the outcomes of those responses which migrate across the supply network by 
forming another network of causations of threats (and conditions that produce threats), 
strategies and outcomes. 
Proposition 2: Supply chain resilience relevant conditions and capabilities are politically, 
culturally and geographically embedded and this embeddedness is largely what makes the 
supply networks and the networks of causations (of threats and conditions that produce 
threats; strategies and outcomes) so strongly interconnected. 
Meaning of Supply Chain Resilience from the Findings 
From the propositions above, it can be concluded that supply chain resilience is a continual 
process. Most of the SCRES definitions identified in the extant literature have suggested that 
SCRES is a capability; and that it is composed of four distinct and linear stages of 
preparation, response, recovery and growth/ competitive advantage (e.g. Hohenstein et al., 
2015).  Similarly, the working definition of SCRES that was earlier put forward based on the 
literature in Chapter 2 emphasised capabilities in the meaning of resilience. Although there 
are many definitions of the term capability, the commonly cited authors like Ray et al., 
(2004) use the term ‘capabilities’ as the tangible and intangible assets firms use to develop 
and implement their strategies. This is different  from ‘business processes’ which the same 
authors define as actions (routines or activities) that firms engage in to accomplish some 
business purpose or objective. SCRES is more than just a capability – capabilities have the 
potential for providing value (e.g. improving SCRES) but that potential can be realised only 
if used in business processes (e.g. Ray et al., 2004). In this particular study, the findings 
showed that SCRES is associated more with routines or continuous activities (or the 
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processes) of responding to chronic and endogenous threats than exogenous distinctive and 
discrete threats. 
     The embeddedness theoretical perspective explained how SCRES involves the process of 
interaction between the supply chain and the environment in which it is embedded. It is this 
interaction process that explains the relationships between adaptation strategies or capabilities 
and threats/conditions and outcomes.  The findings showed that this potentially results in risk 
migration whereby threats shift to a different supply network fragment or new threats are 
created at the same or different supply network fragment. This process calls for deployment 
of more adaptation strategies/capabilities, and the cycle continues meaning SCRES process is 
continuous rather than discrete – it is not about response to a specific threat but management 
of risk migration.  In short, based on the findings of this study, the definition of SCRES has 
evolved from prior emphasis on capabilities in Chapter 2 to the process perspective, in order 
to understand how different threats and strategies/capabilities interact and respective 
outcomes in the response process.  
6.4. Implications for Practice  
In addition to the research contributions discussed above, this study has provided new 
insights for managers wishing to make their supply chains resilient. Managers should be 
aware that the threats to the resilience of their supply chains are not necessarily large-scale 
discrete events – they are also events of continuous possibilities. Hence, they should not 
underestimate seemingly small but chronic events because they are capable of gradually 
weakening the supply network, resulting in either major consequences (due to non-linearity) 
or a reduced capability to respond to future catastrophic events.  
Managers should also be aware of potential migration of supply chain threats when 
crafting strategies to build SCRES. This means their adaptation decisions, and those of 
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managers at other points in the supply network, contain latent threats that can potentially 
hinder SCRES. Rather than looking at their operation in isolation, managers should look at 
the supply chain holistically because actors along the chain are so interconnected. This 
holistic analysis is important to identify endogenous threats, which this study finds important 
for SCRES. This may be implemented through supply chain mapping to have a clear 
visibility of the entire relevant network, such that before adopting and implementing a 
SCRES strategy, its potential outcome and the response of other actors across the supply 
network are considered. Further, risk migration presupposes that managers should understand 
how threats and strategies are interconnected and what this could mean for their SCRES 
strategy implementation. The fact that SCRES strategies produce unexpected adverse 
outcomes informs managers that SCRES should not be viewed as a static phenomenon; and 
the capacity to adapt should be built into the system, so it has the flexibility to respond to 
different manifestations of threats.  
Finally, this study is not only of relevance to managers in developing countries but also to 
global sourcing managers buying from developing countries. Managers in general need to be 
aware of the context in which their supply chains are embedded if they are to understand the 
potential threats and the conditions that might render their SCRES strategies ineffective or 
even counterproductive.  
6.5. Limitations and Future Research Implications 
It is clear that there will always be trade-offs between breadth and depth in research. This is a 
case study focusing on a network of related firms in a specific context – thus the potential 
limitations in generalising results are acknowledged. But the in-depth information that a case 
study like this provides is important for generalising on theory rather than statistical 
generalisation, and this is important for theory building, especially on an emerging 
249 
 
phenomenon like SCRES, that was found to be under-explored in a developing country 
context. Future research could also be undertaken in other developing countries to obtain a 
more general insight into embedded supply networks and SCRES so as to add more validity 
to the findings. 
      Further, all firms in the network studied were manufacturing firms whereas the literature 
on SCRES reveals that service supply chains are still under-researched. Yet, disruptions in 
service supply chains can be catastrophic to human life. Further, services such as transport 
services, banking and finance, insurance, consultancy, telecommunications and healthcare 
facilitate the manufacturing sector. Thus, future research could look at the resilience of pure 
service supply chains and of services in manufacturing oriented supply chains to increase 
understanding of SCRES.  
     Another limitation of this study is its cross-sectional nature, which limits our 
understanding, such as of the process of co-evolution in building SCRES. It was found that 
SCRES involves continuously adapting to chronic threats as well as to the consequences of 
such adaptations, which depicts resilience as a dynamic process rather than a static attribute 
of a supply chain. This could also imply that a supply chain’s resilience may not be 
effectively assessed based on a discrete disruptive event – but only based on a series of events 
over time. Future research could therefore be conducted longitudinally. This would also allow 
us to understand how resilience is gained or lost over time.  
     Further, due to continuous adaptations and co-evolution, we expect actors in a supply 
chain to learn from their experiences. This could mean that SCRES develops over time such 
that firms encountering a disruption similar to one they have experienced before can respond 
better than those experiencing it for the first time – a longitudinal study may also be 
appropriate to further investigate this conjecture. Such a study could, for example, identify 
vulnerable supply chains and study them several times before and after the occurrence of 
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successive disruptive events over a long time span to understand the effect on resilience of 
learning from experience. 
     Finally, this research identified a phenomenon of threat migration but did not provide 
depth for example on this process of threat migration. This should be investigated further, for 
example, by selecting specific threats and investigating how their mitigation transforms into 
different threats or transfers them to other points in the supply network. This could be 
through a longitudinal study across a supply network. Although clearly supply chain research 
shows it is not feasible to study the entire supply chain, it can be argued that a phenomenon 
like supply chain threat migration can best be understood by analysing a relatively larger 
fragment of the network across different tiers. Supply chain mapping would be important 
before such research is undertaken, as it was found in this research that threats and conditions 
– that produce threats, strategies and outcomes – form a network of causations across 
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Name: Benjamin R Tukamuhabwa 
Department: Management Science 
Supervisors: 
Dr. Jerry Busby 
Prof. Mark Stevenson 
PART A: General information 
 Interviewee information 
 Job Title............................................................................................................................ 
 Years spent in the position............................................................................................... 
 Years spent with this company......................................................................................... 
 Can you explain your role within this company? 
 How does your role link within the supply chain decision-making processes? 
 Company information 
 Company name: .............................................................................................................. 
 Industry sector: ................................................................................................................ 
 Business starting date: ..................................................................................................... 
 Number of employees: .................................................................................................... 
 Average Turnover for the last two years………………………………………………..  
 Nature of operation (multinational or domestic).............................................................. 
 If multinational, describe the mode of entry (e.g. Direct, Franchise)…………………..  
 Core business process (e.g. manufacture of ….)……………………………………….. 
 What is the nature of your products e.g. standard, variety, customised……………….. 
 Your major suppliers (main countries/ regions)............................................................. 
 Your major customers (main countries/ regions) ……………………………………… 
 Strategic objectives of this company (e.g. cost leadership, differentiation, Focus on 
particular segment)……………………………………………………………………... 
 
PART B: Supply Chain Threats, Resilience Strategies and Outcomes 




 Supply related threats – originating from suppliers 
 Firm level threats – originating from the focal firms but affecting the upstream or 
downstream 
 Customer related threats – originating from the downstream 
 External threats – originating from outside the supply chain  
2. What strategies do you apply to build resilience against each of the threats you mentioned? 
Hint: 
 Demand management strategies 
 Supply management strategies 
 Relationship management strategies 
 Information management strategies  
 Etc. 
3. What are the outcomes of implementing each of the resilience strategies? 
Hint: Whether the strategies were successful or had side effects e.g. causing more threats. 
     General hint: For each threat mentioned, it is probed at depth including the strategies 







APPENDIX 2: Firms' Responses to Each Supply Chain Threat, SCRES Strategy and Outcome, Identified from the Data 
 
 Respondent Firms  
Total 
Firms 
 AU BU CU DU EU FU GU HU IU JU KU LU MU NU OU PU QU RU SU TU 
Categories                     
Exogenous Threats                     
Geopolitical Threats                     
Political instabilities × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 20 
Geographical 
location(landlockedness) 
     ×    ×  × ×   ×    × 6 
National politics  ×              ×     2 
Government policy  ×  ×  ×  × × ×   ×     ×   8 
Weak legal system   ×         ×        × 3 
Corruption  × ×   × × ×  × × × ×   ×    × 11 
Product counterfeiting × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 20 
In-transit raw material 
theft 
 ×     ×    ×     ×  ×   5 
Communication barriers     ×   ×   ×   ×  ×     5 
Natural disasters      × ×  ×        ×   × 5 
Economic Threats                      
Informal sector        ×        × ×    3 
Unfair competition × × × ×   × × × × × ×   × × × ×  × 15 
Poor transport 
infrastructure 
 × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × ×   17 
Unstable taxation    ×   ×  × ×      ×    × 6 
Exchange rate 
fluctuations 
 ×      × × ×        ×   5 
Power shortages × × ×     × × × × × × ×    ×   11 
Endogenous Threats                      
Supply-Side Threats                      
Power asymmetries 
related threats (stronger 
suppliers)  
    ×    ×  ×  ×        4 
285 
 
Long distance sourcing 
triggered threats 
× × ×  × ×  ×  × × × × ×  ×  × ×  14 
 AU BU CU DU EU FU GU HU IU JU KU LU MU NU OU PU QU RU SU TU  
Limited local supply 
market 
×  ×  × ×  × × × × × × ×  × × × × × 16 
Product counterfeiting   ×  ×   ×             3 
Poor quality raw 
materials 
 × × × ×  × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 18 
Dishonest suppliers  × ×  ×    × × × ×   ×  × ×   10 
Raw material delays and 
shortages 
× × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 20 
Financial difficulties of 
suppliers 
    × ×  × × × × ×  ×  × ×    10 
Supplier delivery failure   ×  × × × × × × × × × ×    ×  × 13 
Reputational risk                × ×    2 
Firm Level Threats                      
Machine breakdowns ×  × ×  × × × × × × × × × × × × × ×  17 
Product characteristics  × ×     ×     ×    × ×   6 
Owner management 
behaviour 
  ×       × × ×         4 
Dishonest employees × ×   ×  × × × × × ×  ×  ×    × 12 
Insufficient skilled 
manpower 
  ×  ×  × ×  × × × × ×  ×   ×  11 
Poor internal 
coordination 
 × ×    × × × × × ×  ×  ×     10 
Poor quality products  ×  ×  × × × × × × ×  × × × × ×  × 15 
Payment threat (to 
suppliers/labour) 
× × ×    × × × × × × × ×  ×  ×   13 
Financial difficulties 
(focal firm) 
× × × × × × × × × × × × × × × ×   ×  17 
Procurement risk  ×   ×    × ×   ×   ×     6 
Industrial disputes ×      ×   × × ×      ×   6 
Poor customer delivery 
performance 
× × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 20 
Demand-Side Threats                      
Power asymmetries   × × ×  × ×  ×  × × × ×   ×   11 
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related threats (stronger 
customers)  
 AU BU CU DU EU FU GU HU IU JU KU LU MU NU OU PU QU RU SU TU  
Dishonest customers/ 
distributors 
 × × ×  × × × × × × ×    ×  × × × 14 
Payment threat (from 
customers) 
× × × ×  × × × × × × × × ×  ×  × ×  16 
Financial difficulties of 
customers 
    × ×    ×        ×   4 
Order cancellations × × × ×  ×  ×  ×  × × × ×      11 
Demand variations  × × × × × × ×  ×   × × × ×  ×  × 14 
Customer characteristics  ×    ×  ×      × ×  ×   × 7 
Reputational risk  ×      ×   ×      ×    4 
                      
Resilience Strategies                      
Relationship 
Management 
                     
Co-opetition        × ×   ×    ×  ×   5 
collaboration with 
government 
 ×   × ×   × × ×  ×  × × × ×   11 
collaboration with 
customers 
×   ×    ×   × × × × ×      8 
collaboration with 
suppliers 
× × ×  ×    × ×  × × × × × ×  × × 14 
Informal networking     ×   ×  × ×     × ×    6 
Supply Management                      
Backward integration   ×   × ×     ×         4 
Outsourcing     ×   ×  ×  ×      ×   5 
Appropriate supplier 
selection  
 ×   ×    × ×   ×  × ×   × × 9 
Alternative 
transportation 
×           ×    ×     3 
Multiple sourcing  × × × ×  × × × × × × × × × × × × ×  17 
Supplier development     × × ×  × ×  × ×    ×  × × 10 
Maintaining strategic 
stocks 
× × × × ×  × × × × × × × ×  ×  ×  × 16 
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Buying instead of 
making (temporarily 
    × × ×     ×      ×   5 
 AU BU CU DU EU FU GU HU IU JU KU LU MU NU OU PU QU RU SU TU  
Effective contracting × × × × ×  ×  × ×  × ×  × ×     12 
Local sourcing   × ×     × × ×  ×   ×  ×   8 
Order splitting             ×   ×     2 
Enhancing proximity to 
suppliers 
           × ×        2 
Procurement 
management 
×  ×  ×    × ×  × × ×  ×    × 10 
Quality management  ×    ×   ×    ×   ×  ×   6 
Exclusive sourcing ×     ×               2 
Inter-branch stock 
transfer 
× ×           ×        3 
Demand Management                      
Creating customer 
flexibility 
 ×      ×  × × ×  × ×  × × ×  10 
Customer incentives ×   × ×  × ×  ×  ×   ×   × ×  10 
Inventory management  ×        ×   × × ×  ×    6 
Product recalls  ×  ×  × × × × × × ×    × × ×  × 13 
Demand forecasting ×   ×         ×   ×     4 
Information 
Management 
                     
Risk communication × × × × ×   × × × × × × × × × ×  ×  16 
Market intelligence × ×     ×  ×  × ×  × × ×  ×  × 11 
Increasing product 
knowledge 
 × × ×       × ×  × × × × ×   10 




 ×      × × ×  × ×        6 
Product Management                      
Manufacturing 
flexibility 
   ×      ×   × × × × ×    7 
Ensuring product 
security 
× ×  ×      ×   ×   ×  ×  × 8 
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Financial Management                       
Borrowing from 
customers  
          ×          1 
 AU BU CU DU EU FU GU HU IU JU KU LU MU NU OU PU QU RU SU TU  
Effective credit 
management 
               ×  ×   2 
 Insurance   ×  ×      ×    × ×  ×   6 
Human resource 
management 
                     
Employee training  ×   ×   ×   × × ×   ×   ×  8 
Outcomes                      
Confidentiality risk            ×    ×     2 
Limited flexibility to 
switch suppliers 
× ×        ×      ×     4 
Poor customer delivery 
performance 
         ×      ×     2 
Supplier complacency             ×        1 
Raw material delays and 
shortages 
         ×   ×       × 3 
Financial difficulties 
(focal firm) 
×   × × × ×  × ×  × ×   ×     10 
Stock theft       × ×    ×         3 
Reputational risk  ×      ×             2 
Poor quality raw 
materials 
       × × × ×     ×   ×  6 
Product counterfeiting                 ×     1 
Loss of control     ×     ×           2 
Distributor complacency                 ×    1 
Reduced customer base  ×  ×                 2 







APPENDIX 3: Number of Firms Identifying the Threats, Strategies & Outcomes 
 
Exogenous Threats No. of 
Firms 
Endogenous Threats No. of 
Firms 
Resilience Strategies No. of 
Firms 
Outcomes No. of 
Firms 
Geopolitical Threats  Supply-Side Threats  Relationship Management  Confidentiality risk 2 
Political instabilities 20 Power asymmetries related threats 
(stronger suppliers)  





6 Long distance sourcing triggered 
threats 
14 Collaboration with government 11 Poor customer delivery 
performance 
2 
National politics 2 Limited local supply market 16 Collaboration with customers 8 Supplier complacency 1 
Government policy 8 Product counterfeiting 3 Collaboration with suppliers 14 Raw material delays and 
shortages 
3 
Weak legal system 3 Poor quality raw materials 18 Informal networking 6 Financial difficulties 
(focal firm) 
10 
Corruption 11 Dishonest suppliers 10 Supply Management  Stock theft 3 
Product counterfeiting 20 Raw material delays and shortages 20 Backward integration 4 Reputational risk 2 
In-transit raw material theft 5 Financial difficulties of suppliers 10 Outsourcing 5 Poor quality raw 
materials 
6 
Communication barriers 5 Supplier delivery failure 13 Appropriate supplier selection  9 Product counterfeiting  1 
Natural disasters 5 Reputational risk 2 Alternative transportation 3 Loss of control 2 
Economic Threats  Firm Level Threats  Multiple sourcing 17 Distributor complacency 1 
Informal sector 3 Machine breakdowns 17 Supplier development 10 Reduced customer base 2 
Unfair competition 15 Product characteristics 6 Maintaining strategic stocks 16 Labour turn-over 4 
Poor transport infrastructure 17 Owner management behaviour 4 Buying instead of making 
(temporarily) 
5   
Unstable taxation 6 Dishonest employees 12 Effective contracting 12   
Exchange rate fluctuations 5 Insufficient skilled manpower 11 Local sourcing 8   
Power shortages 11 Poor internal coordination 10 Order splitting 2   
  Poor quality products 15 Enhancing proximity to suppliers 2   
  Payment threat (to suppliers/labour) 13 Procurement management 10   
  Financial difficulties (focal firm) 17 Quality management 6   
  Procurement risk 6 Exclusive sourcing 2   
  Industrial disputes 6 Inter-branch stock transfer 3   
  Poor customer delivery performance 20 Demand Management    
  Demand-Side Threats  Creating customer flexibility 10   
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  Power asymmetries related threats 
(stronger customers)  
11 Customer incentives 10   
    Inventory management 6   
  Dishonest customers/ distributors 14 Product recalls 13   
  Payment threat (from customers) 16 Demand forecasting 4   
  Financial difficulties of customers 4 Information Management    
  Order cancellations 11 Risk communication 16   
  Demand variations 14 Market intelligence 11   
  Customer characteristics 7 Increasing product knowledge 10   
  Reputational risk 4 Improving visibility 9   
    Using information communication 
technology 
6   
    Product Management    
    Manufacturing flexibility 7   
    Ensuring product security 8   
    Financial Management     
    Borrowing from customers  1   
    Effective credit management 2   
     Insurance 6   
    Human resource management    







APPENDIX 4: Table Showing Links Into And Out Of the Nodes Forming a Network of 
Conditions, Threats, Strategies & Outcomes with Corresponding Data Sources 
(Firms/Interviewees) 
 
T – threat/condition, S – strategy, O – outcomes 
 Links into the 
Node 





Data Source (Firms /Interviewees) 
T Long distance 
sourcing 







AU (MKTG), FU(CMGR), BU(DWMG), 
CU(PSCO, MKTG), KU(MKTG, GENL), 
JU(SMKT,PLMO, RMKT), PU(PROM), 
SU (APRO, FACE), MU(COMP, SCMG), 
RU (SMGR), LU(PROC), HU(MKTG), 
NU(INVG),BU(DWMG) 
T Limited local 
supply market 




SU(FACE, APRO), KU(GENL, MKTG), 
LU(PROC), CU(MKTG), AU(MKTG), 
EU(PROM), HU(PROM, MKTG), 
JU(PLMO, MAND), NU(INVG), 
MU(SCMG), RU (SMGR) 







T Limited local 
supply market 
S Order splitting Focal firm-
Supplier 
PU(PROC), 
T Raw material 
delays and 
shortages 






S Order splitting Focal firm-
Customer 
MU(COMP) 
T Long distance 
sourcing 
S Local sourcing Focal firm-
Supplier 
KU (MKTG) 













DU (MAOF). PU(PROC) 









T Raw material 
delays and 
shortages 
S Local sourcing Focal firm-
Supplier 




S Local sourcing Focal firm-
Supplier, 
KU(MKTG),JU(PROM),CU(PSCO) 
S Local sourcing   Focal firm-
Supplier, 
JU(MAND), MU(COMP) 

































PU(PROC, PROM), AU(MKTG), 
LU(PROC,), HU(MKTG), NU(INVG), 
MU(SCMG), GU(SMAE), JU(SMKT), 
RU(LASS), IU(FING), TU(CSMG), 
DU(MAOF) 


















PU(PROC), AU(MKTG), MU(SCMG), 








CU(MKTG), BU(SSUP), TU(CSMG) 
T Limited local 
supply market 










O Limited flexibility 























O Limited flexibility 





AU(MKTG), JU(TMKG), BU(MERG), 
PU(BRMG) 
O Limited flexibility 
to switch suppliers 








T/O Stock theft Focal firm-
Customer 
HU(MKTG), LU(ASMG, WARG), 
GU(SMAE) 






PU(PROC), SU(APRO), QU(PROM), 
IU(BRMG), 













TU(CSMG), GU(SMAE), QU(PROM, 
PROC),IU(BRMG), FU(CMGR), 









IU(BRMG), QU(PROM),  





























TU(CSMG), IU(BRMG), FU(CMGR), 
SU(APRO) 
T Limited local 
supply market 











TU(SCMG), SU(APRO, FACE), 
MU(SCMG, COMP), 







T Raw material 
delays and 
S Risk Focal firm-
Supplier, 
SU(APRO), OU(SMKT), BU(SSUP), 
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shortages communication Focal firm-
Customer 
CU(MKTG), QU(PROC), MU(COMP) 




























T Raw material 
delays and 
shortages 






RU (SMGR), SU(APRO), QU(PROC), 
JU(PROM), OU(SMKT), 





T Supplier delivery 
failure 














T Raw material 
delays and 
shortages 




















T Poor customer 
delivery 
performance 




KU(GENL), LU(ASMG), BU(SSUP) 
S Collaboration 
with suppliers 

















T Raw material 
delays and 
shortages 




LU(ASMG), PU(PROM), RU(LASS) 
T Machine 
breakdowns 





S Co-opetition Focal firm-
Supplier 
IU(FING) 




























































DU(MAOF), FU(CMGR), MU(COMP) 
T Government 
policy 

























































T Poor quality 
products 
S Co-opetition Focal firm-
Supplier 
HU(POMG) 





BU(DWMG), IU(BRMG), MU(COMP), 
JU(PLMO), 











BU(DWMG), JU(PLMO, RMKT) 
T Procurement risk   Focal firm-
Supplier 
EU(PROM),  






T Procurement risk Focal firm-
Supplier 

















































T Poor internal 
coordination 






































CU(PSCO), KU(GENL), JU(PROM, 
TMKG) 
T Poor internal 
coordination 

























T Poor internal 
coordination 





T Poor internal 
coordination 







T Poor internal 
coordination 













T Poor internal 
coordination 
















T Raw material 
delays and 
shortages 


























































































HU(MKTG), JU(TMKG), LU(ASMG), 
MU(COMP), NU(INVG), RU(SMGR) 






















































  Focal firm-
Customer 
DU(MAOF), GU(SMAE), JU(TMKG), 











S Procurement T/O Raw material 
delays and 
Focal firm- JU(PLMO), MU(COMP), TU(CSMG), 
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management shortages Supplier 
S Procurement 
management 














EU(PROM, DEPO), MU(COMP), 
KU(MKTG), 
T Raw material 
delays and 
shortages 
















HU(MKTG), KU(MKTG), JU(PROM) 
















































T Supplier delivery 
failure 









































HU(POMG), JU(PLMO), AU(MKTG) 













DU(MAOF), PU(PROC), AU(MKTG) 


















NU(INVG), PU(PROC), OU(SMKT) 










T Poor quality 
products 



















TU(CSMG), FU(CMGR), GU(SMAE), 
EU(DEPO), JU(PROM), PU(PROM) 
T Poor customer 
delivery 
performance 




BU(SSUP), KU(MKTG), OU(SMKT), 





















































T Payment threat 
(from customers) 




GU(SMAE), BU(MERG), DU(MAOF), 












































JU(TMKG)     
T Payment threat 
(from customers) 






























































JU(MAND, PROM, PLMO),CU(PSCO), 
KU(MKTG), NU(INVG), 
T Payment threat (to 
suppliers/labour) 




RU(SMGR), KU(MKTG), LU(ASMG), 
RU(LASS),AU(MKTG),GU(SMAE), 
JU(PROM) 
















T Payment threat (to 
suppliers/labour) 



















T Payment threat (to 
suppliers/labour) 














T Payment threat (to 
suppliers/labour) 









S Effective credit 
management 






S Effective credit 
management 
T Reputational risk Focal firm-
Customer 
BU(MERG,EXMG) 
S Effective credit 
management 













































































































































JU(PROM, RESG), BU(SMGR), 










































JU(PROM), HU(MKTG), DU(MAOF), 
T Machine 
breakdowns 







  Focal firm-
Customer 


























PU(BRMG), HU(MKTG), AU(MKTG), 






































S Order splitting Focal firm-
Customer 







DU(MAOF),  MU(SCMG,COMP), 
JU(MAND) 






























































































S Employee training O Labour turnover Focal firm-
Customer 
LU(ASMG), KU(MKTG), MU(SCMG), 
CU(MKTG) 















T Power shortages   Focal firm-
Customer 
LU(PROC), MU(COMP), RU(SMGR),  
HU(POMG),IU(BRMG), KU(MKTG) 

























































S Multiple sourcing Focal firm-
Supplier 
IU(BRMG), QU(PROM), RU(LASS), 
T Payment threat (to 
suppliers/labour) 
S Multiple sourcing Focal firm-
Supplier 
CU(MKTG) 









  Focal firm-
Supplier 
CU(MKTG), BU(EXMG) 
T Raw material 
delays and 
shortages 















































MKTG)                                                                                                                                     
T Unfair 
competition 





JU(TMKT), IU(BRMG), TU(CSMG) 
T Unfair 
competition 

































































T Reputational risk  BU(SSUP), PU(PROM) 
T Political 
instabilities 
T Reputational risk Focal firm-
Supplier 
PU(PROC), 




















T Supplier delivery 
failure 












T Supplier delivery 
failure 


























T Poor quality raw 
materials 




RU(LASS), LU(ASMG), JU(PLMO), 
NU(INVG), 
T Multiple sourcing   Focal firm-
Supplier 
OU(SMKT) 
T Raw material 
delays and 
shortages 




T Limited local 
supply market 













CU(PSCO), JU(PLMO), KU(GENL) 










T Exchange rate 
fluctuations 





IU(BRMG), RU(SMGR), JU(PROM) 








T Exchange rate 
fluctuations 

































PU(BRMG, PROC) ,LU(ASMG, PROC), 




















T Poor quality 
products 
S Product recalls Focal firm-
Customer 
FU(CMGR), TU(SCMG), JU(PLMO), 

















T Product recalls T/O Reputational risk Focal firm-
Customer 
HU(POMG) 
T Poor quality 
products 
  Focal firm-
Customer 
RU(LASS) 
T Poor quality 
products 





T Poor quality raw 
materials 







HU(POMG), GU(SMAE) IU(FING), 
DU(MAOF),KU(MKTG) 
T Poor quality raw 
materials 
  Focal firm-
Supplier,  
BU(DWMG),NU(INVG) 
T Poor quality 
products 
T Reputational risk Focal firm-
Customer 
HU(POMG),) 
T Poor transport 
infrastructure 










LU(ASMG), TU(CSMG) BU(EXMG) 
T Product 
counterfeiting 






LU(ASMG), OU(SMKT), PU(PROM), 
BU(SMGR), KU(MKTG), RU(SMGR), 
DU(MAOF), 















































T Poor quality 
products 





































































MU(COMP), RU(LASS), PU(PROM) 
T Dishonest S Ensuring  product Focal firm- AU(MKTG) 
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OU(SMKT), IU(BRMG), NU(MKTG), 
PU(PROM), AU(MKTG) BU(SMGR), 




S Multiple sourcing Focal firm-
Supplier 
BU(SSUP) 






























































































GU(SMAE), BU(DWMG, EXMG, 
MERG), KU(MKTG), GENL),PU(PROM) 
JU(PLMO) 





























































T Poor transport 
infrastructure 







JU(PROM), DU(MAOF), GU(SMAE), 














T Poor transport 
infrastructure 





T Poor transport 
infrastructure 





T In-transit raw 
material theft 
S Insurance Focal firm-
Supplier 
PU(PROC), KU(MKTG), RU(LASS) 
T Dishonest 
employees 












T Poor transport 
infrastructure 





T Poor transport 
infrastructure 


























TU(CSMG), PU(PROM), LU(ASMG) 
T Political 
instabilities 





JU(PROM), QU(PROC), MU(COMP), 
KU(MKTG), BU(SSUP, SMGR), 
HU(MKTG),SU(APRO), EU(DEPO), 



























DU(MAOF), JU(RMKT), MU(COMP, 




































































S Insurance Focal firm-
Supplier 
CU(PSCO) 
T Raw material 
delays and 
shortages 




BU(SSUP, SMGR), AU(MKTG) 









T Unstable taxation Focal firm-
Customer 
 IU(BRMG), PU(PROM), TU(CSMG), 
JU(PROM) 












T Government T Poor customer 
delivery 
Focal firm- RU(SMGR) 
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policy performance Customer 
T Poor customer 
delivery 
performance 





T Raw material 
delays and 
shortages 





T Poor transport 
infrastructure 




















S Outsourcing Focal firm-
Customer 
HU(MKTG), 








T Raw material 
delays and 
shortages 
T Order 
cancellations 
Focal firm-
Supplier, 
Focal firm-
Customer 
OU(SMKT) 
 
